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Thomas Oliver Dixon 
An Electrophysiological Examination of Visuomotor Activity Elicited by Visual Object 
Affordances 
Abstract 
A wide literature of predominantly behavioural experiments that use Stimulus Response 
Compatibility (SRC) have suggested that visual action information such as object 
affordance yields rapid and concurrent activation of visual and motor brain areas, but has 
rarely provided direct evidence for this proposition.  This thesis examines some of the key 
claims from the affordance literature by applying electrophysiological measures to well 
established SRC procedures to determine the verities of the behavioural claims of rapid 
and automatic visuomotor activation evoked by viewing affording objects.  The temporal 
sensitivity offered by the Lateralised Readiness Potential and by visual evoked potentials 
P1 and N1 made ideal candidates to assess the behavioural claims of rapid visuomotor 
activation by seen objects by examining the timecourse of neural activation elicited by 
viewing affording objects under various conditions.  The experimental work in this thesis 
broadly confirms the claims of the behavioural literature however it also found a series of 
novel results that are not predicted by the behavioural literature due to limitations in 
reaction time measures.  For example, while different classes of affordance have been 
shown to exert the same behavioural facilitation, electrophysiological measures reveal 
very different patterns of cortical activation for grip-type and lateralised affordances.  
These novel findings question the applicability of the label ‘visuomotor’ to grip-type 
affordance processing and suggest considerable revision to models of affordance.  This 
thesis also offers a series of novel and surprising insights into the ability to dissociate 
afforded motor activity from behavioural output, into the relationship between affordance 
and early visual evoked potentials, and into affordance in the absence of the intention to 
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act.  Overall, this thesis provides detailed suggestions for considerable changes to current 
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1. Chapter one  
Affordance and stimulus-response compatibility 
1.1 General introduction 
This thesis considers the synergy between vision and action as espoused in the behavioural 
SRC affordance literature.  The SRC affordance paradigm has been used to demonstrate a 
two-way relationship between vision and action wherein action possibilities contained in 
seen objects can have a profound impact on executing motor behaviours, even when the 
action possibilities are not relevant to the task at hand.  From this, deep claims have been 
made on the nature and layout of neural processes supporting these action effects.  These 
claims will be discussed in the introductory chapters.  This thesis seeks to expand this body 
of knowledge by extending the affordance SRC paradigm to include the use of 
electroencephalography (EEG) to investigate the timecourse of visuomotor activity 
associated with the affordance effect under a variety of parameters.  In the process, it will 
examine the veracity of some of the core claims and assumptions of the behavioural 
literature.   
This introductory chapter begins by briefly reviewing the rich historical context in which 
the present experimental work was undertaken. It will initially consider some of the key 
studies and principles in the history of the stimulus-response compatibility paradigm, 
which is at the core of the thesis. After this, the concept of object affordance will be 
introduced and the relation between affordance and SRC will be considered, followed by 
some philosophical grounds for the approach taken in this thesis.  
1.2 Stimulus Response Compatibility  
The paradigm at the heart of this work is the SRC paradigm. This paradigm yields the SRC 
effect, which is the name given to the increased speed and accuracy with which 
participants respond to stimulus sets that are similar to their response sets when 
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compared with stimulus sets that are different. The interpretation of the SRC paradigm has 
undergone a number of revisions and changes and has been used in a wide variety of 
contexts.  
The earliest SRC studies may be found in the work of Paul Fitts, a former US Army 
Lieutenant Colonel who became an academic studying human movement and human-
machine interactions, particularly with a view to improving aviation safety. It was in this 
context that the now seminal experiments by Fitts and Seeger (1953) provided the first 
evidence for SRC effects.  They presented participants with three different stimulus arrays, 
each matched with a response array.  Stimulus arrays consisted of lights in various 
positions around the midline of the participants.  Only some of the lights would be lit on 
each trial, and participants were tasked with moving the joysticks in the response arrays 
towards or away from whatever lights on the array were lit. This forms the parameters for 
compatibility between stimulus and response and lays out the basic format for all 
subsequent SRC studies; a dichotomy is created where stimulus and response share or do 
not share features (such as spatial location) and the trials on which these features are 
shared are termed compatible and the trails on which they are not shared and termed 
incompatible. The finding is consistently that responses are faster and more accurate on 
compatible trials than on incompatible trials.  This was an exceptional finding at the time, 
suggesting that something as apparently simple as stimulus location could interact with 
responses to yield its own effect, outside of any other experimental manipulations. 
Fitts and Seegar extended this in another experiment, having participants either use 
matched or mismatched stimulus and response arrays to complete the task 32 times over a 
ten week period.  This gave them a great deal of time to practice the relations between the 
mismatched arrays.  Additionally, from the 27th testing session a distractor task was added.  
It was found that regardless of how practiced a participant was mismatched arrays always 
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produced longer reaction times (RT), with very little change in RT overall.  This was also 
found to be true when completing a distractor task.  This led the authors make the claim 
that is at the core of the SRC literature, that SR translation effects are an integral part of 
human perception and not something that needs to be learned or that can be easily 
modified by practice or task complexity.  It shows a functional association between what is 
seen and what is done in a way that had not been seen before. 
The next key events in the history of SRC came from the work of J.R. Simon whose 
eponymous effects are very similar to those of Fitts and Seegar.  For example, Simon and 
Wolf (1963) used similar light displays to those described above that rotated relative to a 
fixed response location with a sample divided into older and younger participants.  The 
rotation of the stimulus lights was intended to vary the difficulty of the task with a view to 
identifying an effect of aging however this effect was not obtained.  Instead Simon found 
an effect of stimulus location with up to a 30% RT advantage for the most compatible 
display (where the stimulus light was rotated closest to response) compared with the least 
compatible display ( where the stimulus light was rotated furthest from response). Like 
Fitts and Seegar (1953) this result indicated that there was an interaction between 
stimulus and response sets occurring in the observer as they performed the task, where 
motor movements made in the direction of congruent visual stimulation were facilitated 
simply by virtue of the stimulation.  
Simon provided several further demonstrations of this principle and many of the later 
studies used auditory instead of visual stimuli yet still obtained analogous results and in 
doing so further expanded the providence of SRC. For example, Simon and Ruddell (1967) 
presented tones monaurally and had participants make a button press response that was 
either ipsilateral or contralateral to the tone.  Participants had shorter RTs when the 
button press was ipsilateral to the tone than when it was contralateral, mimicking the 
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visual results above. A similar effect was also demonstrated using verbal commands ‘left’ 
and ‘right’, presented to left and right ears and responded to with left and right button 
presses (Simon and Ruddell, 1967).  Simon suggested that all of these studies evinced a 
natural bias to relate our bodies to our surrounding space.  To check this interpretation 
and rule out the possibility of the results being due to a simple isomorphic association, 
Simon (1969) presented the words ‘left’ and ‘right’ to left and right ears, meaning that on 
half of the trials the word and the ear were mismatched.  It was found that when word and 
ear were matched, RT was shorter than when they were mismatched.  This shows that SRC 
effects come from information drawn from the stimulus and not a simple 1:1 relation of 
response hand to stimulus laterality.  Simon (1969) provides the final core principle in SRC 
research by presenting participants with monaural tones and the instruction to move a 
joystick towards or away from the tone on a per-block basis, altering the task relevance of 
the tone by predetermining the response.  Again, the same effects were obtained. 
From the work of Simon and of Fitts and Seegar we can draw out a number of core 
principles that characterise SRC research and will underpin the experimental work in this 
thesis: 
1. Participants respond more rapidly when stimulus and response are similar than when they 
are different. 
2. This effect is not due to an isomorphic relation between stimulus and response but rather 
is drawn from the information contained in the stimulus. 
3. The effects occur with a wide range of stimulus modalities, including visual, aural and 
linguistic stimuli. 
4. These effects are not a product of learning and are not modified by practice. 
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1.3 Object Affordance 
Affordance is the name given to the potentiation of actions that may be performed with 
seen objects and shares one of the crucial principles of SRC given above; that information 
contained within stimuli shapes perception and subsequently shapes behavioural output.  
One difference between affordance and the studies described above is that with 
affordance, that information is drawn from objects and the possible actions that may be 
performed with them rather than from the mere location of the stimulus.   
EJ and JJ Gibson first posited this concept after some years of working on perceptual 
learning (e.g. Gibson & Gibson, 1955), where they were concerned that perceptual learning 
was characterised as the improvement of amodal, global discriminatory processes which 
ultimately led to a “decreased psychophysical correspondence between perception and 
stimulation” (Gibson & Gibson, 1955). In their view, perceptual learning should be more 
interested in increasing this correspondence because the main challenge in perceptual 
learning involves dealing with novel stimuli and therefore requires a system that allows 
high quality interaction with novel stimuli that could only be facilitated by a tighter 
coupling of perception and stimulation. From this view the notion of affordances flows 
naturally, representing a mechanism by which observers may detect their relationship with 
characteristics of their environment, novel or otherwise and so be prepared for real-time 
interactions with their environment.  This is achieved by potentiating action possibilities in 
observers at the earliest stages of perception in a way that they are not merely products of 
perception, but rather that their production constitutes a central part of perception itself. 
In this way, affordances were the forerunner to more modern concepts such as situativity 
theory (Greeno & Moore, 1993) which states that cognition should be treated as the 
relationship between agents and their surroundings. It is important to note that the notion 
of affordance eschews the traditional, behaviouristic mechanics of perceptual input to 
action output. Instead it creates a loop where perceptual input becomes action 
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potentiation which shapes subsequent perceptual input and where the output is not an 
independent stage but is rather a conglomeration of the perceptual input to action 
potentiation loop formed in context of the agent’s goals. In this way, the goals and form of 
affordances are malleable and have been variously debated, reinterpreted and even 
misinterpreted (cf. Greeno, 1994). 
The idea of affordance is uniquely suited to investigation by SRC methods because if the 
principle of potentiating actions to facilitate behaviours is true, then when presenting 
objects that have properties that are matched or mismatched with response, the SRC 
effect should be obtained.  Indeed a wide variety of research has shown this to be the case 
and these experiments will be reviewed in chapter two.  
1.4 Looking backwards 
It is interesting to note that well before the work of Fitts, Simon, Gibson and colleagues, 
philosophers had for some time been appealing to similar ideas when discussing problems 
with purely computational and representationalist accounts of human function –
particularly with respect to how agents could execute their actions in real-time with such 
success– without appealing to computationally expensive representationalist accounts that 
would have agents effectively create a ‘mirror image’ of the world in their mind, 
necessitating the maintenance of a staggering amount of detailed information in order to 
execute even the most basic of actions. These representationalist accounts would frame 
agents as passive observers, however as early as 1927, philosophers such as Heidegger 
were trying to reframe these agents as active participants in the world around them who 
had no need to represent in mind the minutiae of their environment, goals and tools, but 
rather emphasised the functional coupling of objects in context of the agent’s goals as the 
core of intentional action.  This is clearly reflected in Gibson and Gibson’s (1955) emphasis 
on increasing correspondence between perception and stimulation.  This also speaks 
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clearly to the principles of SRC laid out above, wherein stimulus features (that may or may 
not be relevant to the task) that overlap with response features facilitate action by virtue 
of perceptual processes that relate body and intention to peripersonal space, yielding the 
functional coupling of task apparatus and goal that are a plausible explanation for the SRC 
effects described above.  The importance of functional coupling has also been asserted by 
more modern philosophers such as Andy Clark (1998) who gives the example of using a 
hammer to drive a nail; one does not require a rigid representation of the physical 
characteristics of the hammer, of the nail and of the relationship between these 
characteristics in order to perform mental calculations of how much force to apply or 
where to apply it in order to successfully drive the nail home.  Instead a more pragmatic 
coupling of hammer and nail could simply consist of a hammer as an object that is capable 
of achieving the goal of driving nails.  
Another philosophical grounding for the present thesis may be drawn from Merleau-
Ponty’s work. Merleau-Ponty also wanted to reduce the focus on representational 
accounts and instead emphasised the synergy of agent and world in an active perceptual 
loop, where the agent’s actions change the world, leading to a modification in the action 
plan, leading to a change in executed actions, which cause a new change in the world, 
leading to another modification and so forth. At the core of this notion again is the implicit 
importance of the relationship between agent and world, just as in Heidegger’s ideas and 
found in the work of Fitts and Seegar, of Simon and of Gibson and Gibson. Although in 
quite a different context, Merleau-Ponty (1942) gives the excellent example of trying to 
capture and hold a small, struggling animal, wherein each minute movement of the animal 
is matched rapidly and evenly by a compensatory movement from the agent holding it, 
leading to the animal attempting a new and different movement that again changes the 
agent’s grasp on the animal and so forth, in a loop. He suggested that in this way object 
properties mix with agent intentions to from an entirely new construct and that this new 
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construct is what is useful and relevant to carrying out actions in the world in real-time 
with any considerable degree of success. As Andy Clark (1998) points out, this idea is not 
dissimilar to JJ Gibson’s (1979) notion of object affordances, described above, which 
creates a similar loop between perception and action. The similarities are again drawn 
from advocating the active nature of perception, or what may be called perception for 
action, wherein merely viewing a stimulus can prepare relevant response in the viewer. 
Coming full circle, this kind of idea meshes beautifully with the results of Fitts and Seegar 
(1953) and with the work of Simon and colleagues; the RT advantages obtained in these 
studies can be explained by an implicit relation between the stimulus and the response 
that is extracted rapidly on viewing an object, and with almost no interference from 
external distractors but rather guided by simple rules relating the agent’s body to the 
space around it.  
1.5 Looking forwards 
The ideas presented above are now often collected under the umbrella of Embodied 
cognition, a highly collaborative field in which philosophers, psychologists, roboticists, 
cognitive and computational neuroscientists and others converge with the broad goal of 
making explanations of cognition that account for the problems and complexities of real-
time action by attempting to enact the principles described above. This is achieved by 
emphasising the role of the body and of the perception of external space in cognition. As 
mentioned above, this necessitates a move away from computationally expensive 
representationalist accounts and attempts to pare cognition down to its most essential 
components by offloading as much computation as possible to the body of the agent and 
their perception of their surroundings. This is not to suggest that embodied cognition is a 
single unified notion, for there is surely much debate over quite how body-world-mind 
interaction might occur and the importance of the different proportions, but it does well 
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express the spirit of the present work and the broad ideas on which it rests. Wilson (2002) 
identifies six core claims in embodied cognition; 
1. Cognition is situated; meaning that it takes place in a body or in the world and takes 
advantage of that fact and does not occur in an abstracted or homuncular representational 
space. 
2. Cognition is time-pressured; placing limits on what may be computed in time to execute 
actions successfully and therefore how they may be computed. 
3. We offload cognitive work onto the environment; as seen in the functional coupling 
observed in the SRC work cited above. 
4. The environment is part of the cognitive system; Clark (1998) asks the question, if one is 
working through a maths problem on paper, where does one’s mind end?  In one’s head, 
hands or on the page?  This is deliberately difficult to answer with certainty. 
5. Cognition is for action; this is a central notion in this thesis, it indicates that goal directed 
behaviour is what drives cognition. 
6. Offline cognition is body-based. This is one of the more contentious claims and is not a 
central focus of the present work. 
These claims are broadly agreed within the field, with a healthy level of debate. They do 
not espouse a single view point but rather, as suggested by authors such as Anderson 
(2003), form the principles at the core of a radical revision of the general approach to 
cognitive sciences and it is this general approach that is adopted by the author. Wilson 
(2002) states that not every claim is important to all work on embodiment and the claims 
central to the present treatment are that cognition is time pressured, that this is overcome 
because cognition is also situated, that the environment (and its relationship with the 
body) has a central role to play and overall, some broad, positive evidence will be provided 
that cognition is for action. 
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1.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has shown that for the better part of a century, a variety of scientists and 
philosophers have been converging on the notion of a tight, reciprocal relationship 
between perception and action with an increasing emphasis on the role of the 
environment in cognition.  They underline the importance of the relationship between 
observer and environment in agent-world interactions and suggest that there are innate 
processes in perception that use these relations to expedite behaviour where possible.  
This has been pursued in the context of learning, in the laboratory and in explaining day to 
day behaviour.  The following chapter will first examine the behavioural research that 




2. Chapter two  
Affordance and embodiment 
2.1 SRC, Affordance and Embodiment; a milieu 
Chapter one introduced the phenomenon of SRC in terms of abstract SR relations such as 
the location of a stimulus (e.g. a light or auditory tone) and its relationship with the spatial 
characteristics of a response set.  Chapter one also introduced the notion of affordances as 
espoused by Gibson and Gibson (Gibson & Gibson, 1955; Gibson, 1977).  As discussed, 
these two ideas emerged at quite different times and from quite different backgrounds, 
however they synergise well with each other and with some of the philosophical 
groundings also given in the previous chapter.  The key to this synergy can be found in the 
structure of the SRC paradigm and in the predictions made by the idea of affordances; SRC 
results are obtained by the use of matched or mismatched SR pairs, where matched pairs 
are said to better cue responses than mismatched pairs.  The core idea here is that 
matched pairs are cueing the response in the observers, similar to what Simon described 
as the natural tendency to respond toward stimulation.  Similarly, the notion at the core of 
the affordance account is that the physical structure of objects prepares the agent for 
interaction with the objects.  In both of these accounts, perceived stimulus characteristics 
are cueing behaviours.  They key difference between Simon’s and Gibson’s initial accounts 
are the types of stimuli that they consider, with Simon using abstract stimuli that do not 
have clear goals associated with them and Gibson and Gibson’s (1955) initial focus from 
their work on perceptual learning being on interaction with novel objects in what would 
generally be goal directed behaviour.  Since this time however, some researchers have 
brought these ideas together and the SRC notion of matched pairs cueing responses has 
been extrapolated to use with abstract stimuli that simulate real actions, as well as with 
real objects.  This section will consider some experiments that show how the ideas given in 
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the introduction can be unified and in so doing, will set up the theoretical approach for the 
experimental sections.   
An SRC experiment by Michaels (1988) simulated the affordance of catching by showing 
computer generated squares moving toward or away from the response location.  The 
square appeared in front of one hand at one response location and moved towards it, or 
towards the other hand at the other response location.  It was found that when squares 
appeared to be moving toward the response location, participants responded more rapidly 
than when they appeared to be moving away.  This experiment uses the SRC structure 
from Simon’s studies but was designed around and explained by Gibson’s affordances; the 
affordance of catching a moving object was mimicked by having the stimulus moving 
towards the response location.   
Crucially, a second experiment supported this interpretation by systematically varying the 
response in three locations around the body midline; participants deployed their responses 
with both hands at a location that was right, left or medial around their body midline to 
the same stimulus.  This exaggerated the correspondence between stimulus motion and 
response location to show that the results were not due to relative position or motion but 
rather to the action possibilities conferred by the destination of the moving stimulus.  It 
was found that responses were faster at a medial location than at an exaggerated left or 
right location, confirming that it was the perceived destination of stimulus movement (and 
the actions it afforded the participant) that yielded the effect, rather than the mere 
relative position.  This is what chiefly supports the affordance explanation, the functional 
association between stimulus motion and response location, rather than a simple spatial 
correspondence that is seen in the abstract SRC examples given by Simon.  If the effect was 
stronger due to relative position then an explanation such as Simon’s natural tendency 
may have been a better fit however the information contained within the SR pair here 
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appeared to yield the effect by mimicking the affordance of catching.  This study employed 
the SRC paradigm to demonstrate more than a faster response toward stimulation, it 
showed that the SRC paradigm can be used to demonstrate the existence and utility of the 
extraction of functional, action-relevant information from visual stimuli.  This is of course, 
one of the core ideas in affordance.   
The link between SRC and affordance in Michael’s work has since been expanded by a 
great many studies and of chief interest to this thesis is the work of Rob Ellis and Mike 
Tucker, who showed SRC effects with real object stimuli that appear to be solely 
attributable to the objects affordances.  Tucker and Ellis (1998) showed participants 
images of common household objects that had graspable handles.  The objects were 
pictured in their familiar upright position or were inverted.  Object handles were 
orientated to the left or right of the images and participants were asked to declare 
whether an object was upright or inverted by using a left or a right button press.  This 
yields the dimension for an SRC effect with a real object; when the required button press is 
of the same laterality as the orientation of the handle a compatible trial is created and 
when they are opposite, an incompatible trial is created.  An important feature of this 
experiment is that the orientation of the handle is not part of the task and the role of 
handle orientation was never made explicit.  An SRC effect was found with handle 
orientation yielding the effect regardless of the stimuli being upright or inverted, with 
fewer errors and more rapid responses on compatible trials than incompatible trials.  This 
effect was attributed to an affordance effect, where the object affordance was interacting 
with the planned response to yield shorter RTs.  In order to confirm this, a second 
experiment was conducted in which participants were presented the same stimuli but used 
a unimanual response, using middle and index fingers to declare the responses.  By 
removing the correspondence between response hand and stimulus rotation and limiting 
both responses to a single hand the claim of an interaction between bodily position and 
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actions afforded by the stimulus could be falsified.  With this manipulation, no effect was 
detected, supporting the results from the first experiment.  This echoes Simon (1969) who 
also used a unimanual response to show that Simon effects were not due to a simple 
isomorphic association between stimulated ear and ipsilateral effector.  However Tucker 
and Ellis’ (1998) effect is readily distinguishable from a Simon effect.  This is due to the 
central presentation of the stimulus as compared with Simon’s lateralised presentations 
and also to the use of familiar, action-relevant SR pairs instead of Simon’s (1968) abstract 
relationship between auditory stimulus and effector.  In Tucker and Ellis’ (1998) study, the 
only changes in lateralisation were the objects handle, which was the same or opposite 
side as response and always pictured centrally, unlike Simon-like stimuli which are 
generally pictured on either side of the midline of the stimulus.  Tucker and Ellis’ (1998) 
central position means that the effect cannot be explained as a Simon effect and the effect 
can only be explained by the varying affordance provided by the laterality of the objects 
handle and its relationship with the response.  A third experiment saw a change in the 
response; participants responded to images of upright or inverted common household 
objects that were oriented horizontally or vertically, requiring a wrist rotation to interact 
with them.  Participants’ forearms rested on an arm rest with their wrists extended past 
the armrest.  A tilt-switch ensured their arm was within 3° of the assigned starting position 
for each trial, which had their thumb pointing toward the 11 o’clock position; this meant 
that to grasp a vertical object (e.g. a wine bottle) required a clockwise wrist rotation and to 
grasp a horizontal object (e.g. a table knife) would require an anticlockwise wrist rotation.  
Responses consisted of a small wrist rotation and any rotation greater than 9° in either 
direction was recorded as a response.  Compatibility was determined by the relation 
between required wrist rotation, and the mapping of wrist rotation responses to object 
categories.  The familiar compatibility effect was observed.  This third experiment extends 
the results of the first two by providing another demonstration that the effect is borne of 
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the relationship between response set and the actions afforded by the objects by using a 
different type of response whilst maintaining the other aspects of the experiment and also 
shows that these compatibility effects are not limited to lateralised stimulus presentations 
but also emerge with other relations between body and stimulus. 
Although Tucker and Ellis’s (1998) results broadly match with the results from Simon and 
Fitts and Seegar (1953), there are some crucial differences that greatly affect their 
interpretation.  The objects in this study were centrally presented, undermining Simon’s 
‘natural tendency to respond towards stimulation’ explanation.  Instead, the results are 
explicable as a functional association between the relative positions of the body and the 
interactions afforded by the laterality of the objects.  Also, the dimension for compatibility 
was not made explicit, reinforcing the notion of the utility of functional associations 
connecting perception and action, because responses were influenced by the non-task 
relevant dimension of the rotation of the graspable parts of the objects simply by viewing 
the objects.  This is a great expansion on the catching affordances from Michaels (1988) 
because this not only provides an elegant demonstration of the existence of object 
affordance, it also demonstrates the utility of affordances in relating body to world to 
facilitate actions with real objects.  This also begins to creep into the territory of 
embodiment, where the implicit stimulus features cued actions and reflect Wilson’s (2002) 
description of cognition being situated and taking advantage of the world around the 
agent.  Furthermore, this result speaks to the allied notion of cognition being time-
pressured because the key result here is the reduced RT when object rotation matched 
with the planned action.  This study provides the foundation for the premise of this thesis, 
that the SRC paradigm may be used to demonstrate the functional association of visual 
stimulus characteristics with bodily state and that the results appear to best fit an 
embodied model in which object affordances provide a mechanism for enacting some of 
the Wilson’s (2002) principles of embodied cognition. 
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The principles demonstrated in Tucker and Ellis (1998) can be extended to other types of 
object affordance too.  Ellis and Tucker (2000) demonstrated another kind of affordance 
SRC effect by having participants mimic two grips whilst presenting them with images of 
objects that required those grips to interact with them.  The first grip was a power grip, 
consisting of a palmer grip with the digits folded around the object, such as one might use 
with a hammer.  The second grip was a precision grip, made with thumb and forefinger, 
such as one might use to operate a key in a lock or to pick up a single grape.  Participants 
were told which response to make by an auditory tone.  A grip-type compatibility effect 
emerged, where RTs were shorter and errors were fewer when the response grip matched 
the grip associated with the objects than when the two were mismatched.  This mirrors the 
result from Tucker and Ellis (1998) with another kind of affordance, reinforcing the claim 
that the objects affordance is what yields these effects.  Also, because participants used 
both response devices in a single hand this supports the claim that the effect is not a 
simple isomorphic association but really is about the functional association between visual 
input and available actions.  A second experiment used wrist rotations that were matched 
or mismatched with the wrist rotations required to interact with the stimuli, similar to 
Tucker and Ellis (1998) but as in experiment one, had responses cued by an auditory tone.  
In this experiment, the stimulus had also disappeared before the response was made.  
Again, this yielded a compatibility effect based on the object affordance and again, this is 
taken as further evidence that viewing objects potentiates the actions that are afforded by 
them in the observer, which is the claim at the heart of affordances.  As with the previous 
study, these results are not attributable to Simon’s claim that humans respond more 
rapidly toward stimulation because the stimuli were centrally pictured and both responses 
were made with a single hand.  Ellis and Tucker (2000) note that the size of these effects is 
small but that this is sensible and necessary to avoid afforded actions disrupting active 
goal-directed actions, indicating the real-world utility of the phenomenon as preparing and 
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facilitating actions, but not dictating them.  Taken together, these studies provide 
converging evidence from three types of affordance that seen objects, even when not task 
relevant, appear to facilitate actions or components of actions, that are similar.  It appears 
that some process is rapidly extracting action possibilities from viewed objects and that 
this influences motor processing very rapidly, likely during the planning stage of making a 
response and certainly before the participant is able to respond.  This hints at a tight link 
between visual and motor processes where the apparent visual extraction of motoric 
properties of the stimulus has led some researchers to characterise this system as neither 
purely visual nor purely motor but instead as a combination of the two; visuomotor.  That 
said, it does not provide direct evidence for such a link and this shall be the part of the goal 
of this thesis. 
The evidence for this position does not only come from SRC studies.  Symes, Ellis, Tucker 
and Ottoboni (2008) conducted a change blindness experiment, a paradigm in which 
participants are presented with two identical images that switch back and forth, containing 
one substantial change between each image.  Participants are asked to identify the change 
and it often takes several seconds for them to do so (cf. Grimes, 1996; Simons & Levin, 
1997).  In Symes et al. (2008) participants were shown repeatedly switching images of 
arrays of twelve objects between which a single object would change.  In this case, one of 
twelve stimuli would be replaced by a similar stimulus, for example a strawberry was 
replaced by a cherry.  These objects were all compatible with precision or power grips and 
participants were asked to signal their responses by making one grip or another, using the 
response devices from Ellis and Tucker (2000).  Change blindness paradigms are 
intentionally difficult and response times can be much longer than in conventional RT 
experiments, such as the SRC paradigm.  It was found that when the changing object was 
compatible with the participant’s prepared grip the RT was reduced by an average of 
372ms.  This provides a different demonstration of the principles outlined above.  In some 
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ways this is a more direct demonstration of the visuomotor nature of perception because 
the preparation of a grip is seen to directly influence how the visual scene is perceived.  
This also speaks directly to Wilson’s (2002) tenets of embodied cognition, with perceptual 
work being offloaded to the effectors and reducing reaction times greatly.   
An older study by Craighero, Fadiga, Umiltà and Rizzolatti (1996) used task-irrelevant 
primes during a task that involved grasping a bar.  The task-irrelevant primes were either 
congruent or incongruent with the position of the bar that was to be grasped.  Primes 
consisted of drawings of a circle, a rectangle rotated 45° clockwise or a rectangle rotated 
45° anticlockwise.  The bar was rotated 45° clockwise or anticlockwise, offering a 
dimension for compatibility with the prime.  They found that when the primes were 
congruent with the bar, responses were facilitated. They described this result as the first 
evidence for visuomotor priming by irrelevant stimuli, again supporting the notion of 
integrated visual and motor systems.  An interesting feature of this study is that the result 
is almost the inverse of Symes et al. (2008) with perception of irrelevant drawings 
influencing the grasp, rather than the prepared grasp influencing the perception of visual 
stimuli.  This again speaks to a reciprocal relationship between vision and action. 
Similar evidence for these principles may be drawn from Gutteling, Kenemans and Neggers 
(2011) who sought to provide direct evidence of the influence of the motor system over 
early stages of perception.  They did this by comparing the results of grasping and pointing 
to a bar during an orientation discrimination task.  Crucially, the bar could slightly change 
its orientation during the trials.  They found increased sensitivity to orientation changes 
when grasping the bar instead of pointing at it.  In a control experiment, the bar remained 
static and researchers varied the luminance of the bar, a property that is not relevant for 
grasping or pointing behaviours.  When the bar remained static and only luminance varied 
no effects were found whether gripping or pointing at the bar.  The authors suggest that 
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this is the first direct evidence of visual features influencing action preparation, leading on 
from a large body of indirect evidence such as that cited so far. Gutteling et al. suggest a 
neuronal feedback explanation for these effects, with motor planning areas feeding into 
early visual cortex.  As suggested above, this study represents another strong piece of 
evidence for a functional coupling of vision and action and as the authors suggest, it is 
indeed a direct demonstration of this principle.  It is not however, a direct demonstration 
of their proposed neuronal feedback loop between visual and motor cortices.  This claim 
typifies a trend in the behavioural literature on this connection between vision and action; 
based on behavioural data alone, researchers offer conclusions about the neural 
framework underlying their effects.  Although these behavioural demonstrations can be 
elegant and convincing, they rely on inference to reach their conclusions rather than 
measurement of their target structures.   
Further behavioural evidence supporting the reciprocal perception-action link comes from 
Lindemann and Bekkering (2009) who had participants grasp a response device shaped like 
the letter ‘X’ that could be rotated clockwise or anti-clockwise.  Upon the delivery of a go 
signal, apparent motion induced the effect of a rotation in the stimulus.  A compatibility 
effect was found when stimulus apparent motion matched with the planned rotation of 
the response device.  Consistent with the research cited in this section, the conclusion was 
for a bidirectional relationship between vision and action.  Vingerhoets, Vandamme and 
Vercammen (2009) conducted a series of priming experiments examining the different 
contributions of physical object properties and conceptual object properties to motor 
affordances.  This is an important caveat to the work cited so far because the affordance 
account directly claims that the physical properties of an object gives rise to its affordance.  
They presented a series of familiar and unfamiliar tools as well as simple graspable shapes 
and had participants respond according to the direction of a centrally presented arrow.  
When comparing familiar and unfamiliar tools they found that familiarity yields no effect 
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on RT, supporting the Gibsonian notion that affordance could represent a means for 
interaction with novel objects (Gibson & Gibson, 1955).  Interestingly, RTs were shorter for 
highly graspable (as determined by participant ratings) unfamiliar tools and graspable 
shapes than for familiar objects.  They found that conceptual information such as semantic 
category or learned associations failed to affect responses in the same way, indicating that 
the affordance effect was arising from the physical features of the stimuli.  Indeed, the 
largest effects were products of perceived graspability and visual complexity.  Vingerhoets 
et al. (2009) concluded that the brain automatically extracts object affordances based on 
intrinsic (e.g. shape) and extrinsic (e.g. orientation) object properties in a way that is not 
achieved by conceptual object properties.   
This section has detailed a set of experiments from a variety of laboratories that all reach 
the same conclusion; that there is a close and reciprocal relationship between vision and 
action in which action relevant cues from a wide variety of meaningful visual stimuli have 
influenced a variety of physical responses, even when these cues have been irrelevant to 
the task at hand.  Another common thread in these experiments is the implications of 
these studies for the organization of visual perception and motor coordination in the brain.  
It has been suggested that this reciprocal relationship between visual systems and action 
systems is reflected in the organization of the neural architecture underpinning the task.  
Over the remainder of the present chapter some attempts to model SRC will be 
considered, with particular reference to their claims about organisation in the brain.  Also, 
some alternative views on agent-object interaction will be considered. 
2.2 Attempts to model SRC 
A number of attempts to model SRC have been made, but few of them cover the kind of 
affordance SRC effects discussed so far.  This section will briefly consider two of the most 
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widely cited models and some of the ways in which they differ from some of the principles 
described above. 
The Dimensional Overlap model (DO) by Kornblum, Hasbroucq and Osman (1990) broadly 
states that SRC effects are explicable as the product of the similarity (overlap) of features 
(dimensions) of the SR pair.  When viewing stimuli they are first checked for DO, if DO is 
found then stimulus and response are compared.  Subsequently, the result of these 
comparisons feeds forward to influence the generation of a motor program which then 
accounts for similarities and differences between stimulus and response.  This process is 
conducted in serial.  DO provides a taxonomy of SRC effects (table 1) that cover a variety of 
SR dimensions, both task relevant and irrelevant as well as including stimulus-stimulus (SS) 
compatibility.  The taxonomy allows for DO across stimulus modalities (visual, linguistic and 
auditory), enabling it to explain abstract SRC effects such as JR Simon’s SRC effects or the 
classic Stroop effect.  However, the taxonomy does not make provision for the use of real 
object stimuli, meaning that even after several revisions (e.g. Kornblum, 1994; Kornblum & 
Lee, 1995) it offers a poor fit for the stimuli given in the key citations above.  In coping with 
multi-modal SRC effects, the model implies a kind of amodal space for checking SR pairs for 
DO and integrating them where DO is found.  A problem with this method of first checking 
for DO is that it necessarily reduces the predictive validity of the model because SR pairs 
need to be checked for DO before they can be integrated in order for the effect to occur.  
Moreover, necessitating a check for DO before any interaction suggests that this type of 
system would not be capable of aiding interactions with novel objects in the same way as 
envisioned by Gibson and Gibson when they suggested the concept of affordance, making 
this a poor candidate for explaining the kind of effects obtained with affording objects 
discussed here so far.  Another issue with this model in the context of this thesis is the lack 
of biological referents entailed in its design, with no reference made to brain regions or the 
role of body/ effectors, undermining embodied ideas laid out above and failing to account 
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for effects such as Tucker and Ellis (1998) that are dependent on body position as much as 
response type.  An assumption from cognitive neuroscience is that various regions function 
in concert with each other to produce complex behaviours and this is also difficult to 
reconcile with the serial structure of the model.  Simply checking for DO would then mean 
sending signals to different brain regions associated with the modalities entailed in the 
task, each of which would have to be sent pending the output of the previous stage of 
checking.  After the modality had been resolved, another region would be required to 
integrate the output of these stages and check for DO and all of this would have to occur 
before the response was planned.  This would present a computationally expensive and 
biologically and temporally implausible method of handling SRC effects that does not 
appear to fit with the principles of embodiment, affordance and cognitive neuroscience 
that guide this thesis.  Hommel (1997) discussed DO’s serial approach over three 
experiments that showed that response-related processes were starting before stimulus-
related processes were complete, which is inconsistent with the serial framework laid out 
in the DO model.  This was accomplished by using an SRC task (Simon task) with one of 
three stimulus-stimulus congruency (SSC) tasks.  The DO model would predict an additive 
Table 1.  Taxonomy of SR ensembles in the DO model.  Reproduced from Kornblum and Lee 




effect of SSC and SRC however Hommel (1997) showed separate, competing effects of SSC 
and SRC in each experiment.  Hommel (1997) suggests that the DO models serial processes 
are a poor fit to their data, which showed competing effects consistent with continuous 
transmission of visuomotor information.  This is troubling when considering real objects, 
which are not properly accounted for in the taxonomy and tend not to appear individually, 
further testing the serial approach laid out in the DO model.  
A more recent model from Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben and Prinz (2001) is better 
equipped to cope with object stimuli in SRC and is known as the Theory of Event Coding 
(TEC).  Hommel (2009) described TEC as based on Hommel’s (2000) notion of the prepared 
reflex, which broadly suggests that the major control operations required in SRC tasks are 
performed before the stimulus is even presented.  TEC was intended to model willed 
actions but is partly based on SRC evidence and so can account for that too.  The model 
suggests that perception and action receive equal representation in common 
representational medium that consists of cognitive constructs they refer to as event codes, 
and that event codes are generated according to the action intentions of the observer.  
The codes account for the physical as well as the functional characteristics of perceptions, 
and actions.  It emphasises the role of the outcome of actions in action selection, and by 
doing so accounts for action intention.  The use of codes as a ‘common representational 
medium’ allows for continuous and simultaneous comparison and combination of 
perceptual and action information gathered through any perceptual modality, all with the 
goal of producing behaviour in real-time.   
The model was intended to bridge a gap between the dominant cognitivist approach, 
which was suggested to fail to sufficiently account for the impact of action intentions on 
perception, and the action-orientated approach, which tends to treat action planning as a 
continuation of stimulus processing.  Treating action planning in this way makes TEC a 
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good fit with the concept of affordance, which offers the similar idea that afforded actions 
are potentiated in observers upon viewing objects and that this potentiation produces the 
SRC effect as part of continuous and reciprocal visuomotor processing, rather than 
discrete, serial processing described in the DO model.  TEC is defined by three core 
assumptions; firstly that perception and action share a coding scheme which offers a 
platform to create representations of the world.  Assuming a suitable coding scheme, this 
provides a cognitive mechanism for the integration of real object stimulus affordances and 
response set affordances, allowing TEC greater explanatory value than DO when dealing 
with affordance SRC effects.  A second assumption is that representing these SR pairs is 
distributed based on composites of feature codes, with each represented in discrete 
subsystems.  Hommel (2009) describes this by suggesting that the number of features 
shared by SR pairs defines their similarity and that when considering the tight connections 
between visual and motor systems, this means that one may also define similarity between 
perceptions and actions. Hommel et al. (2001) suggested that to plan an action is to 
consider not only the mechanics of performing the action, but also the effects it may have 
on the world, recalling the notion of affordance i.e. viewing an object elicits a preparation 
of actions that are afforded by the object, and these affordances are a means to 
understand the effect using the object may have on the world, just as described by 
Hommel et al. (2001).  He goes on to say that this view requires perceptual and motor 
systems work together to define the relationship between the visual input and possible 
behavioural output in order to compute the effects of those possible actions. The third 
assumption is that cognitive representations refer to distal and not proximal 
representations, effectively meaning that it describes the action possibilities and actions 
that exist in the external world, rather than the plethora of possible actions that could be 
internally represented. This is both a strength and a weakness; a strength because it 
reduces the computational expense of the SR translations required and filters out many 
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irrelevant dimensions that are invited when relying on internal representations.  However 
it could be seen as a weakness insofar as it fails to explain how an observer may make the 
transition between distal and proximal relations or vice versa and so it cannot account for 
all aspects in generating a particular motor pattern.  For example, when interacting with 
something novel (e.g. a rock climber visualising a way to scale an unfamiliar rock face or 
watching another climber scale that same novel rock face). As suggested above, TEC’s 
action orientated approach is much closer to the idea of affordance than the DO model 
and chimes with some ideas in embodiment.  Despite the strengths in this approach, it 
does not make direct or specific predictions about the anatomy or timecourse of 
neurophysiological events entailed in structuring the coding of external events.  In 
particular the timecourse of visuomotor events underpinning object interactions is a key 
idea in this thesis.  So, whilst the model provides a clear rationale for a role for the body in 
generating codes, it lacks the kind of physiological and anatomical specificity sought to 
guide this thesis.  Additionally, from an embodied perspective it is difficult to see how 
positing extra processing stages for transforming sensory information into abstract codes 
offers greater parsimony as an explanation of real time cognition or how and why it is 
needed in a biological sense.  So, despite the clear theoretical rationale it provides for 
visuomotor processing, the TEC is still not a perfect fit for the ideas in this thesis. 
A more recent computational model from Cisek (2007) gives direct consideration to some 
of the brain regions involved in affordance as well as overturning the idea of serial 
processing in favour of parallel processes.  The Affordance Competition Hypothesis 
suggests that constant competition exists between current action possibilities and the 
actual need for action.  This idea of competition suggests that agents constantly potentiate 
actions and select between them, aided by a brain that has evolved to mediate action in 
real-time.  Cisek’s (2007) sentiments here echo those of Wilson (2002), Anderson (2003) 
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and others given earlier in this chapter, perhaps reflecting the direct involvement of the 
concept of affordance in the development of this model.   
The affordance competition hypothesis suggests that visual information is processed in 
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) in parallel with processing in prefrontal cortex (PFC). In this 
way, this model surpasses any serial models and is a better fit with the fundamentals of 
cognitive neuroscience, which strongly indicates parallel processing in different brain 
regions.  PPC is seen as being involved in selecting the target and maintaining that 
selection for subsequent use, which will come from the reciprocal connection with dorsal 
premotor cortex (dPM).  This reciprocal connection allows for online changes of the action 
plan induced by new targets, but moreover, it allows the product of the PFC processing of 
action goals and planning of action execution to be communicated back to PPC, via dPM.  
Aside from the reciprocal connection back to PPC, dPM is divided into three layers in this 
model with reciprocal connections between each that allow this layer to resolve 
competition between different inputs from PPC in context of the input from PFC.  As Cisek 
stated, the output of the competition in these layers constitutes the decision of which 
response to make, however this decision is not deployed before the activation reaches the 
final node in the network, primary motor cortex, which essentially functions as an output 
stage.  
The brain regions implicated in the model are well supported, for example Anderson and 
Cui’s (2009) review made similar suggestions about the roles of PPC and its links with PFC, 
particularly in terms of low-level sensorimotor elements being managed by PPC but being 
moderated by high-level planning and goal-state elements by PFC.  The behavioural 
implications of the model are also well supported by studies such as Tucker and Ellis 
(1998), Ellis and Tucker (2000) and Michaels (1988). The author himself suggests the 
biggest weakness to the affordance competition hypothesis; that it does not account for 
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the full panoply of brain regions that have been shown to play a role in action preparation 
and execution.  This is however, a considerable improvement over other models, such as 
the DO model or TEC which have been generated without reference to brain areas and 
instead appear to exist in an abstract space with little to no biological constraint.  Cisek’s 
(2007) model is one of relatively few to consider affordance as being at the heart of real-
time decision making and action execution and similarly one of few to consider the brain 
regions entailed in this too.  His reciprocal connections between parietal and premotor 
cortices are compatible with the conclusion of many studies from the previous section, 
studies that invoke a reciprocal connection between visual and motor stages.  That said, 
although the precise anatomy of visuomotor  processing is up for discussion, Cisek (2007) 
provides a clear model offered in context of multiple layers of reciprocal, self-referential 
processing, chiming well with a variety of citations given above (e.g. Ellis, 2009).  This 
model is not comprehensive however, for example it does not make direct predictions 
about the role of response preparation (e.g. Symes et al., 2008; Ellis and Tucker, 2000) in 
detecting affordances or indeed what would happen in the absence of these physical 
preparations.  It also does not make direct predictions about priming or multiple object 
presentations.  These themes will be visited in the experimental chapters. 
Although we have seen that the SRC paradigm is capable of demonstrating object 
affordances, particularly with real object stimuli, it appears that the DO model of SRC fails 
to account for affordance effects.  Whilst Hommel et al.’s (2001) TEC provides a clear 
rationale for visuomotor coactivation, the coding explanation is fundamentally cognitivist 
and lacks the neurophysiological specificity sought to guide this thesis. Cisek’s (2007) 
model best describes a neurologically-grounded framework for affordance SRC effects 
because it has been designed with affordance in mind and moreover that it has been 
designed with relevant anatomical and physiological constraints in mind.  Cisek’s model 
typifies the kind of approach adopted in this thesis; the integration of behavioural results 
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and cognitive neuroscience with the goal of understanding affordance effects in context of 
the biological, physical and temporal constraints placed upon the agent. 
2.3 Other views on the SRC affordance effect 
One alternative explanation of object affordance effects may be drawn from Anderson, 
Yamagishi and Karavia (2002) who showed participants a series of simulated objects over 
three experiments and simulated non-objects over two experiments.  Stimuli are detailed 
in in figure 1.  They suggest that the SRC affordance effects described above are products 
of attentional bias by asymmetries within the stimuli.  Each experiment had participants 
complete an SRC-type task, with the stimuli rotated 18° clockwise or anticlockwise 
determining the hand of response, and the orientation of the objects determining 
compatibility.  Their first experiment saw two of the authors complete this task and rate 
the salient parts of the stimuli.  They rated the hands of the clock, the handle of the 
scissors and the bowl of the wineglass as the salient features.  Interestingly, they found 
shorter RT but increased errors when the lateralisation of the salient features matched 
with the lateralisation of the button press response.  The increased error rates with 
compatible stimuli conflict with the findings of Tucker and Ellis (1998) and Ellis and Tucker 
(2000), who found reduced error rates when stimuli were compatible.  The main 
differences between these studies were the use of black and white object silhouettes as 
stimuli, compared with Tucker and Ellis’ (1998) photographs of real objects or the real 
object stimuli used in Ellis and Tucker (2000).  Their second experiment repeated this with 
a sample of 21 naïve observers and found similar results.  Participants rated the same parts 
as the authors as being most salient and showed the same RT and error rate effect, except 
with the scissors.  Ten participants rated the handle as the most salient feature of the 
scissors, ten rated it as the blade and one rated the axis of the stimulus as being most 
salient.  When the data were reanalysed with respect to participants’ ratings of salience 
the results matched with that of the experimenters.  The authors concluded that the 
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location of the salient feature was the ‘critical factor’ and stated their assumption that 
these features induced attentional bias in the observers.  A third experiment saw the 
object stimuli pictured only in the left visual field and again used only the authors for 
participants, who used self-report and indicated the salient features as being the same as 
in experiment one and showed the same shorter RT and increased errors when the salient 
part was on the same side as response.  In concluding experiment three, they state that 
their self-report data supports their assumption from experiment two that asymmetry is 
directing attention. 
Anderson, Yamagishi and Karavia (2002) also conducted a series of non-object 
experiments, with the stimulus consisting of a white circle with two smaller circles pictured 
on each side (’side-patches’) that gave laterality information (see figure 1).  They again 
used an author for a participant alongside a sample of 12 naïve observers.  Again, RT was 
shorter and error rates higher when response was on the same side as the asymmetry (i.e. 
left response to left-asymmetric stimuli and vice versa). This is consistent with self-reports 
from observers and authors that the larger side patches were used to judge orientation. 
They conclude that because the same behavioural data was obtained for object and non-
object stimuli (regardless of the nature of the stimuli), an affordance effect may be ruled 
out.  They then repeat their assumption that stimulus asymmetry is causing attentional 
shifts and use this assumption to conclude that the RT effect obtains when the attentional 
shift is compatible with the response and not when handle and response match.  Their final 
experiment saw one side-patch removed from the non-object stimuli and only two authors 
for participants.  Again they found shorter RT and more errors when response coincided 
with stimulus asymmetry.  Overall, they conclude that visual asymmetry in the stimuli 
induced attentional bias in their participants and that it was an interaction of the 
attentional bias and the hand of response that yielded the effects here, rather than 
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interactions of handle orientation and response location as suggested in other affordance 
SRC paradigms. 
 
Figure 1. Stimuli found in Anderson et al. (2002).a) clock face stimulus, always pictured with hands 
at 3.15 or 8.45, i.e. orientated left or right. b) Scissor stimulus, could be oriented left or right. c) 
Wine glass stimulus. d) Non-object stimulus, note asymmetrical ‘side patches’ that yielded 
orientation information.  All objects were also pictured rotated 18° clockwise or anticlockwise.  
Stimuli a-c were used in the object experiments 1-3 and stimulus d was used in the non-object 
experiments. Figure reproduced and edited from Anderson, Yamagishi and Karavia (2002). 
There are several problems with this conclusion, mostly arising from the method. Not least 
among them is the issue of the use of the authors as participants in a study where the 
analyses were conducted based around the author’s own self-reports of the salient 
features of the stimuli.  Naïve observers were only used in two of five experiments and 
when they were they completed fewer trials than the authors before all of the data were 
entered into group means.  The use of experimenters as participants introduces a possible 
bias and this notion is supported by the lack of agreement on the scissor stimulus from 
experiments one and two.  Another related issue is the use of assumptions in the study.  
The authors clearly state in the discussion of object experiments two and three, as well as 
non-object experiments one and two, that the attentional bias explanation is an 
assumption and offer no little supporting argument.  They also assume that their stimuli 
are equivalent to affording objects however they were merely monochrome silhouettes of 
objects (figure 1), only loosely resembling real objects.  The objects lacked cues to depth, 
three-dimensional shape or graspability, something present in Tucker and Ellis’ (1998) and 
Ellis and Tucker’s (2000) real object stimuli and critical to object affordance.  Additionally, 
no effort was presented to establish whether the objects would generate an affordance 
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effect, critical to delineate an affordance effect from what they describe as an effect of 
salience. The monochrome, simulated stimuli (figure 1) used in the study are not 
comparable to the clear photographs and actual real-object stimuli used in the affordance 
SRC studys that it seeks to refute (e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Ellis & Tucker, 2000).  For 
example, the proportions of the scissors are very unusual.  Also, because the stimuli are 
monochrome, they have no texture or colour information to separate functional and 
graspable parts.  Another reason that this study is insufficient to refute the affordance 
explanation is because it only considers lateralised affordance and does not consider grip-
type affordance, such as that seen in Ellis and Tucker (2000).  An alternative explanation 
may be drawn from their use of ‘side-patches’ suggesting a Simon-like effect may be taking 
place instead, considering the lack of affording characteristics in the stimuli.     
Allied to the issue with authors rating stimuli that they created is the error rate data, the 
opposite of that found in the affordance SRC literature cited earlier in this chapter, where 
compatible trials see fewer errors rather than more.  Although this is insufficient to draw 
any conclusions, it suggests that Anderson and colleagues may be dealing with a different 
phenomenon.  These error rate differences could also be related to the analyses, where 
functional parts (i.e. scissor blades, bowl of wineglass) were defined as the most salient 
instead of graspable parts (i.e. handles) as in an affordance experiment, however this is 
difficult to resolve with the RT advantage for functional parts.  A key feature of Anderson 
et al.’s (2002) disagreement with the affordance explanation comes from the use of RT 
metrics; they claim to refute the affordance explanation by replicating the RT effect with 
non-object stimuli.  However this argument is insufficient; although they replicated the 
global RT effect, this single point of measurement does not reveal enough about the 
underlying processing that produced the effect to justify the strength of their conclusion.  
More convincing would be to demonstrate that simulated objects elicited the same 
visuomotor activity as real objects.  This disagreement supports the use of ERP measures in 
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the present thesis because they would enable a direct test of whether the simulated object 
silhouette stimuli elicit a comparable visuomotor response to an object affordance, 
allowing a direct test of the physiology underpinning Anderson et al.’s (2002) claims.    
Another alternative position on SRC effects is typified by RW Proctor, who has sought to 
show the equivalence of many different kinds of SRC effects, whether with affording 
objects, words, numbers, abstract visual or auditory stimuli.  More specifically, Proctor 
describes affordance SRC effects as object-based Simon effects (e.g. Cho & Proctor, 2011) 
and relates all other forms of SRC to Simon effects too (e.g. Proctor, Miles & Baroni, 2011), 
where they define a Simon effect very generally, as a compatibility effect of an irrelevant 
stimulus dimension.  However, Proctor does not suggest that these effects are all identical, 
conceding that different factors may be at work.  For example, in Proctor, Miles and Baroni 
(2011) it is suggested that an object-based Simon effect would require additional semantic 
processing when compared with abstract Simon effects, implying that there are many 
different kinds of Simon effects.  The critical difference between Proctor’s approach and 
the approach in the present thesis is the application of an affordance explanation.  Proctor 
has repeatedly found against the affordance account (e.g. Cho & Proctor, 2010; Proctor & 
Vu, 2006), generally by failing to replicate results from other labs (e.g. Lien, Gray, Jardin & 
Proctor, 2014).   
Proctor and Miles (2014) identify two versions of affordance at large in the literature; 
traditional Gibsonian affordance, also called the direct-perception account, and 
representational affordances, which they describe as a blend of ecological and information 
processing accounts.  Proctor comes from an information processing background and so is 
against the direct perception account because it removes several processing stages that 
would normally be considered important by an information processing model.  On the 
representational affordance account, Proctor and Miles suggest that there is no value to be 
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gained by introducing the concept of affordance, a concept from ecological psychology, 
into the information-processing dominated SRC literature.  They reason that by uniting 
ideas from the different fields the resulting amalgamation will fail to satisfy either the 
typical affordance or the typical information processing accounts.  For instance, they see 
insufficient justification for introducing ecological concepts into the information processing 
model, which they deem sufficient to account for all SRC phenomena, regardless of the 
source of the effect.  They also suggest that the ecological model is less useful in a 
laboratory setting than the information processing model, given its real world orientation 
and the relatively barren arrangements seen in the lab as compared with the real world.  
Another key factor in this disagreement is the stage at which the effect is occurring.  With 
Simon effects simply due to spatial correspondence it is sufficient for these to occur at the 
stimulus identification stage, however, because an affordance SRC effect depends on the 
combination of specific features of stimulus and response, it has been suggested to occur 
later, at the response selection stage (Hasbroucq & Guiard, 1991; Tucker & Ellis, 1998). 
That said, Lu and Proctor (1994) also put the effect at the response selection stage and 
claimed that it arose from the application of the translation rule, from the relevant to 
irrelevant stimulus dimension, used for completing the task.  This highlights again the 
problems in trying to use behavioural data to reach deep conclusions about neural 
processing; all three positions are supported by a considerable number of experiments, but 
are at odds with each other.  A critical issue here is that Proctor and colleagues do not 
recognise the argument that the centrally presented object stimuli constitute a sufficiently 
different class of stimuli –as compared with lateralised presentation of non-objects, 
arrows, abstract symbols or tones– to warrant their own class of explanation.  They do not 
see the action information suggested by the affordance explanation as anything more than 
a task-irrelevant stimulus feature and so are happy to lump the effects in together.   
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A number of behavioural studies have successfully disentangled affordance and Simon 
effects; Symes, Tucker and Ellis (2005) show that it is possible to elicit both effects in the 
same paradigms by varying the attentional demand placed on participants.  By varying the 
location of lateralised affording objects around fixation, they found it was possible to 
produce a Simon effect of stimulus location that was dissociable from an affordance effect 
of handle orientation.  They argued that that for an affordance effect to occur, the objects 
must be represented at the level of objects.  This is similar to the findings from Tipper, Paul 
and Hayes (2006) and Pellicano, Iani, Borghi, Rubichi and Nicoletti (2010) (described in 
greater detail below) who also disentangled Simon and affordance effects using 
behavioural methods; they showed participants affording stimuli that were depicted in 
different colours.  They found that when asked to respond to the colour of an object, they 
obtained a Simon effect, but when asked to respond to the category of the object, they 
obtained an affordance effect.  Similar to Symes, Tucker and Ellis (2005) they argued that 
this is a matter of how attention is directed to the object, and what object features are 
attended.  However, despite these (and other) experiments Proctor and colleagues (e.g. 
Proctor & Miles, 2014) have continued to argue that affordances do not represent a special 
case for SRC.  
Michaels and Stins (1997) provide an excellent discussion on this; they suggest that RT data 
is so crude and stimulus properties so arbitrary that the interpretation of the majority of 
SRC experiments depends as much on the constructs that the authors begin with as the 
results they find, perhaps explaining the persistence of this disagreement despite the 
evidence.  When similar RT and error data are obtained using the same paradigm but 
different stimuli, it is intuitive to seek to unite these notions.  However, as described in Ellis 
(2009), a great many SRC experiments use abstract stimuli that have little or no 
relationship with the response, and these responses often fail to mimic an action. Proctor’s 
information processing approach makes this into a minor concern by simply focussing on 
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the RT effect of the relevant/ irrelevant stimulus properties, regardless of stimulus class 
and ignoring nuances of stimulus presentation and/ or response set.  However, coming 
from an affordance background the different stimulus and response classes become a huge 
concern because the affordance account stands and falls on its assumption of the overlap 
of action relevant information and available action possibilities.  The nature of the 
affordance account means that experiments around it must use stimuli that contain action 
possibilities and that effects found with stimuli that lack these action properties must be 
measuring a different construct.  As Ellis (2009) suggests, new questions must be asked and 
new paradigms devised in order to end this disagreement.   This is a key motivator for the 
present thesis; one possible means to build on the behavioural literature that has 
attempted to disentangle these possibilities (e.g. Symes et al., 2005; Tipper et al., 2006; 
Pellicano et al., 2010) would be to directly measure the visuomotor activity elicited in the 
presence of each effect using cognitive neuroscience methods (such as event-related 
potentials, ERPs).  Due to their high temporal resolution, ERPs are particularly well suited 
to address the question of the stage at which affordance effects are exerted.  Also, the 
Lateralised Readiness Potential (LRP) offers an ideal tool to directly investigate motor 
activity afforded by object stimuli, an issue discussed above.  Understanding the motor 
processing entailed in each effect using LRPs might differentiate more clearly the 
information processing and affordance accounts.   
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has seen a wide variety of evidence for and explanations of affordance SRC 
effects.  Those studies used behavioural methods that have consistently implicated 
visuomotor processing, suggesting that this approach could benefit from directly 
measuring visuomotor activity.  The following chapter will consider evidence from 
cognitive neuroscience on affordance SRC and consider whether these methods may 






3. Chapter three 
Cognitive neuroscience and affordance 
 
3.1 Affordance, SRC and cognitive neuroscience 
The first two chapters introduced the idea of affordance and gave some evidence to 
support the notion that affordance effects develop based on overlap in SR pairs due to a 
reciprocal visual and motor processing best described as visuomotor.  However, it also saw 
considerable dispute between different points of view on affordance when compared with 
Simon effects or effects of salience and where affordance effects fit in with SRC effects in a 
wider sense.  Those chapters suggested that one way to attempt to clarify this is by that 
employing deeper metrics may help to choose between these differing views.  In order to 
do this, the present chapter will consider the evidence from cognitive neuroscience on the 
question of the linkage, timecourse and automaticity of object perception and action 
processes, particularly the affordance SRC effect.  First for consideration are two 
replications of studies discussed in the previous chapter in Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET) followed by some further 
evidence demonstrating the role of the motor cortex in perception.  Following this is a 
discussion of the temporal factors, beginning with evidence from single cell recordings and 
moving on to more recent ERP, LRP and Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) 
investigations.  Finally, some reasoning for some of the temporal differences shall be 
presented. 
3.2 Spatial evidence 
This section will focus on evidence for the spatial arrangement of brain activity underlying 
visuomotor processes seen in SRC and affordance experiments to see if evidence from the 
spatial domain may help to resolve some of the issues from chapter two, such as how to 
assess the motor effects of looking at objects and the equivalence of behavioural results 
38 
 
for affordance and Simon effects.  This evidence will be drawn from methods such as fMRI 
and PET.  As mentioned above, some of the results that are central to this work have been 
replicated and extended by using neuroimaging methods, such as Grezes and Decety 
(2002) who used PET in an experiment similar to Tucker and Ellis’s (1998) first experiment.  
Again, they had participants make a left or right button press in order to declare whether a 
stimulus was in its normal orientation or was inverted.  The stimuli also had graspable 
parts that were oriented left or right, creating the axes for a lateralised affordance SRC 
effect.  There was also a motor imagery task, consisting of an object presented every three 
seconds to which participants were instructed to imagine grasping and using each object 
before making a left or right handed keypress dependent on the orientation of the object.  
A silent object naming task was employed, with participants instructed to silently name an 
object presented every three seconds before making a keypress dependent on the objects 
orientation.  A silent verb generation task was employed, in which participants silently 
named the verb associated with each tool before making a keypress response.  To form a 
baseline, non-objects were presented in a separate condition.  The core result that was 
observed here was that there was a common network serving each of these tasks; the 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL), premotor cortex (PMC), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the 
supplementary motor area (SMA) with an additional activation in MT/V5.  Interestingly, 
whilst there were bilateral activations associated with all conditions, the areas primarily 
associated with the perception of tools were right hemisphere dominated and included 
inferior and middle frontal gyri (rIFG/ rMFG), middle temporal gyrus (rMTG), right putamen 
and right cingulate gyrus. The authors suggest that their results are consistent with the 
ventral/ dorsal distinction as described by Goodale and Milner (1992) with projections 
from primary visual cortex following the prescribed route.  They also suggest that eliciting 
activation in motion-sensitive visual area MT/V5 is characteristic of the dorsal processing 
stream in the presence of action-relevant stimuli.  They went on to suggest that stimulus 
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motion is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for activating the dorsal stream but 
that the presence of a cue to action in the stimuli is a necessary condition for eliciting this 
kind of dorsal stream activation.  The authors conclude that affordances are a precondition 
for dorsal activity, and that this study provides neurophysiological evidence to support the 
notion of object affordance and its automaticity, based in similar reasoning as Tucker and 
Ellis (1998) regarding the lack of relevance the object affordance has to the task.  On the 
point of the visuomotor nature of perception from previous chapters, the action of visual 
motion area MT/ V5 in concert with activation in motor cortices in resolving this object 
affordance task speaks the visuomotor account of object perception.  MT/ V5 is suggested 
by Grezes and Decety (2002) to be the first area of the dorsal processing stream, which is 
implicated in the detection of movements and movement-related stimuli and object 
affordances are intrinsically linked with guiding movement to or with an object.  This, in 
conjunction with activation in action planning areas PMC/ SMA implies evidence for 
visuomotor interpretations.  However, due to the poor temporal resolution available in PET 
it is impossible to know whether these areas were activated concurrently or not, which 
would need to be true for the assertion would be properly supported.  This shows a limit of 
using spatially-orientated techniques to answer questions about the nature of processing.   
Another core experiment  discussed in chapters one and two was replicated and extended 
by Grezes, Tucker, Armony, Ellis and Passingham (2003), who replicated the grip-type 
affordance SRC experiment presented in Ellis and Tucker (2000) using fMRI.  As described 
above, this was a grip-type affordance SRC paradigm, in which participants mimicked a 
power and precision grip by holding two manipulanda.  One had them make a precision 
grip with their thumb and index finger and the other had them make a palmar grip.  Half 
used the precision in the right hand and power in the left and the other half used the 
opposite combination, representing a small deviation from the original design.  They found 
a significant behavioural interaction between object grip and response grip, signifying a 
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compatibility effect as in Ellis and Tucker (2000).  This behavioural effect was  accompanied 
by left hemisphere dominated compatibility effects that correlated with the behavioural 
compatibility effect in left dorsal premotor cortex, left anterior parietal cortex, left superior 
parietal lobe, left inferior frontal sulcus and left temporal sulcus.  The left premotor cortex 
activation in particular supports the notion of automatic motor activation by seen 
affordances.  This brings us back to the question from the first chapter of whether we can 
reasonably expect the same processes to occur under two quite different affordance SRC 
paradigms because this experiment does not show activation in the same locations as 
Grezes and Decety (2002).  Some are shared, such as the premotor cortex activation 
however there are some considerable differences. Most obviously, the processing in this 
grip-type study appears to be confined to a left hemisphere network and no activation was 
detected in the temporal cortex, fitting broadly with Cisek’s (2007) proposed network 
detailed in the previous chapter.  In Grezes and Decety, there were bilateral activations in 
some areas as well as a series of right hemisphere dominant effects associated specifically 
with tool perception, located in rMTG, rIFG, rMFG, right cingulate gyrus and right putamen. 
Furthermore, no activation was detected in IPL which is quite irregular, considering that 
some researchers have suggested that this area may be the seat of affordance processing 
(cf. Arbib, 1997; discussed below).  No cingulate gyrus activity was reported here either, 
which is surprising both due to it being enlisted in the previous study and given the 
multifunction nature of cingulate cortex, featuring in both motor function as well having 
been implicated in a link between task performance and motivation (cf. Torta & Cauda, 
2011).  This cannot however be taken as a final indication.  fMRI analysis techniques are 
notorious for the wide degrees of freedom and dependence on analysis parameters 
affecting the significance of activation and Grezes and Decety (2002) used PET instead of 
fMRI and so used very different thresholds and techniques, leaving weak grounds for a 
direct comparison.  However it does provide some tentative evidence towards the 
41 
 
proposition that processing underlying different affordance effects may indeed differ at a 
neuroanatomical level.  Although merely speculation, the lack of IPL activation may reflect 
the maintenance of the grips during this experiment as part of the possible scaffolding of 
affordance processing discussed above, however that possibility has not been directly 
tested and remains conjecture.   
These two studies from Grezes and colleagues –two revisions of well-known experiments 
in the area– show a possible difference between grip-type and lateralised affordance that 
is completely unavailable when using behavioural methods alone.  This supports the 
rationale for the use of techniques from cognitive neuroscience by showing the depth of 
information they offer and returns us to the question of what new knowledge may be 
gained by the application of these techniques to the relatively old and familiar SRC 
paradigm.  In order to elucidate this possible difference between types of affordance, 
further PET and fMRI results will be considered.  There is also some theoretical support for 
a difference too, with evidence on the prospect of a difference at a neurophysiological 
level from a proposed network for grasping, suggested initially by Arbib (1997).  This study 
was extensive and used comparative studies with rats and monkeys to generate 
conclusions about the network and emphasised the interaction of anterior parietal cortex 
with premotor cortex and prefrontal cortex, as well as interactions between hippocampus 
and parietal cortex in rat navigation.  The assertion most pertinent to this thesis was that 
affordances appeared to be resolved in monkeys in a parietal-premotor portion of the 
proposed network.  We have already seen in Grezes and Decety (2002) that images of 
affording objects preferentially activated IPL and precentral gyrus but not postcentral 
gyrus.  Further support for this notion may be drawn from Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Matelli, 
Bettinardi, Paulesu, Perani and Fazio (1996) who used PET to isolate brain regions 
associated with grasping that matched well with those proposed by Arbib (1997) and with 
the findings of Grezes et al. (2003).  They used three conditions, one in which participants 
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watched the experimenter making grasping movements on common objects, one in which 
participants grasped the same objects and a final condition that consisted of merely 
viewing the objects, used as a comparison.  For the grasping condition, they found 
activation in precentral and postcentral gyrus, left inferior parietal cortex and cingulate 
gyrus.  The use of real objects in obtaining these effects makes for compelling evidence for 
two reasons; firstly because the stimuli are appropriate for what they sought to test 
(avoiding problems from Anderson, Yamagishi and Karavia, 2002, cited in chapter two).  
Secondly, it is compelling due to the good fit with the work from Grezes and colleagues, 
Arbib (1997) and Cisek (2007).  This is interesting because if there really is a specialised 
network for grasping in the way this suggests, then grip-type affordances should 
presumably entail the use of this network.  However a lateralised affordance effect does 
not share the same grasping characteristics as a grip-type study, again supporting the 
possibility of a difference in processing, or minimally in the supporting brain regions.  
Combine this with the large overlap between the left hemisphere dominated results of 
Grezes et al. (2003) and those seen in Rizzolatti et al. (1996) as compared with right 
hemisphere dominated results from Grezes and Decety (2002) and the evidence begins to 
mount for a difference in processing different classes (e.g. grip-type vs. lateralised) of 
affording stimuli.  
The results of Castiello, Bennett, Egan, Tochon-Danguy, Kritikos and Dunai (2000) provide 
further support to this novel juxtaposition of grip and lateralised affordance processing by 
evidence from neuroscience methods.  Castiello et al. (2000) used PET with four 
conditions, mouth grasping movements, finger grasping movements, imagined mouth 
grasping and passive viewing, for subtraction analysis. During this, the experimenter 
moved a piece of food (a small sweet) on a fork towards the participant’s hand or mouth.  
Participants were instructed to open or close the mouth or hand as if they were to grasp 
the morsel.  Due to use of finger grasping as a response, these data clearly speak more to 
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the grip-type study of Ellis and Tucker (2000) or Grezes et al, (2003) than lateralised studies 
like Tucker and Ellis (1998) or Grezes and Decety (2002).  The core reason for this is that in 
order to respond here, the participants execute a prepared grip just as in the other grip- 
type citations given above.  There is also greater consistency in the relationship between 
stimulus and response amongst these grip-type studies, where they use whole-object level 
features to determine compatibility instead of relying on the affordance of components of 
objects (i.e. handles) as is the case with lateralised affordance experiments.  As described 
above, a left-hemisphere dominant network emerges that enlists both pre and post central 
gyri and again enlists cingulate gyrus, something not observed in the lateralised studies.  
Castiello et al. (2000) also found activation related to hand grasps were left-hemisphere 
dominated.  For the mouth grasp condition, bilateral pre and post central gyri activations 
were observed, however for hand movements these were dominated by left hemisphere 
activity.  IPL activity was observed here too, as predicted by Arbib (1997) and by the results 
of Rizzolatti et al. (1996), which also mesh beautifully with these data.  Left cingulate gyrus 
activity was observed here too, the opposite pattern to that from Grezes and Decety 
(2002) who used lateralised affordances instead of Castiello et al.’s grip-type stimuli, 
further reinforcing a difference between processing different classes of affordance.  Taken 
on its own, it would be easy to explain away the left hemisphere dominance as simply 
being an artefact of the right handed responses, however the left hemisphere dominated 
network has been described above for grasping movements.  Castiello et al. (2000) 
focussed on the role of IPL in affordance generation here, however the overall 
lateralisation is also pertinent to the present discussion.  This selection of studies indicates 
that grip-type and grasping studies are particularly left hemisphere dominated and that 
lateralised studies appear to be right hemisphere dominated.  There are some ambiguities 
however, such as why the cingulate gyrus is not enlisted in Grezes et al. (2003), but are in 
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Rizzolatti’s and Castiello’s work, although there are clear task differences, such as the 
constant maintenance of the grasp in Grezes’ studies.     
Expanding the notion of automaticity visited in the previous chapters, an interesting dual 
method experiment from Handy, Grafton, Shroff, Ketay and Gazzaniga (2003) used ERPs 
and fMRI to show that when viewing graspable objects, spatial attention is automatically 
courted by the graspable features and that this effect is strongest in the lower visual field 
and the right visual field. Handy et al. characterised the lower and the right visual field as 
being dominant in visuomotor processing and their experiments provided evidence of this.  
They did so by presenting a task-irrelevant tool object and a non-object (e.g. animals) in 
the upper visual field to the left or right of fixation before one would be replaced by a 
target.  They used the P1 component to assess their results, as it is known to be associated 
with orientating spatial attention to non-foveated areas.  A second experiment did the 
same but orientated the images above and below fixation.  These two experiments show 
that visual field asymmetries are integrated with visuomotor processes, with right handed 
participants showing a stronger effect for right visual field and lower visual field 
presentations and a greater P1 activation for tools presented in the right visual field.  This 
shows that early stages of visual perception appear to have some relationship with action-
properties, a key consideration in using P1 and N1 in the experimental chapters.  A third 
experiment used fMRI and found that the attention grabbing effect was only obtained 
when the target was a tool pictured in the right visual field and that this was accompanied 
by dorsal premotor and prefrontal activations, areas that Handy et al. assert are critical to 
action planning.  Handy et al. characterised the right visual field (of their right-handed 
participants) as being specialised for visuomotor processing and suggest that this is why 
the fMRI effects were only found with tool targets presented in the right visual field.  This 
innovative approach shows that not only should authors consider the asymmetry within 
the brain, but they should also be mindful of asymmetries that exist long before visual 
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information is processed.  One of the most interesting results however, and one that is 
troublesome to the discussion of the role of intention (see above and below) in the 
affordance effect is that this effect occurred on trials when participants responded, as well 
as when they did not respond, supporting the case for automaticity over intention. This 
interaction between the fundamental rules of visual fields in the earliest stages of visual 
input and the output of the motor response or a neural response provides a another angle 
that supports the visuomotor nature of perception and the notions that vision is for action 
and also that vision is mediated by action.   
To round out this section, the last study for consideration shall be a review from Lewis 
(2006) that was comprised of a meta-analysis of 64 studies of tool use skills and 
knowledge.  Overwhelmingly, the results pointed to shared circuitry for viewing, 
interacting with or pantomiming interaction with objects, fitting well with an embodied 
approach to cognition as described in previous chapters.  There was a particular emphasis 
on the IPL and the dPMC for these purposes, with premotor cortex particularly entailed in 
accessing, preparing and maintaining the intention to perform an act and how to translate 
the preparation into a sequence of motor commands, with IPL associated with the 
preparation of these motor commands in the effectors, including selecting the correct 
effector.  Ventral premotor cortex (vPMC) was more concerned with the execution of 
actions in what we shall see over the following sections are later stages of visuomotor 
processing.  Another key result found here was that in effectively all reviewed aspects, 
both hemispheres were enlisted for different purposes but that the left hemisphere was 
always dominant in this, something else that we shall see fleshed out in the 
electrophysiological data presented below.   
From examining the studies presented in this section it appears that the application of 
neuroimaging techniques is highly elucidative for the area of object and affordance 
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processing.  The spatial evidence on SRC and object use appears fairly consistent, with left 
hemisphere dominance exhibited for most action preparations and stimulus classes, whilst 
maintaining the classical contralateral control of effectors and still allowing the right 
hemisphere a considerable role to play, as shown by Grezes and Decety (2002).  That said 
Grezes and Decety and Grezes et al. (2003) also show up a considerable inconsistency in 
the hemispheric asymmetry associated with lateralised as opposed to grip-type affordance 
SRC paradigms.  Although there is no apriori significance to particular patterns of 
hemispheric asymmetry (Hellige, 1993) this is of potentially great theoretical significance, 
particularly to affordance orientated models such as Cisek (2007) because this represents 
one of the first indications of a fundamental processing difference between different 
classes of affordance that appear to behave identically when examining the behavioural 
data.  Overall however, the evidence agrees that on the questions of response preparation 
that the SRC paradigm is geared to, the dorsal premotor cortex is the main candidate for 
further investigation.  Evidence from Handy et al. (2003) also illustrates the importance of 
considering the role of visual fields, particularly with lateralised tool stimuli.  Perhaps most 
importantly, Handy et al. (2003) also showed that early visual ERP component P1 may also 
be elucidative of the visuomotor nature of these response preparations, providing a 
motivator towards the use of ERPs over spatial methods in the present thesis.  This is again 
of great theoretical significance, with early visual components generally thought of as not 
being influenced by task parameters (discussed in more depth below).  One problem with 
the use of spatial techniques is that whilst we might see what areas are entailed in 
particular tasks, the lack of temporal resolution means that it can be difficult to assert 
what stages of processing the different areas are activated, and so what their functions 
are.  For this reason, this chapter will now proceed to examine what new information on 
object affordance may be found by the use of techniques with great temporal resolution 
but poor spatial resolution.   
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3.3 Temporal evidence 
Whilst the evidence from imaging techniques such as PET and fMRI are informative in the 
spatial domain, as discussed above their lack of temporal resolution means that it is 
difficult –if not impossible– to accurately infer function by correlating blood flow with 
behaviour.  Instead, techniques with high temporal resolution allow us to expand on 
localisation studies by understanding the order in which areas become activated, when 
and for how long they are activated, whether they are activated serially or in parallel and 
these things allow researchers to make much deeper inferences about the processing at 
work and do not simply rely on correlation.  This section is particularly pertinent as the 
studies in the experimental chapters all made use of electrophysiological measures in 
order to improve upon the specificity of behavioural measures and the temporal 
limitations of fMRI and PET, as discussed above.  First, some comparative studies will be 
considered, followed by some evidence from human electrophysiology, with a view to 
establishing the timing of the effect of objects and object affordances in motor cortex. 
3.3.1 Single cell recordings  
Some of the earlier evidence on the timecourse of object processing and action 
preparations may be drawn from single cell recordings, in which the firing of single 
neurons or small populations of neurons are monitored intracranially by microelectrodes.  
These studies provide evidence of very early motor activation arising from compatibility 
effects.  However, due to their invasive nature, they are also almost exclusively 
comparative studies, conducted on primates instead of human participants.  Due to the 
use of primates, the paradigms are more like spatial SRC than affordance SRC simply 
because primates do not share the same relationships with objects that humans do.  That 
said, such studies still show converging evidence on temporal aspects of action initiation 
and motor activation during SRC.   
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A frequently cited study from Georgopoulos, Kalaska, Caminiti and Massey (1982) provides 
a good starting point.  They recorded 606 cells in motor cortex related to proximal arm 
movements, focussing on 323 cells that were most activated by the task.  Four rhesus 
monkeys were trained to move a manipulandum from a central position to one of eight 
target positions marked by LEDs, meaning that this was not a typical SRC paradigm as there 
were no incompatible trials, however the task closely resembles the format for compatible 
trials.  As well as single unit recordings, electromyograms (EMG) and electrooculargrams 
(EOG) were recorded.  EOG revealed that monkeys made saccades to foveate the target 
around 150ms after stimulus onset. Taken with a mean RT of 265ms, this illustrates how 
rapidly (at approximately 100ms) the visual information was translated into a motor 
programme that was executed.  EMG revealed that muscle activity was detectable 80ms 
before movement onset, leaving around 20ms between foveating the target and the 
earliest detectable muscular response. This could not have been due to a predictable trial 
structure due to a 2 second jitter, again indicating that these visual to motor translations 
can occur extremely rapidly.  However, as suggested in Requin and Riehle (1995, reviewed 
below) with their own data, the implications of these studies depend greatly on the 
constructs one postulates to explain the data, meaning that it is very difficult to infer the 
nature of the processing (particularly cognitivist discrete stage versus continuous 
transmission accounts) based solely on these impressive rapidity of the effects.  The 
frequency domain analysis revealed orderly variation of cell direction with movement 
direction, however Georgopoulos et al. did not identify discrete populations of cells 
specific to a particular response direction.  Instead, they found that different directions 
were signalled by combined activation of neurons that were tuned to the characteristics of 
the required movement.  Put another way, different cell populations were found to 
activate in concert to produce responses in different directions and no cell populations 
were identified that related solely to a single direction. This study shows the depth of 
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information available when working outside of the behavioural RT domain by observing 
not only the rapidity with which visual information interacts with motor processes but also 
hinting at the interaction of the visual system, the motor cortex and the musculoskeletal 
system through the use of single unit recordings, EOG and EMG data.  Although not 
interpreted this way, the temporal proximity of the effects in the different metrics 
employed here hint strongly at an integrated visuomotor system, rather than discrete 
visual and motor systems.   
This proposition is supported by Rizzolatti and Gentilucci (1988) who found that the same 
canonical neurons in the vPMC fire during both the presentation of an object and during 
the execution of actions associated with that object, in agreement with the meta-analysis 
by Lewis (2006).  This supports the embodied notion of scaffolding discussed in previous 
chapters because it shows physiological evidence for the interrelation of perceptual 
processes and action processes in neuronal populations that are not specific to either 
process, but rather support both.  This speaks to the notion of scaffolding because action 
areas are supporting perception and moreover, this favour is returned during action 
execution.  This also suggests that the traditional cognitivist distinction between action and 
perception or input and output may be flawed, because the evidence shows little to 
distinguish between the two at a neurological level, with similar populations recruited for 
both, shown in electrophysiology and spatially by Lewis (2006).  Rizzolatti and Gentilucci 
(1988) suggest that the activation of these canonical neurons under both conditions 
indicates a basis for the automaticity of SR translations. However this is questionable 
because presumably each action must also be served by other neurons in a similar way 
that Georgopoulos et al. (1982) did not find neuronal populations specific to particular 
directions but instead found that combinations of different populations signalled particular 
directions in a way that is more diffuse than simple 1:1 relationships between neurons and 
behaviours.  If this is the case, then this does not provide sufficient evidence for a claim of 
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automaticity, because it does not consider what other neurons are required to complete 
the behaviour.  The authors conclude that the vPMC neurons they measured provided a 
kind of vocabulary of grip-types in PMC based on the principles described above and 
suggested that this would be monitored by anterior parietal neurons, fitting well with the 
spatial evidence given above.  Given the necessity of visual area activation to these results 
with viewed objects, these principles of distributed processing again support the 
visuomotor account of perception. 
Further to Georgopoulos et al. (1982), a compelling body of evidence for early motor 
cortex effects caused by visual and auditory compatibility may be drawn from the work of 
Requin, Riehle and colleagues. Requin and Riehle (1995) collected intracranial data from 
motor cortex with two monkeys over two experiments.  The first was a mixed go, no-go 
and two-choice paradigm in which one monkey was trained to align a pointer with visual 
targets (LEDs) by using unimanual flexion/ extension wrist movements. It was found that 
motor neurons responded to the signal very early, between 113ms and 173ms.  Overall, 
similar effects were observed in the go and no-go trails, with the effect most pronounced 
when time-locked to the movement onset.  The authors interpreted this experiment as 
showing that the motor component of sensorimotor neurons is activated by directional 
information, with this activation peaking at around 150ms.  This was strongest in the go 
trails but was still clearly detectable in the no-go trials. The timing of these effects coincide 
well with the data from Georgopoulos et al. (1982) who found effects commencing before 
200ms in a slightly different paradigm.   
In their second experiment, Requin and Riehle (1995) examined the temporal overlap of 
perceptual and motor processes in a fairly typical SRC paradigm.  This is an interesting 
question for any visuomotor account because these accounts claim that the work of 
perception and action is shared so temporal factors should be able to elucidate the way in 
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which the work is shared by showing when different systems make their contributions.  To 
assess this, they used a variation on their first task, this time with compatible and 
incompatible trials that were determined by the colour of the visual target. They found a 
behavioural SRC effect (shorter RT and shorter movement time for compatible trials than 
incompatible trials) and a neural correlate of this SRC effect in 114 neurons in primary 
motor cortex.  More interestingly, they found that the earliest motor cortex activity 
associated with the stimulus was the same for compatible and incompatible stimuli.  That 
is to say the initial phase of activity was facilitatory for both compatible and incompatible 
trials, however this was brief and incompatible trials yielded opposite activity to 
compatible trials soon after.  The authors suggested that the visually triggered motor 
cortex neurons appear to be targets for response relevant information and so their 
activation provides direct evidence for the automatic activation of compatible responses.  
They went on to say the these neurons appear to play quite a different role to those in 
primary sensory areas, despite their activation by visual stimuli and that one could argue 
either way for their status as sensory or motor neurons.  This conclusion gets to the core of 
the embodied viewpoint, functionality can be almost impossible to put into discrete 
categories and so it becomes more important to consider synergy. This study provides 
excellent evidence that visual information selectively activates motor cortex.  It also shows 
that the selective components of this activation are preceded by non-selective activation 
that appears to spring automatically from the perception of the stimulus. 
Zhang, Riehle, Requin and Kornblum (1997) conducted another SRC study using Rhesus 
monkeys who were trained to align a pointer with coloured LEDs that required an 
extension or a flexion of the wrist, similar to Requin and Riehle (1995) and used the same 
LED arrangements. Both RT and MT were measured, as was activity in 154 neurons in 
motor cortex.  It was found that initial motor activation correlated with the side of the LED, 
with differential activity between the trial types peaking early at 160ms.  Differences 
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between neuronal responses to the mapping rule were observed to peak at around 260ms, 
around the same time as the compatibility effect.  Average RTs were 336ms (SD 33ms), 
indicating that each trial was resolved extremely quickly and reinforcing the notion that 
the speed of responses indicate a rapid link from vision to action.  This study provides a 
result that is inaccessible to behavioural studies too; it was found that after the response 
had begun, the differences associated with the compatibility effect persisted.  One 
limitation of these data is that as well as being interpreted as the result of SR compatibility, 
the compatibility effect observed at 260ms could also be interpreted as SS congruence 
between LED colour and location, because the LED colour indicated the response location.  
This cannot be resolved because the authors only analysed the correct trials. However they 
suggest that whether SR compatibility or SS congruence the neurons still belong to a 
generic class of SR association neurons that translate the visual stimulus into a behavioural 
response and so are still doing the kind of visuomotor transforms that are pertinent to this 
thesis.  Overall, this study provides evidence that SR translation processes have a dynamic 
timecourse in motor cortex in which stages are not discrete but motor activity changes 
based on the simple visual input being parsed and then filtered through the mapping rule, 
implying continuous processing as well as a role for the task in the transformations.  That 
said, the average overall RT is shorter than in many of the human studies cited in the 
previous chapter so the timecourse may not be perfectly reflected in humans, however the 
demonstration of the principle of rapid and selective motor activation by visual stimuli 
remains clear. 
Two further SRC experiments conducted by Riehle, Kornblum and Requin (1997) found a 
systematic motor cortex effect based on the mapping rule and supported the conclusions 
from Zhang et al. (1997).  Two Rhesus monkeys were presented with stimuli on the left and 
right that were compatible or incompatible with left or right movements, with movements 
signalled by high or low pitched tones that were presented to the left or right ear using 
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similar apparatus to Requin and Riehle (1995).  The procedure for their first experiment 
was as that of Zhang et al. (1997) but using two Rhesus monkeys.  In their second 
experiment equipment and procedure were almost identical except that the laterality of 
the stimulus presentation was irrelevant to the mapping rule, with three white LEDs used 
to show the locations with which to align the pointer and the laterality of the response was 
signalled by a high or low tone.  Using a tone closely resembles the manipulations seen in 
Simon and Ruddell (1967) and Tucker and Ellis (1998).  154 neurons in primary motor 
cortex were monitored in monkey one and 123 in monkey two.  Behaviourally they found 
the typical SRC effect, with shorter RTs on compatible trials than incompatible.  Their 
intracranial recordings identified several populations of neurons that were associated with 
different aspects of the task, with a population for the side on which the stimulus was 
presented, a population that varied with the response rule and one that varied with the 
response side.  These populations also showed considerable overlap, supporting the idea 
that the visuomotor transformations entailed in this kind of paradigm are continuous 
rather than discrete. Examining the figures in this experiment, these effects were observed 
to occur very rapidly with effects observed in cell populations related to response peaking 
as early as 100ms and not later than 200ms, with incompatible trials persisting until up to 
400ms, around 150ms longer than in compatible trials. They also found a good deal of 
overlap between these factors, showing that the transformation of visual information to 
motor information is not a discrete process but rather a continuous one, representing a 
problem for the information-processing models in chapter two.  Revealed by these 
continuous changes is an interesting result; the data suggest that the increased reaction 
times observed in incompatible trials may be due to an automatic activation of compatible 
responses that need to be overridden in order to supply the correct (incompatible) 
response as indicated by the longer activations observed for incompatible trials as well as 
54 
 
the large overlap of different populations of neurons in the observed effects, as in Zhang et 
al. (1997).   
These data are supported by Riehle and Requin (1995), where two monkeys were trained 
to rotate a handle using wrist flexion/ extension movements in order to signal a response 
in a movement precueing RT task whilst intracranial data were recorded from 411 neurons 
in primary motor cortex, premotor cortex, somatosensory cortex and parietal cortex.  
Movement direction and required force were precued by different coloured LEDs, in a 
similar arrangement to the other studies cited here.  They found different populations of 
neurons associated with stimulus onset, response and compatibility, similar to those 
studies cited above.  The populations behaved differently during different stages of the 
preparation (when processing the precues) and execution (MT and RT) of the response.  
Some of these differences clustered around the precuing of direction and force, with 
primary motor cortex found to respond most strongly to both.  Different regions were seen 
to be differentially influenced by the stage of processing, interacting with how much (if 
any) information was cued on movement direction and force, again indicating a continuous 
flow of visual to motor translations, this time under cueing conditions, with the LED display 
interacting with the response rules to yield primary motor cortex activation associated not 
only with the execution but also the preparation of responses. Upon the presentation of a 
cue, activation rapidly increased with a component lasting around 100ms reflecting the 
nature of the cue, again showing the rapidity with which the visual input selectively 
activates motor cortex and with which the input is resolved into motor preparations and 
outputs.   
Further evidence for the timing and duration of these effects may be drawn from a wide 
pool of research, such as Weinrich, Wise and Mauritz (1984) who found an effect at 138ms 
or Johnson, Ferraina, Bianchi, Caminiti (1996) who found an effect of an instructive 
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stimulus in motor cortex at 166ms.  However, these single unit studies have been included 
not only because the method gives a very direct sense of what is happening in motor 
cortex during compatibility effects, when it is happening and how long it is happening for 
but also because they show that the kind of processing that is implicated from human SRC 
appears to hold in primates too.  This is interesting because one of the principles espoused 
by the proponents of embodiment is that comparative studies can evince the nature of the 
heuristic processes that allow real time interaction (cf. Clark, 1998), with the emphasis on 
heuristics.  However, the use of primates introduces a problem too; primates do not share 
the same relationships with objects as humans and as such many of the studies cited here 
used spatial SRC rather than affordance SRC paradigms.  This means that whilst the 
comparison may be valid at a neural level, it is not necessarily the same at a behavioural 
level.  This is of little concern to the present thesis however, as these hallmark studies in 
the early SRC literature provide an excellent foundation in the physiology of visuomotor 
transformations as well as showing the utility of temporally-acute methods for 
understanding SRC processes.   
As discussed above, rapid and reliable but fairly brief changes occurred between 100ms 
and 200ms upon presentation of a stimulus (or precue) just as hypothesised from the 
behavioural evidence presented in chapter two, with some effects commencing even 
before 100ms.  Other studies showed premotor cortex concurrently activated with visual 
areas in this time period, again indicating the visuomotor nature of perception, in the vein 
of Georgopoulos et al.’s (1982) demonstration that directional effects were produced by 
combinations of neuronal populations acting in concert.  A remarkable finding is that there 
appears to be an automatic component where the ipsilateral response is briefly activated 
before the rule-based responses are processed.  This shows the additional power in 
physiological investigations and provides part of the rationale for the use of 
electrophysiological measures in the experimental chapters.  To complete this review and 
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rationale and to further elucidate the temporal dynamics of compatibility effects, human 
electrophysiological evidence in SRC will be considered. 
3.3.2 Electrophysiological evidence 
The previous section has demonstrated the usefulness of high temporal resolution in 
understanding the processing underlying the SRC phenomenon, however it was limited by 
the use of non-human participants.  So, this section will now consider temporal evidence 
from human participants gained by the use of the Event-Related Potential (ERP) technique.  
Compared with single-unit recordings, ERPs have the advantage of being able to monitor 
activity at several sites across the scalp and so can monitor more regions in a single session 
and is completely non-invasive, however this comes at a cost to spatial acuity.   
When dealing with lateralised motor preparations, another ERP-based technique can be 
employed that focuses on just two sensors, one in each hemisphere positioned over 
precentral gyrus, typically C3 and C4 in the 10/20 system.  Due to the contralateral control 
of the effectors, potentials from one hemisphere can be subtracted from the other, 
removing any noise associated with the testing environment or resting state activity from 
the signal and leaving only activity related to motor preparation; the Lateralised Readiness 
Potential (LRP).  Using this technique, movement preparations are characterised by 
negative-going waves and potentials are larger when contralateral to the employed 
effector (c.f. Vaughn, Costa & Ritter, 1968; Kutas & Donchin, 1980).  LRP measures 
selective response preparation and removes noise by using a subtraction procedure; 
ipsilateral motor activity is subtracted from the contralateral motor activity for one 
response hand and the same calculation is then performed for the opposite hand.  Or in 
the Coles (1989) derivation, the contralateral activity is subtracted for the ipsilateral 
activity for the opposite hand, producing a positive-going wave.  Then, the output for one 
response hand is subtracted from the other, with the process yielding much smaller values 
57 
 
than the initial input.  These smaller values reflect only differences in response preparation 
between hands and theoretically should have very little noise.  This procedure is given in 
the following equation (from Osman, Bashore, Coles, Donchin and Meyer, 1992): 
Left hand (C3 – C4) – right hand (C3 – C4) 
LRPs are widely accepted as selectively monitoring motor activity and make an ideal 
method for cognitive neuroscience orientated investigations of SRC and visuomotor 
processing.  This section will consider the ERP and LRP results from SRC-type paradigms, 
considering particularly the timing of response preparation effects in motor cortex, as well 
as issues related to the automaticity and selectivity of these effects. 
Some relatively early evidence for the rapidity of spatial affordance effects may be drawn 
from Osman, Bashore, Coles, Donchin and Meyer (1992), who used LRPs in a mixed 
paradigm consisting of choice RT combined with a go/ no-go paradigm.  They also recorded 
RT and EMG.  In the first experiment, participants held a joystick in each hand and were 
briefly presented (50ms) with a command signal that appeared to the left or right of 
fixation, not dissimilar to Michaels’ (1988) as discussed above.  If the signal was a letter, 
participants moved a joystick towards the letter (a go trial), which joystick was determined 
by the side that the signal appeared on (choice RT).  If the signal was a digit, they did not 
move their joystick (a no-go trial).  It is important to note that both the choice RT and go/ 
no-go component were dependent on different characteristics of the presentation.  The 
LRPs revealed that initial activation was not statistically different for the go and no-go 
trials, with large components elicited from 100-200ms after stimulus onset for both trial 
types.  After this period, the LRPs for the two trial types began to diverge, with go trials 
eliciting larger amplitudes (~9µV) and no go trials eliciting some negative amplitudes (~-
2µV).  On go trials, EMG revealed large potentials commencing 200-300ms after the 
presentation of the command signal, indicating that the fundamentals of the response had 
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already been computed.  Importantly, no EMG activity was observed on correct no-go trials 
meaning that the LRP results could not be due to small undetected movements.  These two 
results have an interesting implication; the lack of EMG on no-go trials indicates that 
participants did complete the go/ no-go discrimination before response preparation. 
However, if response preparation occurred after this in a serial fashion then one might not 
predict the detected LRP effects because the authors hypothesised that the brief 
presentation (50ms) of the stimulus would only convey partial information that they 
suggested would decay very rapidly.  They argue that this strongly indicates parallel 
processing, with serial limits evinced by the lack of an EMG effect.  The depth and 
specificity of these claims illustrate the power of neuroscience methods in addressing 
questions of response preparation, particularly methods with great temporal resolution.  In 
order to rule out an alternative explanation, a second experiment was conducted that was 
identical but this time dissociated the location of the signal and the identity of the signalled 
response, employing elements from an SRC paradigm. As in the first experiment, the 
response hand was determined by the location of the signal however compatibility was 
determined by condition. Compatible and incompatible trials were determined by a 
response rule that asked participants to either respond with an ipsilateral (as in 
experiment one) or contralateral button press with alternating blocks of each.  This tests 
whether the LRP results observed in experiment one were specific to the response hand or 
command signal.  The use of SRC-like conditions was also reasoned to affect preparation 
time, given the RT advantage usually observed for compatible over incompatible trials.  A 
significant behavioural compatibility effect was obtained.  As in experiment one, EMG 
revealed little activity in the no-go trials and was not statistically different from zero.  For 
go trials, EMG peaks commenced at around 300ms, again indicating the rapidity with which 
the task information was computed.  LRP data again revealed effects becoming significant 
from 100-200ms; at 150ms after stimulus onset for compatible no-go trials and 160ms for 
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compatible go trials with a long delay before significance was reached on incompatible 
trials, with 260ms for incompatible go trials and 270ms for compatible no-go trials.  It is 
important to note that t-tests against a baseline of zero revealed that no-go trials were 
significantly different to baseline and so did show an effect.  When examining the 
difference waves for go and no-go trials for compatible and incompatible mappings, a 
startling effect emerges; the waves can be seen to diverge even before 100ms, although 
they do not reach significance until after 100ms this is still impressively early. The authors 
concluded that experiment two replicated and extended experiment one, again showing 
LRP for no-go trials in the absence of EMG activity and again showed a dissociation of 
different stimulus properties in the onset and divergence of the LRP.  Overall, the authors 
suggested that the latencies observed in this experiment indicate parallel processing of the 
features of the command signal that indicated whether it was a go or no-go trial and what 
side to make a response because each component of the command signal appeared to 
exert a different effect of the waves, but at the same latency; the polarity of the potential 
appeared to vary with the lateralisation of the command signal, but this did not interact 
with spatial compatibility.  Spatial compatibility instead appeared to interact with the go/ 
no-go signal, with similar latencies emerging for both that were affected by spatial 
compatibility between command signal and response.  That said, it is easy to reconsider 
these data in an affordance framework wherein stimulus onset yields an affordance (albeit 
a spatial, rather than an object affordance), explaining the highly similar early activity in go 
and no-go trials, before the response rule takes over and yields the divergence observed in 
LRP.  This does not trouble Osman et al.’s interpretation on parallel processing, but rather 
compliments it by giving a basis for the early effects.  The timing of the effects here is 
extremely interesting to the present work, meshing well with the claims from the 
behavioural affordance SRC literature on the rapidity of the affordance effects.  Overall, 
this study provides LRP timings that broadly coincide with those seen in other studies cited 
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in this thesis even though Osman et al. did not use real object stimuli like other studies 
discussed here.  That said their experimental set-up was similar to Michaels’ (1988) 
abstract catching affordance experiment, meriting the relation to an affordance 
explanation. Moreover, this study provides an insight into the parallel nature of the early 
stages of visuomotor processes, with EEG directly demonstrating parallel activation just as 
suggested in the previous chapters and with the rapidity suggested in previous chapters.   
Direct support for Osman et al. (1992) may be drawn from Miller and Hackley (1992).  They 
employed the same mixed forced choice and go/ no go paradigm as Osman et al. (1992) 
and found highly comparable results.  Although slightly later, very early LRP components 
again support the rapidity of visuomotor transformations for both trial types.  A 
particularly interesting result here was the role of stimulus size and shape; it was found 
that readily recognisable information on stimulus shape reliably cued motor preparation 
based on the response rule, speaking directly to the grip-type studies cited above where 
stimulus size and shape is highly salient.  This result also shows the rapidity with which the 
visual information is not only parsed but also how early the response rule comes to bear 
on processing the stimulus.  However it was also found that once the stimulus size had 
been parsed, the motor preparation based on stimulus shape could be aborted rapidly.  
This again supports the possible distinction of grip-type and lateralised affordance SRC 
because the shape of handles in lateralised experiments and the associated binary choice 
shows less variation than the continuum of different size and shape information in a grip-
type experiment, particularly when accounting for practical concerns such as visual angle, 
where a larger object may end up subtending a similar angle to a smaller object in order to 
maintain a balanced stimulus set.   
Miller and Hackley (1992) also replicated the finding that no-go trials show no EMG activity 
despite similarities in the LRPs up to around 200-250ms.  As above, the null result in EMG 
61 
 
for no-go trials dissociates different stages of response preparation, with the earliest 
stages of response preparation which were begun by simple stimulus features such as 
shape and size, confined to motor cortex.  When taken with EMG peaks emerging at 
around 200-350ms after stimulus presentation in Osman et al. (1992) and Miller and 
Hackley (1992).  One curious result (that shall prove pertinent in the experimental 
chapters) was that once the LRPs diverged at around 250-300ms, they remained that way 
until the end of the experiment.  This replicates not only Osman et al. but is also supported 
by comparative single-unit recordings from Requin and Riehle (1995).  This result was 
extended here by pointing out that because there were no EMG potentials on no-go trials 
that motor activation does not necessarily lead to motor output or muscle preparation in 
the effectors and so the early activation may be aborted according to task demands, 
providing it is before neuro-muscular activation.  Overall, this study lends further support 
to parallel accounts of visuomotor processing and contradicts fully discrete explanations 
(e.g. DO model, described in ch.2) by again demonstrating that partial information is 
sufficient to commence motor preparation but does not support fully continuous models 
either because when stimuli only varied in size, there was no evidence of preliminary 
response preparation.  This study also further bolsters the evidence for the role of 
intention in SR translation and in so doing provides further support for questioning or 
constraining the claims of automaticity put forward in the literature. 
More recent support for these points may be taken from Hohlefeld, Nikulin and Curio 
(2010) who set out to explore the difference between overt and covert movements (e.g. 
motor imagery) and in the process, found an early effect of visual stimuli in motor cortex 
using LRP.  18 participants were shown the letters ‘L’ and ‘R’ presented centrally, indicating 
the hand of response whilst ERPs were recorded.  Effectively, this experiment was 
comprised of compatible trials in an abstract compatibility task in which participants 
related the identity of the stimulus to a response hand.  Participants were instructed to 
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make an overt thumb movement in the overt movement condition, to imagine the same 
movement in the motor imagery condition and to make the smallest possible thumb 
movements for a quasi-movement condition, in order to make the movements barely 
detectable by EMG whilst still having participants make a response of some kind.  The key 
result was a motor component in LRP arising at 120ms but only for overt and not for covert 
movements, where no effects were found.  Similarly, activation on overt movement trials 
clustered over sensors C3, C4, C5, C6, FFC5h/6h and CCP5h/6h however these areas did 
not differ significantly from baseline on the covert movement trails.  This is interesting on 
its own because covert movements are generally considered to share the same 
characteristics as a real movement contraction including sharing the same circuitry, up to 
the point of the final muscle contraction.  This shows another advantage of the temporal 
sensitivity of electrophysiological measures, because based on the spatial evidence 
presented in Lewis (2006) one would predict the same populations being enlisted for overt 
and covert movements.  Perhaps instead, the temporal sensitivity here shows that whilst 
these areas may become active, they are not active at the same time on equivalent trials.  
In terms of this thesis however, the timing of the component is most interesting.  120ms is 
extremely early for a visual stimulus to activate motor cortex in what are effectively 
compatible trials.  One might predict, based on Osman et al. (1992) or on the behavioural 
literature, that incompatible trials may show a later effect, however this is not 
substantiated here.  This study does however provide an interesting caveat, particularly 
when considering automaticity in SR translation; when viewing the same stimuli a motor 
effect was only observed for the overt movement condition and not the covert condition 
and the authors concluded that this provides evidence for the role of intention in the SR 
translation process because there was no intention to make a response on the covert 
trials, hence there being no motor activation.  Conversely, on the overt trials where there 
was the intention to act a motor preparation was observed.  This questions the notion of 
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automaticity in SR translation because if one has no intention to make an overt response 
to the stimulus, this early motor component does not obtain.  The picture is not 
completely clear however, with the authors stating that later activations can be shown to 
be functionally equivalent.  The authors offer some suggestions as to why other studies 
have not obtained effects quite as early, attributing much to the sensitivity of their 
particular LRP method in dealing with components of variable polarity that would be 
averaged out in typical LRP/ ERP studies.  They also suggest a difference may be drawn 
from the overt movement being a simple thumb abduction, rather than a button press as 
in comparable studies, meshing nicely with the arguments presented above around the 
response having an effect not only on reaction time, but also on the processing serving the 
RTs.  The authors suggest that the early component may reflect hand selection processes, 
however this is not supported by the no-go trials from Osman et al. (1990), wherein an 
early effect was obtained even without the necessity of a movement.  Both studies shared 
abstract letter/digit stimuli and although Osman et al. effectively had a Simon paradigm, 
overall this points towards the response shaping the way stimuli are perceived.  This 
supports the distinction of response types suggested from the behavioural citations above, 
as well as providing direct evidence for the role of intention in SR translation.   
Another approach comes from an investigation of motor activity elicited by masked stimuli 
that was conducted by Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998).  They set out to find whether 
motor activation would be affected by masked stimuli presented for extremely short 
durations, such that they were almost imperceptible.  Over three experiments they found 
that masked arrow primes (i.e. >> or <<) that indicated the hand with which to execute a 
button press (same side in compatible condition and opposite side for incompatible 
condition) selectively influenced motor cortex, however it was not in the predicted 
direction.  They found a negative compatibility effect, with slower RTs on compatible trials 
than incompatible trials.  Their LRP analysis showed a pattern similar to that described 
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above, where the earliest stages (~200ms after prime onset) appeared to show the partial 
activation of a compatible response based solely on the visuomotor transformation before 
being countermanded at around 300ms after prime onset and yielding a negative 
compatibility in LRP, supporting the behavioural negative compatibility effect.  This is 
interesting as it shows the same overall effect as Osman et al. and the supporting citations 
given above; the earliest stages of response activation seem to be based solely on the 
visual input, but this seemingly automatic early effect swiftly changed, exhibiting the 
opposite pattern of results.  An extremely interesting feature of this investigation is the 
inclusion of neutral trials, something that many SRC studies do not include.  These neutral 
trials allowed Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) to conclude that not only was there a 
reversal of the effect, but also that this reversal was due to the inhibition of compatible 
responses.  They were able to conclude this because the compatible trails showed a 
performance cost relative to neutral trials and incompatible trials showed a performance 
gain compared to neutral trials.  The LRP effects observed in this experiment were a little 
later than those cited above, however this is likely due to the use of a masking procedure 
and the described reversal of the effects.  This experiment supports the idea that the task 
and stimulus presentation can constrain and modify the apparently automatic activation of 
compatible responses.  This is a possible candidate for the mechanism by which human 
agents are able to make goal-directed actions on affording objects, without the 
interference of conflicting affordances from non-goal objects. If task parameters and 
stimulus presentations were not constraining the automatic activation of compatible 
responses then there would be a great deal of interference from task-irrelevant stimuli in 
routine activities.  This expands on the idea of the role of intention in affordance SRC as 
discussed so far by showing that the intention to act on the object still yields an effect, 
even with a brief presentation.  Moreover, it allies the idea of intention with the selective 
activation of motor cortex by action relevant stimulus features by showing that 
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incompatible responses are inhibited according to the response rule, meaning that 
intention to act is also interacting with the response rule.  Were it not, then we would not 
predict inhibition on incompatible trials. 
On the point of selectivity, there is some evidence that man-made objects are a special 
case for visuomotor processes, showing differential processing to animals in a study by 
Proverbio, Del Zotto and Zani (2007).  Participants were presented vertically arranged pairs 
of images of common man-made objects, animals or mixed pairs of both.  They were 
instructed to make a categorical judgement on the stimuli and to withhold their response 
when a mixed pair was presented.  No effects were found in the P1 or C1 time periods, 
however the most striking result was that posterior N1 at occipito-temporal sites 
(electrodes O1, O2, OL, OR, T5, T6) were preferentially activated from 130-180ms, with 
greater amplitudes elicited by images of animals than objects.  The inverse pattern was 
found when measuring frontocentral (electrodes F3, F4, C3, C4) N1 from 130-160ms, with 
preferential activation by objects over animals.  At the same sites, from 200-260ms the 
frontocentral N2 component was more negative for objects than animals.  They also found 
a smaller P300 component to objects than animals from 300-400ms.  This study is striking 
because it appears to show that natural and manmade objects are processed quite 
differently, with selective effects emerging as early as 130ms after stimulus onset.  The 
differential pattern across visual and motor sites speaks to the kind of visuomotor 
processing suggested above, with manmade objects having greater action relevance and so 
showing greater motor activation, with posterior sites appearing to differentiate the 
nature of the different stimulus categories, forwarding action relevant visual information 
selectively to motor cortex.  The authors suggest that the preferential posterior N1 activity 
to animals is related to the animate, homomorphic nature of the stimuli, indicating a 
perceptual representation compared with the more functional representation of tools, 
resolved in motor cortex.   
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Interesting evidence may be drawn from Proverbio, Adorni and D’Aniello (2011), who 
found quite different latency in their study whilst employing a quite different design that 
entailed presenting manipulable stimuli. They showed participants images of manipulable 
tools, non-tool objects and plants whilst recording ERPs.  Participants were only asked to 
respond to images of plants, which numbered 25 out of 325 possible stimuli, effectively 
forming a passive viewing paradigm with plant stimuli as catch trials.  They found an effect 
of action affordance within 250ms of stimulus onset.  A larger anterior negativity was 
observed to tools than objects from 210-270ms as was a larger centroparietal P300 
observed from 550-600ms. The authors used low-resolution electromagnetic tomography 
(swLORETA) to localise the source of the effects to left precentral gyrus and bilateral 
premotor areas, with a leftward hemispheric asymmetry. The authors explained this as 
showing automatic and rapid access to motor properties of stimuli, even when attention is 
devoted to other stimulus categories. Given that no response was required for the tools 
this is particularly interesting because most SRC effects are explained as an interaction 
between stimulus and response. However this study shows an effect much later than other 
studies presented here and in the absence of a response may not be so easy to combine 
with the other citations given here.  That said it is quite difficult to draw clear divisions and 
there are several reasons that these different studies do converge on the same point; the 
latency difference is possibly attributable to a lack of imperative to provide a rapid 
response or maybe to an effect of attention or an interaction of these two factors.  
Another possibility may be suggested based on Miller and Hackley’s (1992) intimation of a 
role for intention in generating these effects, perhaps the lack of intention to respond to 
these stimuli was responsible for a sort of ‘de-tuning’ of the system to such stimuli or 
rather, perhaps the intention to respond to the plant stimuli was responsible.  It is also 
interesting to note that the trials in this experiment were longer than others cited here, 
perhaps also reflecting another potential source of tuning of the system, based in the same 
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reasoning behind the widespread use of jittered trials in psychology experiments; if trials 
are predictable, participants adapt to that and predictability may from a part of their 
response strategies.  The authors claimed that these data suggest that manipulable tools 
command a stronger capacity to capture attention than other objects of equal familiarity, 
and that this capacity is attributable to their affordance and biological relevance and it is 
difficult to suggest that this study is not congruent with the SRC literature, whilst still 
couching SRC effects in an affordance framework as this thesis seeks to do.  To that end, 
although the effects observed here were later than comparable experiments cited here, 
given that there was no explicit motor output, it represents one of the strongest 
demonstrations of affordance and of visuomotor processes in premotor cortex.  This study 
also shows one of the best reasons to use neuroscience methods to examine object 
affordance; it is possible to gather data even when there are no responses made and 
indeed entire paradigms may be designed around this fact to yield data that would be 
difficult to infer from behavioural experiments alone because they always require a 
response, necessarily conflating the notion of action preparation by seen objects with the 
action preparation necessitated by executing the behavioural response.  With 
electrophysiology in particular we are able to see the divergence of different stimulus 
conditions in time, making apparent the role of selectivity and intention in what has been 
characterised as simply automatic by much of the behavioural literature. 
So, a motor cortex effect in the absence of a response led Proverbio et al. (2011) to suggest 
an attention based explanation, however the link was also made by Allport (1987) with the 
selection for action hypothesis, which broadly states that attention shapes visual 
processing according to the action intentions of the observer.  On the face of it, this seems 
like quite a plain statement, but there are considerable ramifications in the context of 
different sources of affordance.  By this hypothesis, attention would be directed by the 
response set because it represents the action intentions/ possibilities, so a lateralised 
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button press response would increase the salience of lateralised handles on objects and 
maintaining particular grips would prime the observer for detecting similar grips.  A 
compelling example of this may be drawn from Van Elk, Van Schie, Neggars and Bekkering 
(2010), who investigated the selection for action hypothesis by showing participants 
objects and asking them to either point at or grasp them, with alternating blocks of each.  
ERP data showed an increased N1 response to grasping compared with pointing.  N1 is not 
typically associated with particular task demands but rather is expected in any visually 
evoked potential to any visual stimulus, so this task-influenced N1 effect is remarkable.  
Moreover, it shows the visuomotor processes that have been touted so far by examining 
motor cortex effects also obtain in visual cortex because the motor component of the task 
showed a detectable difference in visual cortex.  This result allies well with the behavioural 
results from Symes et al. (2008) in the previous chapter, where visual search was shown to 
be speeded by maintaining a particular grip.  These and the other citations showing a role 
for intention in affordance generation and visuomotor processing all support the selection 
for action hypothesis.  The hypothesis also provides a complimentary notion to that of 
affordance, giving a mechanism by which relevant affordances can be extracted and acted 
upon.  Moving into the experimental work, this hypothesis and the discussion of the role of 
intention in affordance effects will be increasingly significant.  The studies cited in this 
section clearly demonstrate the depth of explanation available when examining SRC 
affordance effects using methods that have high temporal resolution.  The SR translations 
happen so rapidly that great temporal acuity is required in order to understand the 
processes and the order of events.   
3.3.3 A note on support from transcranial magnetic stimulation 
As we have seen from the electrophysiological data, both human and primate premotor 
cortex appear to respond to visual stimuli within 200ms of stimulus onset and sometimes 
even before 100ms.  The converging evidence on this point is convincing and yet more may 
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be drawn from another source of evidence; the temporally-orientated neurophysiological 
technique, TMS.  TMS makes use of the relationship between electrical potentials and 
magnetic fields in order to trigger the firing of cells in a desired location with high accuracy. 
This is often used in concert with structural MRI data in order to locate the stimulation in 
the desired brain region.  Schluter, Rushworth, Passingham and Mills (1998) employed this 
technique during a choice RT study which saw participants respond with a button press 
from either middle or index finger on one hand, signalled by the appearance of a large 
circle or small rectangle for one response and a small circle or large rectangle for the other 
response.  This manipulation meant that neither size nor shape defined the response, a 
measure taken in order to lengthen the RTs.  Subjects were stimulated during this task in 
premotor cortex or primary motor cortex, contralateral to the hand of response.  As one 
may expect from the electrophysiological data given above, stimulation of premotor cortex 
from 100-140ms disrupted action selection and led to longer RTs overall.  Similarly, primary 
motor cortex stimulation from 300-340ms also delayed the response, attributed to 
disrupting response deployment.  In a second experiment, ipsilateral premotor and 
primary motor cortices were stimulated.  In this case, RTs were only slowed for left handed 
responses.  This was taken as supporting a left-hemisphere dominated network governing 
action selection, compatible with some of the results given above (e.g. Grezes et al. 2003).  
The timing seen in this experiment comes from a third neurophysiological technique and 
converges well with other sources of evidence presented in this chapter, providing strong 
support.  Similar effects at similar latencies have also been observed with manual 
responses to auditory stimulation with right primary motor cortex stimulation at 25ms 
intervals from 50ms to 125ms showing no preference for which hand was affected, with a 
contralateral effect emerging from 150ms (Koch et al., 2006).  In stroke patients with right 
hemiparesis, TMS applied at 100ms to left premotor cortex slowed RTs by 12%, showing 
that the principle of rapid motor access by visual stimuli for the preparation of responses 
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holds, even when dealing with systems that have been damaged and restructured 
(Johansen-Berg et al. 2002).  
TMS has also been shown to yield quite unexpected results in SRC paradigms, even leading 
to shorter RTs on incompatible trials than compatible when stimulating motor cortex at 
200ms after stimulus onset (Koski, Molnar-Szakacs & Iacobonia, 2005).  This is interesting 
because it appears that the TMS pulse has disrupted the influence of the affordance on the 
process of generating a response and this will become pertinent during the experimental 
chapters.  The overall effect in this study was to slow responses compared with baseline 
RTs, however early (50ms or 100ms) stimulation of left hemisphere was shown to facilitate 
responses made with the contralateral effector.  It is extremely interesting that stimulation 
at 50ms would exert such an effect because this is much earlier than any of the timings 
seen in any other method discussed here, and indeed is earlier than one would predict for 
a motor cortex effect.  This study does provide some caution however, stating that 
nonspecific factors of stimulation appeared to contribute to producing the RT increases, as 
evidenced by a slower response on sham TMS trials compared with baseline trials.  Sham 
trials involve the use of equipment that appears to be the same as that which delivers the 
TMS, but does not actually provide the stimulation and is intended to control for any 
effects of the experimental procedure. For this reason and given the volume of support for 
this core point on timing, the current section will be curtailed, having demonstrated good 
support for the electrophysiological data from another angle. 
3.4 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter has considered evidence from cognitive neuroscience on the generation of 
spatial and object affordance effects.  One of the key themes is the rapidity of the 
affordance effect, with converging evidence from ERP, TMS and single-cell recording all 
indicating that effects commonly emerge at around 100-150ms and sometimes even 
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earlier (e.g. Riehle, Kornblum & Requin, 1997; Koski et al., 2005; Georgopoulos et al., 
1982).  It has also been shown that effects may occur much later, up to 250ms (Proverbio 
et al., 2011) and a connection has been suggested between the pressure to provide a rapid 
response (as a function of trial duration and the frequency with which target stimuli 
appear) and the latency of the effect, with earlier effects appearing with shorter trials and 
with more go trials.  This appears to be connected with and indeed is part of the intention 
to act on the objects (e.g. Hohlefeld, Nikulin & Curio, 2010), however some reports suggest 
that intention is irrelevant and upon viewing an object its affordances are automatically 
parsed (e.g. Proverbio et al., 2011).  This point shall be considered again in the 
experimental chapters.  All of the converging TMS, single-cell recording, fMRI and PET 
evidence presented here indicate that premotor cortex is the seat of these early response 
preparation effects, with primary motor cortex more strongly implicated in response 
execution and inferior parietal lobule implicated in the translation of early response 
preparation into execution, apparently as a function of the response rule (e.g. Grezes et al., 
2003; Cisek, 2007).  Some evidence has also been presented that suggests that early visual 
ERP components may have more of a role to play than typically assumed, with stimulus-
orientated effects in N1 and P1 seen in different studies (Van Elk et al. 2010; Proverbio, Del 
Zotto, Zani, 2007), although not widely reported.   
Of the citations given here, effort has been made to provide as many as possible that deal 
with real objects, however the available evidence is limited and as seen in the previous 
chapters, direct comparisons between different stimulus classes in SRC are difficult to 
avoid.  Also, many experiments have been conducted with quite different parameters and 
this has been suggested above to influence the latency of the results in ERPs. So, the 
experiments in the following chapters will only use full colour photographs of real objects 
as stimuli and will tightly control presentation parameters in order to avoid any potential 
confounds and achieve a consistent comparison across datasets.  An addendum to this also 
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revisits the issue of localisation; behavioural and neurological evidence suggests that grip 
and lateralised stimuli may be served by different networks, different processes and 
exhibit different latencies and so a comparison of grip-type and lateralised affordance 
effects will be attempted under controlled presentation conditions in order to attempt to 
understand the difference between these experiments.  
Moving into the experimental chapters, the emphasis on localisation will decrease given 
the converging evidence presented above.  Instead, the following experiments will focus 
on the latency and timecourse of different affordance classes in LRP and VEPs P1 and N1, 




4. Chapter four 
The core SRC affordance effects 
4.1 Outline 
This chapter describes two experiments based on the familiar SRC affordance studies by 
Tucker and Ellis (1998) and Ellis and Tucker (2000).  These studies (among others discussed 
above) have demonstrated that when objects and responses share characteristics such as 
size or orientation, reduced RT and error rates are observed.  This chapter will expand on 
this by examining the timecourse of the visuomotor processes suggested to underpin this 
effect.  The first experiment will use the lateralised affordances from Tucker and Ellis 
(1998), having participants make a categorical judgement on the stimuli and declare their 
response with a bimanual button press.  The second experiment will use the grip-type 
affordances from Ellis and Tucker (2000) with response devices that simulate interacting 
with the stimulus objects.  Unexpected differences are observed between these different 
affordance classes.  
4.2 Experiment one – lateralised affordance SRC 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have described a burgeoning literature on SRC affordance effects, 
however the overwhelming majority had been conducted using behavioural methods (e.g. 
Michaels, 1988; Michaels, 1993; Thorpe, Fize & Marlot, 1996; Hommel, 1997; Stins & 
Michaels, 1997: Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Ellis & Tucker, 2001; Creem & Proffitt, 2001; 
Craighero et al., 2002; Derbyshire, Ellis & Tucker, 2006; Pappas & Mack, 2008; Van Elk, et 
al., 2010; Pellicano et al., 2010; Girardi, Lindemann & Bekkering, 2010; Borghi, Di 
Ferdinando & Parisi, 2011; Galpin et al., 2011; Recent review: McBride et al., 2012).  The 
claim from such studies is broadly that the action relevant properties of the stimuli cue a 
particular kind of visuomotor preparation in the observer, regardless of their task-
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relevance, although the precise mechanism has been the subject of some debate, 
particularly in terms of differentiating from the Simon effect (see chapters one and two).  
This notion suggests that there should be a detectable event in motor cortex that is 
associated with the SRC affordance effect.  As discussed in chapter three, the Event 
Related Potential (ERP) technique is an ideal candidate to assess this idea, with sub-
millisecond temporal resolution offered by the measurement of electrical activity in human 
subjects through the recording and subsequent segmentation of a continuously recorded 
electroencephalogram. 
This experiment sought to observe neural markers, originating in visual and motor cortices 
that signify the behavioural advantage observed in the SRC literature that has led to these 
processes being characterised as visuomotor.  It is predicted, based on the behavioural 
claims that this effect ought to be detectable rapidly after stimulus onset. This is because 
the effect is seen in forced choice experiments with reaction times of approximately 500ms 
(e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 2001), suggesting that this effect must be exerted very early given the 
time taken to compute the affordance, compute the response and convert the computed 
response into a motor program to be sent downstream for execution by the effectors.   
In order to establish the neural marker of the compatibility effect, the first experiment 
consisted of a typical SRC experiment that used lateralised objects and lateralised 
responses as the dimension for compatibility, similar to Tucker and Ellis (1998).  
Participants performed a categorical judgement task in which the laterality of the objects 
and the responses were not task relevant.  In order to control for the Simon effect, the 
same objects were featured in both left and right rotations and Lateralised Readiness 






70 students (26 male) from the University of Plymouth were recruited.  All were right 
handed, aged 18-28 (mean = 20 years, SD = 1.60), with normal or corrected vision and no 
known history of neurological or dermatological problems. In all experiments in this thesis, 
handedness was determined by self-report and checked by a simplified version of the 
Edinburgh handedness index.  A total of six participants were rejected due to excessive 
artefact, defined as greater than 35% of segmented data rejected due to ocular, muscular 
or environmental artefact in the EEG.  This led to a total of 64 participants’ data entering 
into the averaging procedures 
Stimuli 
Participants viewed a single image at a time from a pool of 84 colour images photographed 
from a total of 42 objects graspable handles which could be categorised as either kitchen 
or tool items, with 21 objects of each category.  Note that whilst there were different 
examples of the same kind of object (e.g. small and large frying pans) no single object 
image appeared any more than another.  Each object was photographed twice; once with 
the handle at 45° to the right and once with the handle at 45° to the left, producing 42 
right-oriented and 42 left-oriented objects for the grand total of 84 images.  Each image 
appeared 6 times in the course of the experiment, three times in each rotation, with each 
rotation presented once in each of 3 blocks.  The presentation order was randomised 
within each block and was different for all participants.  E-prime’s E-studio (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc) was used to generate the script and present the experiment.  





Images were viewed on a 21” Viewsonic P227f CRT monitor at 20 degrees viewing angle at 
a resolution of 1280x1024 and a refresh rate of 100Hz.  A  fixation cross (‘+’) appeared in 
the centre of the screen for 1000-1200ms before ceding to a randomly selected image 
from the pool described above for up to 2000ms or until a button response was made. 
Following this a blank screen appeared for up to 400-600ms until a symbol (‘ (-) (-) ’) 
appeared for 1400ms instructing the participants that it was possible for them to blink.  
This ‘blink break’ was included to keep the participants from blinking during the trials and 
to therefore reduce the rejection of segments due to EOG artefacts.  See figure 2 for a 
visualisation of the timecourse of each trial. 
Participants were asked to categorise the images as either kitchen items or tools and 
signify their response by a speeded bimanual button response using a left or right button 
press.  This creates two possible combinations of category and button laterality or 
‘response mappings’; half of the participants responded first with a left button press to 
signal that an item was a tool and a right button press to a kitchen item whilst the other 
half of the participants completed the opposite response mapping; a left button press to a 
kitchen item and a right button press to a tool.  All participants completed both response 
mappings and to ensure that there was no influence of order the first mapping undertaken 
was counter-balanced across participants.  As described above, all responses may be 
classified as either compatible or incompatible based on the lateralisation of the handle 
and the button press; a compatible response would be a right button press to a right-
oriented handle or left button to a left-oriented handle and an incompatible response 





Figure 2. Visual representation of the timecourse of each trial, with each frame 
representing a change in what is displayed.  Each trial consisted of four such changes and 
lasted up to a maximum of 5200ms and was repeated 84 times per block, with a different 
stimulus presented on each trial.  
 
the experiment, participants completed 15 practice trials to give them a chance to get used 
to the experimental conditions, primarily use of the blink break.  Participants were asked 
to repeat this up to three times, or until a minimum of 14 out of 15 trials were answered 
correctly and without EOG contamination. 
EEG Acquisition 
The ERP data was acquired using 29 actively amplified Brain Products Acticap Ag/AgCl 
electrodes in a 32 channel montage (figure 3) arranged according to the international 
10/10 system, with an implicit left mastoid reference (A1) and ground (AFz).  There were 
also two channels recording EOG and a right mastoid electrode (A2) that was averaged 
with A1 offline to form a reference.  Data were recorded at electrode locations FP1, FP2, 
F7, F8, F3, F4, FT7, FT8, FC3, FC4, FCz T7, T8, C3, C4, Cz, TP7, TP8, CP3, CP4, CPz, P7, P8, P3, 




Figure 3. Showing the montage for experiment one consisting of 34 electrodes arranged 
according to the International 10-10 system.  Not pictured here is the implicit reference at A1 
and ground at AFz. 
Electrode impedance was maintained below 20kΩ. The signal was amplified by two 32 
channel Brain Products MR series amplifiers and digitised at 2.5kHz.  Any trials that 
contained a response before 200ms or after 1200ms were rejected, as were any trials that 
contained ocular, muscular or any other artefacts.   
ERP Analysis 
Using Brain Vision Analyser (Brain Products GmbH), the data were then downsampled 
offline to 500Hz before a 0.5-40Hz Butterworth filter was applied and notch filter was 
applied at 50Hz to remove mains noise.  The data were then referenced offline to a 
reference of the average of the two mastoids and a baseline correction was applied taken 
from the 200ms prior to stimulus presentation.  A semiautomatic artefact rejection 
procedure was conducted on all of the segmented data from scalp and EOG electrodes 
using the inbuilt module in Brain Vision Analyser with an amplitude criterion range of -
80µV to 80µV and a gradient criterion of 50µV/ms in order that the procedure only marked 
artefacts.  The output of this process was manually checked for all participants to ensure 
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that no good segments were removed and that no bad segments were allowed into the 
averaged data.  Where more than 35% of segmented data was rejected, the participant 
was removed from the analysis to avoid falsely inflating the sample size. 
4.2.3 Results 
Behavioural data 
Participants correctly categorised 93.62% of stimuli.  Responses less than 200ms and more 
than 1200ms after stimulus onset were excluded in order to remove any accidental 
responses. RTs greater than 2.5SD from the mean cell value were excluded from the 
analysis to remove any remaining outliers.  Repeated measures ANOVA were conducted, 
using factors of object category (kitchen vs. tool) and object compatibility (compatible vs. 
incompatible).  This yielded a significant effect of compatibility (F (1,64) = 6.53, p = 0.012) 
as well as an interaction between compatibility and object category (F (1,64) = 16.81, p < 
.001). 
The typical stimulus-response compatibility effect was observed, with faster responses to 
compatible pairings (542ms) of object and response than incompatible pairings (547ms).  
The interaction revealed a difference in the behaviour of the two categories of stimuli with 
an effect (10.32ms) in the tools (F (1,64) = 6.53, p < .001) and no effect for the kitchen 
items (F < 1).  No such interaction was observed in the errors (p > 0.5). 
LRP data 
LRPs were calculated using the Coles (1989) derivation for compatible and incompatible 
trials: 






With this derivation, potentials recorded in each hemisphere are subtracted separately for 
conditions where the correct response is left or right handed, removing any symmetrical 
activity.   The resulting values index asymmetric activity.  These values are then averaged 
together to create the LRP.  The LRP for compatible trials was calculated by averaging the 
product of subtracting the C3 potential from the C4 potential for left orientated objects 
requiring a left handed response with the product of subtracting the C4 potential from the 
C3 potential for right orientated objects requiring a right handed response.  The LRP for 
incompatible trials was calculated by averaging the product of C3 subtracted from C4 for 
left handed responses to right orientated objects with the product of C4 subtracted from 
C3 for right handed responses to left orientated objects.  These calculations mean that the 
resulting LRPs will have a positive going waveform indicating preparation of an incorrect 
response and a negative going waveform to indicate preparation of a correct response.  
The LRPs may be seen in figure 4.  Compatible LRPs were calculated as: 
[Mean(C4 − C3)𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒 + Mean(C3 − C4)𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒]
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And incompatible LRPs were calculated as: 
[Mean(C4 − C3)l𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒 + Mean(C3 − C4)𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒]
2
 
Averaged LRPs were analysed in five 100ms epochs from 0 to 500ms after stimulus onset 
using a factor of compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) and of object category 
(kitchen vs. tool).  In order to control for the familywise error rate a Bonferroni correction 
was applied by dividing the standard alpha level by the number of comparisons (0.05/5), so 
the corrected α = 0.01.  The only significant effect was observed between from 100 to 
200ms (all other F ‘s< 1) in which congruent trials led to the preparation of the correct 
response hand and incongruent trials led to the preparation of the incorrect response hand 




Figure 4. LRP results for experiment one.  The LRP’s were calculated separately for 
compatible trials (when the handle on the stimulus was orientated in the same direction as 
the button press) and for incompatible trials(when the handle was orientated in the 
opposite direction to the button press).  The red trace plots the grand average for 
compatible trials, the blue trace plots the grand average for incompatible trials and the 
black trace plots the difference of the two.   
ERP data 
Figure 5 shows average ERPs across parietal and occipital electrodes P7, P8, O1, and O2 for 
compatible and incompatible trials.  Average ERP amplitudes were calculated for the visual 
P1 from 70 to 100ms and N1 from 120 to 170ms after stimulus onset.  Repeated measures 
ANOVA was used with factors of response hand (left vs. right), handle orientation (left vs. 




Figure 5. Averaged ERPs for electrodes P7, P8, O1 and O2.  Separate waveforms are 
displayed for each combination of handle orientation and hand of response.  The black 
trace plots left-orientated handles and left handed responses.  The red trace plots left-
orientated handles and right handed responses.  The blue trace plots right-orientated 
handles and left handed responses.  The green trace plots right-orientated handles and 
right handed responses.  
An interaction between hemisphere and handle orientation was observed in P1 (F (1,64) = 
5.98, p = 0.017) and N1 (F (1,64) = 100.87, p < .001).  There was also an interaction of 
handle orientation and response hand in P1 (F (1,64) = 6.91, p = 0.011), with compatible 
responses eliciting greater positivity.  The same interaction of handle orientation and 
response hand was found in N1 (F (1,64) = 5.49, p = 0.022), with greater negativity for 
compatible responses.  These compatibility effects in visual components show that not 
only is there a detectable motor component associated with affordance SRC paradigms, 
but there are also detectable visual effects that mirror the motor effects, supporting the 
notion of visuomotor integration described in the literature review over the notion of 
discrete visual and motor systems.  Following the behavioural finding of a stronger effect 
for tools than kitchen items, a further ANOVA conducted within object categories showed 
that the compatibility effect between handle orientation and response hand was only 
significant in the tool category –as in the LRP data– for P1 (F (1,64) = 10.99, p = 0.001) and 




This experiment found the typical behavioural SRC affordance effect seen in the 
behavioural literature but also demonstrated novel effects in motor cortex and visual 
cortex that appear to provide a neural basis for the well-known SRC affordance effect. 
These data support the notion from embodied cognition that vision and action are tightly 
linked (e.g. Ellis, 2009), as described in the introductory chapters.  The electrophysiological 
data reveals that within 100ms of stimulus onset neural activity occurred that varied 
systematically with the affordance of the objects in both motor and visual cortices.  The 
rapidity of the concurrent visual and motor effects suggests very early (~100ms) 
interaction of visual and motor systems prior to object categorisation and therefore well 
before response selection that matches the idea of visuomotor processing described 
above.  The rapidity with which the effects were detected suggests that the visuomotor 
effects are not produced by relating object affordances to the response rule, because 
semantic access with objects has been shown to occur much later, from 300-600ms, 
marked by the N400 component (e.g. Goto et al., 2010; Van Elk, Van Schie & Bekkering, 
2010; Balconi & Caldiroli, 2011; discussed in detail later).  Currently, the findings appear to 
represent the very early extraction of action relevant properties from the visual 
information however this requires further confirmation over the following experiments.   
Unexpectedly, they show that even low-level visual evoked potentials P1 and N1 are 
modulated by the relation between the actions associated with an object and the action 
intentions of the observer.  This is remarkable considering the literature on P1 and N1 
which states that these components will be detected whenever there is visual input (e.g. 
Van Voorhis & Hillyard, 1977 evoked P1 using only flashing lights) and suggests that they 
are not selective of particular visual properties (e.g. Luck, 2005).   
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These findings support the notion of a visuomotor system that is critical to human 
perception in the way described in the embodied literature given in the introduction.  This 
does not mean to say that all affordances operate in this way.  Semantic affordances for 
example, such as those seen in Tucker and Ellis (2004), who found that object names also 
potentiate actions, clearly operate in a different way given their basis in language.  Rather, 
these data demonstrate a direct link between visual and motor systems, fitting with more 
traditional notions of affordance and providing a neural basis in rapid, concurrent visual 
and motor activation and so supporting key results in the area, such as Tucker and Ellis 
(1998).   
The most surprising results here are the effects in the visual components, N1 and P1.  
These components have typically been thought of as markers of visual attention, varying 
only with non-task stimulus properties such as luminance (e.g. Johannes, Münte, Heinze & 
Mangun, 1995) or due to non-task influences such as the participant’s state of arousal (e.g. 
Vogel & Luck, 2000).  However, these components showed an interaction of handle 
orientation and response hand, forming a compatibility effect.  Visual effects occurred 
contralateral to the object handle, evoking larger N1 and P1 amplitudes.  This is 
remarkable because action intention appears to be guiding the earliest stages of visual 
perception in order to produce this interaction, recalling Symes et al.’s (2008) result where 
preparing a particular grip reduced visual search times for compatible objects.  So, it 
appears that object-based attention is giving rise to these affordance SRC effects, just as 
described by Ellis (2009) but that this is also interacting with available action possibilities, 
as described by Symes et al. (2008).  It also appears that the overall affordance SRC effect 
is not purely motoric, but is rather a composite of visual and motor activation just as 
posited by the embodied account given above.  Interestingly, all effects were stronger for 
tools than kitchen items in visual and behavioural data.  Although this category effect is of 
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no theoretical significance it does imply that the effects observed are closely related, 
because each shows the same pattern across conditions. 
One interpretation of the visual effects is that the visual asymmetry of the objects was 
shifting attention laterally, similar to that seen with spatial cuing (e.g. Handy & Mangun, 
2000; Luck & Hillyard, 1995; Mangun & Hillyard, 1988).  These effects cannot be attributed 
to visual properties of the stimuli because the analyses ensured that comparisons were 
between the same stimuli and all that changed was the response mapping and with it, the 
participant’s expected motor responses. 
Less radical but still of some interest was the observed interaction of hemisphere and 
handle orientation, indicating that the composition of the object appeared to be 
modulating these conventionally independent components similar to spatial cuing (e.g. 
Handy & Mangun, 2000; Luck & Hillyard, 1995).  This is not completely beyond 
expectations (see Hillyard, Vogel and Luck, 1998) but it is difficult to resolve when 
considering the work of Wascher, Hoffman, Sänger and Grosjean (2009).  These authors 
showed that laterally presented stimuli (similar to our centrally presented, lateralised 
stimuli) may elicit an earlier N1 component of greater amplitude, detectable contralateral 
to the stimulus laterality when compared with centrally presented symmetrical stimuli.  
Wascher et al.’s (2009) results predict those here but were attributed to a spatial attention 
shift that occurred well before 300ms.  The present data is insufficient to strongly conclude 
for either object or spatial attention and this is not the focus of the present thesis, but it is 
sufficiently interesting to note that lateralised object stimuli can recreate Wascher et al.’s 
(2009) results. 
This experiment offers two core conclusions; firstly it provides a neural basis for affordance 
SRC effects in motor cortex at around 100ms and also implies the involvement of a 
visuomotor loop from motor to visual cortex.  Moreover it provides first evidence for an 
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influence of action possibilities on early visual components, a previously unforeseen result.  
The next experiment will examine grip type affordances and look at whether similar effects 
are observed. 
4.3 Experiment two – grip-type affordance SRC 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Experiment two will consider another prominent dimension for compatibility seen in the 
literature, referred to here as grip-type compatibility.  This refers to the kind of 
compatibility observed in Ellis and Tucker (2001) where participants were tasked with 
declaring presented stimuli as organic or man made using bespoke response devices that 
forced participants into making precision or power grips.  The objects were all either 
compatible or incompatible with power or precision grips based on their overall size, 
lending the moniker grip-type compatibility because grips were either compatible or 
incompatible with size and shape of objects.  
When considering the behavioural literature, the dimensions for compatibility seen in 
experiment one are difficult to separate from others, such as grip type compatibility, 
simply because they show the same effects in the same metrics, i.e. reduced RT and error 
rates for compatible compared with incompatible SR pairs.  Some authors (e.g. Zhao & Zhu, 
2013) have posited the possibility of a difference in the handling of grip and lateralised 
affordances, but little direct evidence on this distinction is available.  The present approach 
is well suited to providing such direct evidence and this forms the rationale for the present 
experiment; to determine whether the behaviourally equivalent compatibility effects that 
arise from lateralised affordance and grip type affordance are underpinned by the same or 
similar electrophysiological events.  These effects may be described as behaviourally 
equivalent because SRC studies using behavioural metrics are only able to report the global 
reaction time and the error rate and these metrics report the same findings for both 
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affordance classes, however the use of lateralised readiness potentials (LRPs) will allow the 
present investigation to determine whether these different sources of affordance are 
treated in the same way in motor cortex by investigating the timecourse of the neural 
response as with lateralised affordances in experiment one.  
It is difficult to make predictions beyond the behavioural compatibility effect, because no 
work has replicated Ellis and Tucker (2001) in ERP.  In a typical embodied cognition 
framework it can be said that the similarity of response devices should facilitate responses, 
however it is difficult to predict what effect this will have on the affordance component 
observed in experiment one. Furthermore, it is difficult to account for the difference 
between unimanual (as in Ellis and Tucker, 2000) and bimanual use of the grip devices, as 
will be employed here in order to allow for the calculation of LRPs. 
A lack of data on the similarities and differences between different sources of affordance 
make it difficult to offer predictions.  That said, theoretical grounds for a difference may be 
drawn from embodied cognition, which would suggest that physically maintaining a grip 
would scaffold perception in the way shown by Symes et al. (2008) in their change 
blindness paradigm where grip compatibility saw a large RT advantage emerge.  This 
perceptual scaffolding was unavailable to the lateralised object stimuli used in experiment 
one, where participants viewed objects with handles whilst holding a response box that did 
not resemble the handles of any of the objects. 
4.3.2 Method 
Participants 
35 participants (18 females) were recruited, all University of Plymouth students.  All were 
right handed, aged 18-28 (mean = 21, SD= 3.25), with normal or corrected vision and no 
known history of neurological problems.  Two participants were removed from the analysis 
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due to corrupted files and eight participants were removed for excessive artefact, defined 
as greater than one third of segments rejected due to ocular, muscular or other artefact. 
 
Figure 6.  Example stimuli depicting the 2x2 design.  Objects compatible with precision or 
power grips (columns) were chosen based on their classification (rows) as natural (e.g. 
almond, apple) or man-made (e.g. USB pen, sun cream).  Compatibility existed between 
grip required to interact with the object and grip required by the response devices and the 
response rule determined which grip participants made to which category.  Response 
devices are depicted in figure 7. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of colour photographs of 96 objects, classifiable as natural or 
manufactured.  Natural objects consisted of organic items such as fruits, vegetables and 
stones.  Manufactured objects consisted of an array of common household objects.  Of 
each of the two types of stimulus 50% of items required a precision grip to interact with 
them and 50% required a power grip to interact with them.  A precision grip is defined as 
the use of a thumb and index finger to manipulate an object, such as turning a key or 
picking up a coin.  A power grip is defined as the use of the full palm and fingers to pick up 
an item, such as one would to use a hammer or to grasp a door handle when opening a 
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door.  Care was taken to ensure that the stimuli did not contain any lateralised information 
such as handles to avoid contamination by the Simon effect or lateralised affordance 
effects.  Each object was presented three times, once in each of three blocks for a total of 
288 trials per participant. 
 
Figure 7.  Response devices used in experiments two and four.  Devices ran into a 
Psychology Software Systems Serial Response Box that recorded RTs before sending them 
on to the computer. a) Participants grasped this device with a palmar grip, wrapping all 
four fingers around the cylinder to grasp the device with the thumb holding it in place.  
This grip is classed as a power grip.  The cylinder had a cut running down the middle, in 
which a microswitch was positioned to register the responses.  Responses were executed 
by squeezing the cylinder.  b) This simple microswitch was of the same kind as in the 
cylindrical power grip response device.  It was grasped between thumb and forefinger and 






The experiment was presented using the same equipment as experiment one, with the 
same trial format and durations (figure 8).  Participants completed the same practice 
procedure as in experiment one in order to familiarise themselves with the procedure. The 
only changes were to the stimulus and response set (detailed below and in figure 6), which 
led to a slightly greater number of trials overall (288 trials).   
Participants responded to objects using grip devices that forced the participants to mimic a 
power grip or precision grip, depicted in figure 7.  Precision grips were replicated using a 
small switch held between thumb and forefinger and a power grips were replicated by the 
use of a cylinder that required the whole hand to grip.  These devices were seen in Tucker 
and Ellis (2001) where participants used both devices in one hand.  In the present 
experiment participants used the precision grip device in their right hand and the power 
grip device is their left hand.  This allows for the calculation of comparable LRP’s to those 
seen in the lateralised affordance experiments reported here.  
Participants held these response devices throughout the experiment whilst they viewed 
images of objects that were either compatible or incompatible with the grip devices and 
made categorical judgements on whether the objects were natural or manmade, declaring 
their answer with the response devices. Response mappings were counterbalanced across 
participants to ensure that there was no mapping effect.  Half of the participants declared 
objects to be natural with a power grip and the other half did so with a precision grip, and 
vice versa for declaring objects to be manmade.  Half of the objects in each category were 
power or precision grip compatible, meaning that on some trials, objects would be of a 
different grip to the response device, generating an incompatible trial.  Otherwise, the 





Continuous EEG was recorded using Brain Vision Recorder and Brain Products MR plus 
series amplifiers (Brain Products GmbH) at a sampling rate of 500Hz from 64 Ag/AgCl 
electrodes in the following montage, conforming to the 10/10 system consisting of FP1, 
FP2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, FC5, FC1, FC2, FC6, T7, C3, Cz, C3, T8, FCz, CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, TP10, 
P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, Rc, O1, Oz, O2, Rvb, AF7, AF3, AF4, AF8, F5, F1, F2, F6, FT9, FT7, FC3, FC4, 
FT8, FT10, C5, C1, C2, C6, TP7, CP3, CPz, CP4, TP8, P5, P1, P2, P6, PO7, PO3, POz, PO4, PO8.  
Rvb and Rc were used to monitor EOG for the purpose of rejecting segments with 
excessive ocular artefact.  Electrode impedance was maintained below 25kΩ.  EEG was 
referenced to a left mastoid reference electrode online. 
 
Figure 8. Visual representation of the timecourse of each trial in experiment two, with each 
frame representing a change in what is displayed.  Each trial consisted of four such changes 
and lasted up to a maximum of 5200ms and was repeated 96 times per block for a total of 
288 trials per participant, with each stimulus being displayed three times over the course 




Brain vision Analyser 2 (Brain Products GmbH) was used first to filter the data using 0.1-
40Hz bandpass filter, with a 50Hz notch filter to remove mains noise.  A baseline correction 
was applied based on 100ms of data immediately before stimulus onset and the data were 
re-referenced offline using an average of the two mastoids.  The data were divided into 
700ms segments from -100ms to 600ms before and after stimulus onset.  An automatic 
artefact rejection procedure was applied with an amplitude criterion range of -80µV to 
80µV and a gradient criterion of 50µV/ms and the output of this process was manually 
checked to ensure that no artefacts were kept and no good data were rejected.  
4.3.3 Results 
Behavioural data 
Trials with reaction times longer than 1200ms or shorter than 200ms were excluded from 
the analysis, as were trials with RTs that fell beyond 2.5SDs from the mean.  The error rate 
was 2.9% with no significant differences in the errors (p’s > .2).  Mean RT for compatible 
trials with manmade objects was 622ms, and for incompatible trials with manmade objects 
were 13ms slower at 635ms.  Compatible trials with organic objects were the shortest RTs, 
with a mean of 594ms and incompatible trials with organic objects had a mean RT 18ms 
slower, at 616ms.  
Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with factors of object size (power vs. precision) 
and response (power vs. precision).  An interaction of object size and response indicated a 
significantly faster response for compatible trials than incompatible trials (F (1,24) = 40.52, 
p< .001), indicating the typical compatibility effect observed in Ellis and Tucker (2000).  No 
main effects were observed for object size (F (1,24) = 1.659, p = 0.210) or response (F 
(1,24) = 0.795, p = 0.381).  Additional tests revealed that the compatibility effect was 
stronger for organic objects (t (25) = -4.152, p = 0.001) than for man-made objects (t (25) = 
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1.973, p = 0.06), which only showed a tendency towards compatibility.  Additional tests 
also revealed that power responses (610ms) were significantly faster (t (25) = -3.952, p = 
0.001) than precision responses (625ms). 
LRP Data 
LRPs were computed using the Coles (1989) derivation as above, with separate LRPs for 
compatible and incompatible trials.  LRPs were computed as the averaged potential on the 
electrode ipsilateral to response subtracted from the averaged potential on the electrode 
contralateral to response.  For left handed responses this meant that the LRP was 
calculated as C3 subtracted from C4 and for right handed responses as C4 subtracted from 
C3.   
The LRP is depicted in figure 9.  Repeated measures ANOVA with a factor of compatibility 
(compatible vs. incompatible) were conducted from 0-500ms at five 100ms intervals, with 
a sixth interval (225-400ms) based on visual inspection of the differences between the 
waveforms for each condition.  A Bonferroni correction was used to control the familywise 
error rate for the six comparisons, generating an alpha criterion of (0.05/6) α = 0.0083.  RM 
ANOVA revealed a borderline effect of compatibility from 200-300ms (F (1,24) = 4.347, p = 
0.048) and becoming significant with the Bonferroni corrected α from 300-400ms (F (1,24) 
= 5.339, p = 0.003).  Based on visual inspection of the data another epoch was defined, 
yielding a significant effect of compatibility from 225-400ms (F (1,24) = 8.993, p < .006), 
demonstrating greater negativity when SR pairs were matched than when they were 
mismatched.   
Additional t-tests revealed the 225-400ms effect was primarily borne of facilitation, with 
the compatible LRP differing significantly from baseline (t(24) = -6.413, p < .001) and the 
incompatible wave failing to differ significantly from baseline (t(24) = -1.890, p = 0.071).  
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This fits with assertions from studies such as Galpin et al. (2011) that affordance SRC is 
driven by facilitation rather than inhibition.  However, from 300-400ms both compatible 
(t(24) = -6.600, p < .001) and incompatible (t(24) = -3.074, p = 0.005) waves were 
significantly different from baseline indicating a delay in developing the motor activity for 
the rule-cued response on incompatible trials.  However during this period the polarity of 
the LRP for incompatible trials was negative, indicating the preparation of the correct 
response hand. As incompatible affordance driven would be typified by positive LRP (as in 
Experiment 1), it would appear that this deviation is likely associated with motor 
preparation associated with the execution of the rule-cued response. 
 
Figure 9. LRP results for experiment two.  The LRP’s were calculated separately for the 
compatible trials, when stimulus and response grips were the same, and for the 
incompatible trials, when stimulus and response grips were different.  The red trace plots 
the grand average for compatible trials, the blue trace plots the grand average for 
incompatible trials and the black trace plots the difference of the two.  
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Figure 10. Depicting the activity on sensors P7, P8, O1 and O2 for visual P1 and N1.  The 
black trace plots the data for power-grip objects with power-grip responses.  The red trace 
plots the data for power-grip objects with precision-grip responses.  The blue trace plots 
the data for precision-grip objects with power-grip responses.  The green trace plots the 
data for precision-grip objects with precision-grip responses.  Unlike the previous 
experiment, ANOVA revealed no effects of compatibility in P1 or N1, and only main effects 
of object category. 
ERP data 
Average ERP amplitudes were calculated for the visual P1 from 70 to 100ms and N1 from 
120 to 170ms after stimulus onset, depicted in figure 10.  Repeated measures ANOVA was 
used with factors of object size (power vs precision), response (power vs precision), 
electrode hemisphere (left vs. right) and electrode position (parietal vs. occipital).   
Analysis of P1 revealed no compatibility effects, unlike the previous experiment.  Analyses 
of P1 did reveal a significant main effect of object category (F (1,24) = 7.903, p = 0.010), 
which is unsurprising considering the variation in the stimulus sets.  A main effect of 
electrode position (F (1,24) = 76.235, p < .001) was observed, indicating a preference for 
occipital sensors.  Perhaps most interesting was a  main effect of response (F (1,24) = 
5.074, p = 0.035), supporting the idea advanced in Symes et al. (2008) that maintaining 
particular grips affects the perception of object stimuli.  No significant interactions were 
found that would indicate any compatibility effects in P1.  No effects of mapping were 
found (all p’s < .141). 
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Analysis of N1 also failed to reveal any compatibility effects.  However a main effect of 
response was also found in N1 (F (1,24) = 7.487, p = 0.012), lending further support to the 
idea that response (and the actions they cause participants to prepare) affects object 
perception, just as suggested by Symes et al.’s (2008) visual search task.  A significant 
effect of electrode hemisphere was also detected (F (1,24) = 7.525, p = 0.012), indicating 
greater activation in the left hemisphere.  A significant effect of electrode position was also 
detected (F (1,24) = 15.921, p = 0.001), which showed greater activation on occipital 
sensors than parietal. 
4.3.4 Discussion 
The typical RT effect was observed, in line with Ellis and Tucker (2000) and Tucker and Ellis 
(2001), indicating faster responses when stimulus and response shared grip-type 
characteristics compared with when they did not.  A matching compatibility effect was 
observed in LRP from 225-400ms, with compatible responses eliciting greater negative 
amplitudes than incompatible responses.  This signals rapid activation of motor cortex 
when viewing affording objects.  These results support the typical interpretation that SRC 
affordance effects represent motor facilitation by overlap between action characteristics 
(i.e. affordances) of SR pairs.   
However, no compatibility effects were detected in visual components, questioning the 
assertion from Ellis and Tucker (2000) and others that grip-type compatibility effects 
represent visuomotor processing.  When examining visual and motor activation during the 
task, no effect of compatibility was observed in P1 or N1 where they were observed in the 
lateralised SRC affordance experiment (one).  That said, a main effect of response was 
detected in both P1 and N1 which recalls the findings from Symes et al. (2008) who used 
the same response devices as the present experiment and demonstrated that visual search 
is speeded when the target object shares a grip-type affordance with the response device.  
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This was suggested to indicate a two-way relationship between vision and action where 
vision guides action but is also guided by action.  In the present experiment and in Symes 
et al. (2008) participants maintained grips throughout the experiments, holding the 
response devices which kept the grips stable throughout.  This begins to offer a potential 
explanation for the observed differences; the main effect of response in the visual data 
may represent a marker of the role of the response in shaping perception of the objects.  
Although at this stage this is conjecture, it represents a credible explanation based in 
similar research and questions why the role of response has not received greater attention 
in previous treatments of SRC, which typically tend to focus on the relationship between 
stimulus and response without considering the physical aspects of response. 
4.4 Chapter discussion 
Both experiments demonstrated the typical SRC affordance effect that is familiar from the 
behavioural literature.  When stimulus and response were similar, RTs were shorter than 
when stimulus and response were dissimilar for both affordance classes.  However, 
unexpected differences were observed between experiment one and two.  Although both 
experiments demonstrated the typical SRC affordance effect in RT, the electrophysiological 
data revealed quite different timecourses in motor cortex and very different results in 
visual cortex.   
The lateralised affordance experiment elicited an LRP effect 125ms sooner than the grip-
type affordances, at 100-200ms compared to the grip-type experiments 225-400ms effect.  
This indicates a potential difference in terms of how these different affordance classes 
were handled.  Lateralised affordances elicited motor effects more rapidly than grip-type 
affordances and the duration of the effect was shorter.  The visual effects were also very 
different, with the lateralised experiment detecting effects of compatibility (an interaction 
between response and handle orientation) in both P1 and N1 but the grip-type 
experiments detecting no compatibility effects in these components.  Instead, grip-type 
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affordances yielded an effect of response in P1 and N1 that did not interact with the action 
possibilities contained within the stimuli to yield a compatibility effect.  
Two possible explanations present themselves.  The different findings may be due to the 
different SR relationships, with grip-type SR pairs representing a continuum of size and 
lateralised SR pairs representing a binary choice between left and right.  That said, 
response devices ensured that participants’ grips remained the same throughout the grip-
type experiments and the grips required to interact with the stimuli were deliberately 
unambiguous and based on common household objects, effectively making this a binary 
choice in practical terms.  An alternative view was introduced above; perhaps the response 
was affecting the perception of the stimuli in the way demonstrated by Symes et al. (2008), 
who showed that visual search times are reduced when participants prepare a grip that is 
compatible with the target object.  This argument is supported by the main effect of 
response in P1 and N1 in the grip-type stimuli, which indicates that responses were 
affecting the earliest stages of processing the visual features of the stimulus.  Maintaining 
the response grip activates the neuronal populations that would support the affordance, 
which is merely a sub-threshold preparation of the action that is compatible with the 
object and this may explain the differences between grip-type and lateralised results in 
terms of their responses.  
That said, before this may be discussed further it is important to confirm that observed 
differences are accurate because they were observed using two separate samples of 
participants.  This leaves open the possibility that these findings were due to the samples 
so experiments three and four will attempt to expand on this by conducting two similar 
experiments using one sample in order rule out this possibility and also to confirm the 




5. Chapter five  
 The effect of masking on the EEG timecourse of object affordance 
5.1 Outline 
The experiments from chapter four demonstrated some unexpected differences between 
grip-type and lateralised affordances in terms of the latency of motor effects and the 
presence of visual P1 and N1 effects, which is surprising considering the equivalent 
behavioural facilitation demonstrated by both classes of affordance in behavioural studies.  
Understanding these differences motivates the present chapter, which aims to explore the 
differences using a backward masking paradigm and a single sample.  Using a homogenous 
sample allows us to rule out the possibility that differences between affordance classes 
observed in experiments one and two were due to individual differences.  More 
interestingly, the use of backward masking will allow these experiments to probe the 
differences observed in chapter four by determining whether the negative compatibility 
effects observed in RT in the literature will be reflected in LRPs or ERPs.  As we shall see, 
backward masking experiments have offered some of the only evidence suggesting 
fundamental differences in the processing of affordances in lateralised and grip-type SRC 
experiments, making it an ideal paradigm with which to examine the differences between 
lateralised and grip-type SRC.   
Of the limited evidence to explain the differences observed between affordance classes in 
chapter four, one indication of a difference may be drawn from the behavioural literature 
by comparing the findings of Tucker and Ellis’ (2004) masked grip-type study with Vainio et 
al.’s (2011) lateralised study with briefly presented objects and Koch’s (2009) masked 
lateralised study: 
Tucker and Ellis (2004) used the same sort of grip-type stimuli and response devices as 
experiment two, Ellis and Tucker (2000), Tucker and Ellis (2001) and Symes et al. (2008).  
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They presented these stimuli in a backward masked SRC paradigm, with masking appearing 
at various stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 20ms, 30ms, 50ms, 150ms and 300ms.  
They found only a non-significant trend towards negative compatibility at the shortest 
(20ms) SOA, however all other SOAs (30ms, 50ms. 150ms & 300ms) indicated a typical 
compatibility effect.  This is in sharp contrast to Vainio et al. (2011) who employed a brief 
presentation paradigm with lateralised SR pairs, similar to the stimulus from experiment 
one and Tucker and Ellis (1998).  Vainio et al. (2011) observed a negative compatibility 
effect at SOAs of 30ms, 70ms and 170ms.  Indeed only at their longest SOA (370ms) did 
Vainio et al. (2011) detect a typical, positive compatibility effect.  It is important to note 
that Vainio et al. (2011) suggest that their negative compatibility effect may be partially 
explained by the use of a brief presentation procedure instead of a backward-masked, 
brief presentation procedure, citing Koch (2009) to suggest that backward masking might 
elicit a weaker negative compatibility effect, or possibly none at all.  Koch (2009) 
conducted a mixed dual-task and single-task paradigm, however only the single-task 
results are relevant here.  They found no compatibility effect in their lateralised, backward-
masked, single-task blocks, indicating that no RT effect may be detected with the present 
use of backward-masking.  On blocks with strong crosstalk with audio signals they did find 
a compatibility effect, however there are no such audio signals in the present experiments 
so it is difficult to make predictions on the RT effect for masked, lateralised affordance SRC 
given the mixed findings in the literature.  Nonetheless, that these different affordance 
classes would produce opposite or different behavioural compatibility effects at similar 
SOAs supports the suggestion from experiment one and two that processing grip-type and 
lateralised affordances may elicit different processes.  Whilst these findings do little to 
specify these different processes, they do support the rationale to investigate them and 
suggest backward masking as a method to do so.   
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Based on the differences between affordance classes presented in Tucker and Ellis (2004), 
Koch (2009) and Vainio et al.’s (2011) masked experiments, this chapter will present 
backward masked versions of experiments one and two whilst using a single sample.  This 
is intended to explore the differences between affordance classes observed in experiments 
one and two by following the example of the masked experiments by Tucker and Ellis 
(2004), Koch (2009) and Vainio et al. (2011), who also found quite different effects with 
different affordance classes.  Backward masking is a good paradigm for this because Tucker 
and Ellis (2004), Koch (2009) and Vainio et al. (2011) showed roughly opposite effects with 
grip-type and lateralised affordances, with Tucker and Ellis (2004) detecting a positive 
compatibility effect at most SOAs and Vainio et al. (2011) detecting a negative 
compatibility effect at most SOAs and Koch (2009) failing to elicit any RT effect.  This 
suggests that backward masking these experiments will elicit different behavioural effects 
and therefore offer insight into the different LRP and VEP effects elicited by different 
affordance classes.  The two experiments will be presented separately for clarity, however 
it is important to note that the order in which they were presented to participants was 
counterbalanced and that no order effects were observed (p < .4). 
Determining backward-masking SOA 
The differences observed by Tucker and Ellis (2004) and Vainio et al. (2011) at similar mask 
SOAs appear to be factors of the stimuli, so the different SOAs used in these experiments 
become an important constraint for the present chapter, which seeks to elicit this 
difference again at the same SOA for both affordance classes, whilst recording ERPs.  
Tucker and Ellis (2004) found a typical SRC affordance effect at all SOAs over 30ms 
suggesting that any SOA greater than that should elicit the typical effect.  Vainio et al. 
(2011) found a negative compatibility effect at SOAs up to 170ms, with their only typical 
compatibility effect occurring at 370ms, indicating that any latency below 170ms should be 
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sufficient to elicit the same effect.  Together these studies establish an initial range of 
30ms to 170ms for potential mask SOA.  The other consideration for determining masking 
SOA in this experiment is the latency of the peaks in experiments one and two, with a goal 
of masking between the peak of the LRP effect in experiment one (approximately 150ms) 
and the onset of the LRP effect in experiment two (200ms) in order to examine any 
differential effects on RT and LRP effects from the previous experiments and from each 
other.  This was achieved with reference to VanRullen and Thorpe (2001), who 
demonstrated that visual stimuli produced detectable ERP differences 75ms after stimulus 
onset.  This is supported by Tucker and Fitzpatrick’s (2006) comparative study that used 
intracranial recording to find that visual information became available in visual cortex 50-
75ms after stimulus onset.  Tovée (1994) also supports this, showing that the early stages 
of visual processing take roughly 20-40ms per stage, putting the earliest activity in visual 
cortex at around 60-80ms.  Finally the visual effect observed in the previous experiments 
commenced at around 80-90ms.  This convergent evidence suggests that masking at 
between 90ms and 100ms should lead to masking disrupting the processing of the 
affording stimulus from 160-200ms.  Given the 75Hz monitor refresh rate this yields a mask 
onset in the middle of this estimate at 94ms, meaning the stimuli in both experiments 
were displayed for seven frames before ceding to the mask. As will be demonstrated, the 
success of this procedure was confirmed by the LRP effect becoming nonsignificant at 
150ms, shortly after the peak of the effect in experiment one.   
5.2 Experiment three – masked, lateralised affordance SRC 
5.2.1 Introduction 
This experiment sought to examine the timecourse of neural events underpinning a 
masked, lateralised affordance SRC experiment.  The findings of Vainio et al. (2011) predict 
a negative compatibility effect for these lateralised SR pairs, however there is insufficient 
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data to predict how this will translate into the LRP and visual effects.  Also, as discussed 
above, Koch (2009) found mixed results with backward-masked lateralised stimuli, 
suggesting that no compatibility effect may be detected with the use of the present 
backward-masking procedure.  The same sample was employed in the present experiment 
and in the following one, ensuring parity between experiments and allowing a comparison 
of the affordance classes employed in each experiment in order to explore the notion that 
different neural events underpin the processing of different affordance classes.   
5.2.2 Method 
Participants 
33 participants (14 male) the University of Plymouth took part. All were right handed, aged 
18-28 (mean = 22, SD = 2.70), with normal or corrected vision and no known history of 
neurological problems. Three participants were removed from the analysis due to 
problems with the recording or excessive artefact, defined as greater than 35% of 
segments rejected due to ocular, muscular or other artefact.  This was determined as 35% 
of segments across both experiment three and four, which used the same sample in two 
different paradigms.   
Stimuli 
To ensure parity between experiments, participants viewed the same lateralised 
affordance stimuli as in experiment one and the same grip type affordance stimuli as in 
experiment two.  There were also 44 masks of coloured Gaussian noise with similar colour 
distributions to the images of affording objects used to backwards mask the stimuli. 
Procedure 
Participants completed a masked version of the lateralised affordance experiment seen in 
experiment one.  Participants were asked to make the same categorical judgement to the 
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same stimuli with the same response.  The central difference is that each stimulus was 
backwards masked by coloured Gaussian noise.  These masks were generated based on the 
overall colour distribution in the stimuli to minimise artefact from colour changes in the 
stimuli.   
Trials were structured as depicted in figure 11 and as follows; a fixation cross appeared on 
the screen for 1000-1200ms including a jitter, followed by the stimulus image for 94ms.  
The stimulus then ceded to the mask for 1900ms, followed by a blank screen for 1000ms 
and finally by a blink symbol (described in experiment one) for 1400ms.  Overall, trail 
duration remained the same as in experiments one and two and total trials were the same 
at 252 trials per participant, presented in a randomised order over three blocks.  
A single response mapping was used, in which participants made a left handed button 
press to kitchen items and a right handed button press to tools.  This was a practical 
consideration to prevent participants becoming fatigued over the course of a long 
experiment containing two full SRC paradigms and was deemed acceptable because 
experiment one revealed no mapping differences.   
EEG Acquisition 
Continuous EEG was recorded using 64 actively amplified electrodes, (ActiCap, Brain 
Products GmbH) arranged in a montage conforming to the 10/10 system consisting of FP1, 
FP2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, FC5, FC1, FC2, FC6, T7, C3, Cz, C3, T8, FCz, CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, TP10, 
P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, Rc, O1, Oz, O2, Rvb, AF7, AF3, AF4, AF8, F5, F1, F2, F6, FT9, FT7, FC3, FC4, 
FT8, FT10, C5, C1, C2, C6, TP7, CP3, CPz, CP4, TP8, P5, P1, P2, P6, PO7, PO3, Poz, PO4, PO8. 
The EEG was digitised at a sampling rate of 2500Hz and amplified using a Brain Products 
MR Plus amplifier. As before EOG was recorded at Rc and Rvb for excluding segments with 





Figure 11. Visualisation of timecourse of trials in experiment three. Each pane represents a 
change in the display.  Each trial consisted of five such changes and lasted up to a maximum of 
5194ms and was repeated 84 times per block for three blocks for experiment four and 96 
times per block for three blocks for experiment five. Detailed in the procedure. 
 
ERP Analysis 
Using Brain Vision Analyser 2 (Brain Products GmbH) the data were filtered with a 0.1-40Hz 
Butterworth filter and a notch filter at 50Hz to remove mains noise.  The data were then 
re-referenced offline to a reference consisting of the average of the left and right mastoid, 
and a 200ms baseline correction was applied.  An automatic artefact rejection procedure 
was conducted on all of the segmented data from scalp and EOG electrodes using an 
inbuilt module in Brain Vision Analyser 2.  The artefact rejection procedure used an 
amplitude criterion range of -100µV to 100µV and a gradient criterion of 50µV/ms and was 
manually checked for all participants to ensure that no good segments were removed and 
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that no bad segments were present in the averaged data.  Segments were defined as 
intervals from -200 to 600ms. 
5.2.3 Results 
Behavioural 
Participants correctly categorised 93.7% of stimuli, so the global error rate was 6.3%.  As in 
experiment one, RTs shorter than 200ms or greater than 1200ms were excluded in order 
to remove any accidental responses or outliers, resulting in 48 correct trials being excluded 
across the entire sample.  Mean RT for compatible trials was 435.67ms and for 
incompatible trials was 438.66ms.  Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with within-
subjects factors of object lateralisation (left vs. right) and response (left vs. right).  No 
significant effects were detected for Object lateralisation (F (1,29) = .885, p = 0.355), 
response (F (1,29) = .005, p = 0.944) or the interaction (F (1,29) = .084, p = 0.774).   
No significant behavioural compatibility effect was observed, similar to the findings from 
the single task, low crosstalk condition from Koch (2009), which consisted of a backward-
masked, lateralised affordance SRC task.  This is in line with the suggestion from Vainio et 
al. (2011) that backward masking may not elicit a behavioural effect with lateralised 
stimuli, whilst their brief presentation (without backward masking) at similar SOAs elicited 
a negative compatibility effect in RT.   
LRP data 
LRPs were calculated separately for compatible and incompatible trials using the Coles 
(1989) derivation, as detailed above.  The compatible LRP was calculated as C4 minus C3 
for objects with a left orientated handle that required a left handed response and C3 minus 




Figure 12. LRP results for masked, lateralised experiment three.  The LRP’s were calculated 
separately for the compatible trials (when the handle on the stimulus was orientated in the 
same direction as the button press) and for the incompatible trials (when the handle was 
orientated in the opposite direction to the button press).  The compatible wave is marked 
in red and the reversed compatibility effect is visible from 100-200ms by the positive 
inflection in the compatible wave and the negative inflection in the incompatible (blue) 
wave, a reversal of the effect from the unmasked experiment. 
calculated as C4 minus C3 for left handed responses to right orientated objects and C3 
minus C4 for right handed responses to left orientated objects.  As in previous 
experiments, these calculations will result in a positive going waveform for incompatible 
response hand and a negative going waveform for the preparation of the compatible 
response hand.  The LRP was analysed in five 100ms epochs at 100ms intervals from 0-
500ms.  Based on the timing of the masking procedure and visual inspection of the 
waveform, a sixth epoch was defined from 100-150ms and a seventh from 150-200ms.  In 
order to control the familywise error rate across these seven comparisons, a Bonferroni 
correction was applied (0.05/7), generating an alpha criterion of α = 0.0071.  The LRP is 
depicted in figure 12. 
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ANOVA was conducted with a factor of compatibility (compatible vs.  incompatible), 
revealing a single significant effect from 100ms to 150ms (F(1,29) = 9.524, p = .004) with a 
positive going peak in the compatible LRP for this time period indicating the preparation of 
the uncued response hand, the opposite effect as that detected in previous experiments.  
This is remarkable considering the lack of a behavioural effect for this experiment, 
suggesting that LRP effects do not necessarily produce a behavioural effect and that 
intervening factors –such as the backward mask– can disrupt the production of a 
behavioural effect, even when the affordance having already elicited corresponding 
visuomotor activity.  The 100-200ms effect from the previous experiment was not 
significant (p = .325) however this is due to the masking procedure interrupting motor 
processing during this epoch as intended; the 150-200ms epoch was analysed following 
the significant effect from 100-150ms (i.e. before backward-masking interrupted visual 
processing) and revealed no significant effect (p = .601), indicating that the masking 
procedure was interrupting visual processing as described in the experimental 
introduction.   
Additional tests were conducted over the same time period (100ms to 150ms) using a one-
sample t-test to determine whether the experimental conditions were statistically different 
from zero, to determine the source of the effect; compatible trials were found to be 
significantly different from zero (t(29) = 2.790, p = 0.009) and incompatible trials were not 
found to be statistically different from zero (t(29) = -1.238, p = 0.226).  This suggests that 
the source of the effect is the deviation from baseline of the wave for compatible trials, 
with incompatible trials remaining at baseline levels until response.  This indicates that 






Figure 13 shows average ERPs across parietal electrodes P7, P8 and occipital electrodes O1 
and O2.  Average ERP amplitudes were calculated for the visual P1 from 70-120ms and for 
N1 from 120-170ms.  Repeated measures ANOVA was employed with factors of Response 
hand (left vs. right), handle orientation (left vs. right), electrode hemisphere (left vs. right) 
and electrode position (parietal vs. occipital). 
For P1, a main effect of electrode position was observed (F (1,29) = 4.769, p = .037) that 
indicated greater amplitudes on occipital sensors than parietal.  The only compatibility 
effect observed in P1 occurred in a three-way interaction of electrode hemisphere, handle 
orientation and response hand (F (1,29) = 22.808, p = .017), indicating a compatibility 
effect in P1 was restricted to the left hemisphere only.  No further significant effects were 
detected.   
For N1, main effects were detected for electrode hemisphere (F (1,29) = 5.950, p = .021), 
indicating a left hemisphere preference overall.  A main effect of electrode position (F 
(1,29) = 57.129, p < .001) indicated greater amplitudes on occipital electrodes than 
parietal.  A Main effect of response hand (F (1,29) = 6.102, p = .020) was also detected, 
suggesting that prepared responses were affecting the viewing of the stimuli, as suggested 
following experiment two.  The main effect of response hand interacted with the main 
effect of electrode position (F (1,29) = 12.330, p = .001), indicating greater occipital activity 
associated with the effect of response hand.  The only compatibility effect detected in this 
analysis interacted with electrode hemisphere in a three way interaction of electrode 
hemisphere, handle orientation and response (F (1,29) = 7.714, p = .010).  No other 
significant effects were detected.  It is noteworthy that the main effect of response hand 
was detected in N1, in line with the suggestion from the grip-type experiment of a link 
between early visual processes and available action possibilities.   
110 
 
Figure 13. Averaged ERPs for electrodes P7, P8, O1 and O2 for visual P1 and N1.  Separate 
waveforms are displayed for each combination of handle orientation and hand of 
response.  The black trace plots left-lateralised kitchen object and left handed responses.  
The red trace plots right-lateralised kitchen object and left handed responses.  The blue 
trace plots left-lateralised tool object handles and right handed responses.  The green trace 
plots right-lateralised tool object handles and right handed responses.  
5.2.4 Discussion 
The backward-masking procedure elicited quite different results compared to experiment 
one.  This experiment found no effect in RT and a reversal of the LRP effect from 
experiment one, demonstrating a dissociation of afforded motor preparation and 
response.  A compatibility effect was again detected in P1 and N1, however in this 
experiment it was only significant in an interaction that indicated the compatibility effect 
was restricted to the left hemisphere.  
As discussed in the introduction, it was difficult to make predictions on the direction of the 
behavioural effect given limited evidence that showed different effects with different 
affordance classes, as well as different effects with briefly presented and briefly presented 
backward-masked stimuli.  Vainio et al.’s (2011) brief presentation lateralised SRC 
affordance experiment demonstrated a negative compatibility effect in RT (i.e. same 
direction as present LRP) however as they cautioned in their study, Koch (2009) failed to 
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demonstrate the same effect when backward-masking lateralised affordance SRC.  The 
present RT data fit with Koch (2009), not obtaining a behavioural compatibility effect with 
masked, lateralised SRC and so supporting Vainio et al.’s (2011) suggestion that backward-
masking brief presentations has an additional effect compared to brief presentations 
alone, with the mask apparently ‘overwriting’ the stored visual information in  the absence 
of the stimulus.  This did not seem to occur in Vainio et al.’s (2011) experiments, where 
instead they detected a reversal of the effect which was interpreted as representing the 
suppression of the affordance effect in the absence of the affording stimulus.  Although 
this was not the focus of the experiments, it is interesting nonetheless.  
The reversed LRP effect (compared to experiment one) mirrors the negative compatibility 
effect found in Vainio et al.’s (2011) RT data, but did not yield any behavioural effect in RT.  
The reversal of the LRP effect is similar to Koski et al. (2005), who demonstrated reversed 
LRP effects when TMS pulses interrupted processing 200ms after stimulus onset, similar to 
the present masking procedure.  This provides a novel demonstration of a dissociation of 
afforded motor activation and behavioural output and this dissociation was caused by the 
masking procedure.  Indeed the only difference between experiments one and three was 
the use of the backward-masking procedure, with all other factors remaining the same.  So, 
the backward-masking procedure was sufficient to overwrite the action-relevant 
information and produce a null effect, in line with Koch (2009).  This supports the 
suggestion from Vainio et al.’s (2011) brief presentations, which still yielded a negative 
compatibility effect in RT because the action-relevant information was still able to exert an 
influence in the absence of a new, visually complex stimulus that was without action 
information (i.e. the mask).  The idea of the mask overwriting the action-relevant 
information is supported by the LRP effect becoming nonsignificant at 150ms in this 
experiment, just as the mask was intended to be detectable in ERP (cf. VanRullen & 
Thorpe, 2001; Tucker & Fitzpatrick, 2006).  This also indicates that the masking procedure 
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was working as intended.  Overall, the 100ms LRP effects in experiments one and three 
suggest that the motor activity detected from 100ms in LRP does represent an effect of the 
afforded action, but that this is subject to change by, for example, a backward masking 
procedure, speaking to the notion of affordances as rapidly and automatically generated in 
order to aid real-time actions, but also as decaying rapidly too (e.g. Hommel, 1994a; 
1994b; Ellis & Tucker, 2000). 
Examining figure 5 and figure 10, the direction of the compatibility effects in P1 and N1 
appears overall to be the same as in experiment one despite only being significant in left-
hemisphere.  The left-hemisphere locus of these effects recalls the networks proposed by 
Cisek (2007) and Johnson-Frey, Newman-Norlund and Grafton (2005) that suggest that 
planning tool use and other object-directed behaviours elicits predominantly left-
hemisphere activity (discussed in detail in chapter three).  The detection of a left-
hemisphere bias in these early effects speaks to the idea advanced above that 
compatibility effects in P1 and N1 may represent a previously unreported action-sensitivity 
in these early components, recommending a reconsideration of the factors affecting P1 
and N1 amplitudes.  Moreover, the P1 and N1 effects have consistently demonstrated 
stronger activation over occipital electrodes, recommending reconsidering the role of 
occipital cortex in action planning and object directed behaviour, because that region is 
conspicuously absent from Cisek (2007) and Johnson-Frey et al.’s (2005) networks.   
5.3 Experiment four – masked, grip-type affordance SRC 
5.3.1 Introduction 
As described above, this experiment used the same presentation parameters and the same 
sample but with a different affordance class, using grip-type SR pairs instead of lateralised.  
This is in order to assess whether the differences observed between LRP, P1 and N1 effects 
in experiments one and two were real differences or by-products of the samples used.  It is 
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also intended to help elucidate the differences between masked grip-type studies (e.g. 
Tucker & Ellis, 2004) and masked lateralised studies (Koch, 2009) or brief presentation 
lateralised studies (e.g. Vainio et al., 2011).  So, as above, this experiment was a masked 
version of experiment two, with identical presentation parameters other than the masking 
procedure.  The use of the same sample from masked lateralised experiment three also 
allows for direct comparisons of the effects.   
5.3.2 Method 
Participants 
To ensure parity between experiments, the same sample was used as in experiment three. 
Stimuli 
The same grip-type stimuli were used as experiment two.  The masks were the same as 
experiment three. 
Procedure 
To ensure parity between experiments, the same procedure was employed as experiment 
three.  The only difference was the use of the grip-type response devices from experiment 
two.  With these devices participants completed a single response mapping, with power 
grips executed by the left hand and precision grips executed by the right hand.  Three 
blocks of 96 trials saw a total of 288 trials.   
EEG Acquisition 








The global error rate was 6%, with participants correctly categorising 94.00% of stimuli.  
Mean correct responses for manufactured objects with a power response was 94.63% and 
for manufactured objects with a precision response was notably less at 88.89%.  Mean 
correct responses for organic objects with a power grip was 95.56% and for organic objects 
with a precision response was 96.85%. ANOVA revealing no significant differences between 
conditions in the errors (p = 0.474) but revealed a borderline significant effect of object 
category (F (1,29) = 4.331, p = 0.055).  This reflects significantly more errors for 
manufactured objects, with manufactured objects eliciting 91.81% correct responses and 
organic objects eliciting 96.20% correct responses.   
Global mean RT was 467.12ms, with mean RT for manufactured objects with a power 
response at 488.26ms, manufactured objects with a precision response at 527.63ms, 
organic objects with a power response 422.06ms and organic objects with a precision 
response at 430.53ms.  Mean RT for manufactured objects was 507.94ms, considerably 
longer than for organic objects at 426.30ms.  Power responses elicited a mean RT of 
455.16ms and precision responses 479.08ms. 
RM ANOVA was conducted using within subjects factors of object size (power vs. precision) 
and response (power vs. precision).  This revealed significant main effects of object size (F 
(1,29) = 102.419, p < .001), indicating significantly longer RTs for manufactured objects, 
and response (F (1,29) = 43.237, p < .001), indicating significantly longer RTs for precision 
grip responses than power grip responses.  A significant interaction of object size and 
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response (F (1,29) = 9.608, p = 0.004) revealed a significant behavioural compatibility 
effect, with compatible trials eliciting a significantly faster response  (mean RT 459.32ms) 
than incompatible trials (mean RT 474.85ms), indicating the typical behavioural 
compatibility effect, as predicted by Tucker and Ellis (2004) at this SOA.  
LRP Data 
LRP’s were calculated as in experiment two and with the same analysis parameters as in 
the lateralised affordance LRP analysis.  No significant differences were observed from 0-
600ms (all p’s <0.19).  This indicates that the masking procedure has effectively 
overwritten the motor activation by introducing new visual input to the visuomotor 
system. This overwriting may occur as part of the process of checking new visual input for 
action possibilities however this intuitively attractive idea is merely conjecture without 
further, better targeted investigation.  Some support for this may be drawn from Ellis’ 
(2009) characterisation of the visuomotor system as a tightly bound loop where a change 
in visual input before the development of the motor component may result in the 
apparent absence of an LRP effect. 
ERP Data 
Average ERP amplitudes were calculated for the visual P1 from 70 to 110ms and N1 from 
110 to 160ms after stimulus onset.  Repeated measures ANOVA was used with factors of 
object size (power vs precision), response (power vs precision), electrode hemisphere (left 
vs. right) and electrode position (parietal vs. occipital).   
Analysis of P1 revealed no significant compatibility effects (p < .513), similar to the earlier 
grip-type experiment, experiment two.  Analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
response (F (1,29) = 6.145, p = 0.019), indicating that response, which in the grip-type 




Figure 14. Plot depicts LRP for masked, grip-type experiment four in which no significant 
compatibility effects were detected from 0-600ms.  The red trace plots the compatible 
trials, the blue trace plots the incompatible trials and the black trace plots the difference of 
the two.  Experiment two used the same SR pair without masking and obtained a 
significant compatibility effect from 200-300ms, however no tendency toward such an 
effect was observed here. 
perception as suggested by authors such as Symes et al. (2008).  A main effect of electrode 
hemisphere (F (1,29) = 7.349, p = 0.011) was also detected, indicating greater right 
hemisphere activity.  A main effect of electrode position (F (1,29) = 51.568, p < .001), 
indicating greater occipital activity overall.  No interactions were detected in P1.   
Analysis of N1 revealed no compatibility effects (p < .375), similar to experiment two.  
ANOVA of N1 did reveal a significant main effect of object size (F (1,29) = 4.926, p = 0.034), 
similar to the previous experiment.  A mean effect of response (F (1,29) = 7.012, p = 0.013) 
was detected, again showing that prepared actions affect the earliest stages of visual 
perception.  A main effect of electrode hemisphere (F (1,29) = 4.624, p = 0.040) indicated 
greater activation on right-hemisphere electrodes and a main effect of electrode position 
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(F (1,29) = 56.320, p < .001) revealed greater activity on occipital than parietal sensors, 
similar to previous experiments.  Only a single interaction was observed, object size 
interacted with electrode position (F (1,29) = 7.596, p = 0.010) to indicate greater occipital 
amplitudes for manufactured objects than for organic objects.   
5.3.4 Discussion 
This masked, grip-type experiment demonstrated the same typical RT compatibility effect 
as the unmasked grip-type experiment (two), in line with the predictions from Tucker and 
Ellis (2004).  Also, like experiment two no compatibility effects were detected in P1 or N1.  
However it failed to demonstrate the LRP effect from 200-300ms observed in the previous 
grip-type experiment.  This indicates that the masking procedure was affecting the 
processing of the motor information contained within the stimulus.  As discussed above, 
Vainio et al. (2011) and Koch (2009) suggested that the use of a backward masking 
procedure will effectively overwrite the motor information contained within a stimulus in a 
way that does not occur with brief presentations and here it appears that the masking 
procedure resulted in no motor effect after the mask was intended to be detectable in ERP 
around 160-200ms (VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001; others discussed above).   
No significant compatibility effects were detected in LRP throughout the experiment, 
indicating an effect of masking in terms of overwriting the visual action information 
gathered from the stimuli.  When considering the typical RT compatibility effect detected 
in this experiment the lack of an LRP effect is particularly interesting, suggesting that 
something else must have enabled the RT effect that in the experiments so far has 
appeared to be a product of the LRP compatibility effect.   
5.4 Chapter discussion 
The findings of the experiments in this chapter are remarkable, demonstrating a double 
dissociation of LRP and RT effects defined by the use of lateralised or grip-type affordances 
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and supporting the differences observed between affordance classes in the previous 
chapter.  The experiments in this chapter used a single sample to determine whether the 
implication from typical lateralised and grip-type affordance SRC experiments (one and 
two) in chapter four were due to the different affordances or due to the different samples 
used.  These findings confirm and extend the findings from chapter four that suggested 
considerable differences in the way different affordances were processed.  To reiterate, 
the masked, lateralised experiment three found a reversed LRP effect at 100ms, the 
familiar compatibility effects in P1 and N1 but failed to produce an RT effect.  The masked, 
grip-type experiment four found the typical RT effect, but no compatibility effects in LRP, 
P1 or N1.  These findings demonstrate that lateralised and grip-type affordances are 
handled very differently.   
In lateralised experiment one and grip-type experiment two, LRP effects were detected at 
100ms and 200ms respectively, so to probe these findings and confirm their veracity the 
present experiment masked at 94ms based on a variety of evidence suggesting that mask 
should be detectable in ERP from 160-200ms (e.g. VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001; and others, 
above), meaning it would be detectable between the peak of the LRP effect from 
lateralised experiment one and before the onset of the LRP effect in grip-type experiment 
two.  The findings of experiment three and four confirm the differences observed in 
experiment one and two by showing that the masking procedure elicited different effects 
with each affordance class; lateralised affordances still showed a significant LRP 
compatibility effect from 100ms (although this time it was a reversed compatibility effect) 
but failed to show the subsequent RT effect.  In contrast, the LRP effect for grip-type 
stimuli was not detected due to the masking procedure however the RT effect still 
emerged.  This confirms that the latency difference observed in experiment one and two 
appears to be a genuine difference between affordance classes with behaviourally 
equivalent effects.  The masked experiments also support the different visual effects 
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observed in experiments one and two, with lateralised stimuli again eliciting compatibility 
effects in visual P1 and N1 but with neither grip-type experiment eliciting a compatibility 
effect in these components.   
Perhaps the most surprising result was the double dissociation of LRP and RT effects over 
the two masked experiments.  In the experiments so far the LRP has varied with RT, with 
compatible trials eliciting a compatibility effect in both RT and LRP.  The co-occurrence of 
these two effects intuitively implied a direct link between them however the masked 
results call this into question.  Overall, the results of the masked experiments question 
automaticity; the lateralised experiments question automaticity because they failed to 
show the RT compatibility effect suggested to be automatic in the majority of behavioural 
affordance SRC studies (discussed throughout, c.f. McBride et al.’s, 2012 review), despite 
having demonstrated a significant LRP effect that did appear to be automatic because it 
arose when viewing objects to make a categorical judgement that bore no relation to 
action-relevant object properties.  However, the automaticity of the generation of an LRP 
effect was itself questioned by the failure of the masked, grip-type experiment to elicit an 
LRP effect.  This picture is further muddied by the significant RT effect in that experiment.  
The findings of the masked experiments question the notion of automaticity in affordance 
generation, an issue that has received minimal attention in the literature; Tipper, Paul and 
Hayes (2006) showed participants images of common affording objects (doorhandles) 
oriented to the left or right, with squared or rounded edges, depicted in either blue or 
green.  Participants made left or right button presses (compatible or incompatible with 
handle orientation) to deploy one of two categorical judgments; a colour judgement (blue 
vs. green) and a shape judgement (square vs. round).  They found no affordance effect 
when participants made the colour judgement but they did find an affordance SRC effect 
when participants made the shape judgement.  So despite viewing the same affording 
objects, participants only demonstrated automatic affordance generation with the shape 
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judgement.  Similarly, Pellicano, Iani, Borghi, Rubichi and Nicoletti, (2010) demonstrated 
that categorical judgements affected whether they generated an affordance or a Simon 
effect.  Participants were asked to make a judgement on either the colour or the inversion 
of a stimulus, and an affordance effect was only detected when participants attended to 
the inversion of the stimulus and not when attending to the colour of the stimulus.  
Alongside the masked findings, these studies imply that automaticity may not be as robust 
as suggested in the behavioural literature.  The masked results question whether the LRP 
or RT effects could be described as automatic and the dissociation of the two raises an 
interesting question and one to which the answer may elucidate the differences between 
these affordance classes: How can the grip-type experiment show a motor effect in RT 
without detecting a motor effect in motor cortex to support the RT advantage?  This 
appears to go against previous experiments where the co-occurrence of the effects implied 
that the behavioural effect was a product of the LRP effect.  This view is intuitive, with the 
assumption that brain activity directly relates to behavioural output and the finding both 
RT and LRP varying together in both unmasked studies and there is little in the literature to 
choose between different sources of affordance or the automaticity of their effects.   
One approach to the question of different sources of affordance comes from Derbyshire, 
Ellis and Tucker (2006), who suggested a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
affordances.  They defined intrinsic affordances as those that are linked to invariant object 
properties such as the identity of an object and are an inextricable component of the size 
and shape of the object.  This means that when the object is imagined or described an 
agent will generate the affordance automatically because the affording properties are 
intrinsic to the objects form and/or identity.  This would include the grip-type stimuli used 
in experiments two and four.  Derbyshire et al. (2006) give the examples of peanuts or 
paperclips, which agents will know are small, lightweight objects that would be picked up 
with a precision grip.  In contrast, an extrinsic affordance is a variable object property that 
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is not implicitly part of the object but instead comes from the way the object is positioned 
in relation to the viewer.  So extrinsic affordances would not implicitly relate to a particular 
bodily state in abstraction in the way an implicit affordance would.  This definition includes 
lateralised affordances, where the affordance is based on the non-object property of 
lateralisation, i.e. the relationship of object orientation with the agent.  This distinction 
could attempt to account for the present data in two ways.  Firstly, it might suggest that 
the grip-type stimuli elicit a later LRP effect because their affordance is intrinsically linked 
with the object identity.  However, the compatibility effect in experiment two occurred at 
200ms which is considerably earlier than object identification, which studies from Supp et 
al. (2005) or Van Elk, Van Schie and Bekkering (2010) have suggested occurs earliest at 
280ms and is associated with the semantic N400 ERP component.  The intrinsic vs. extrinsic 
dichotomy offers a second explanation by positing a different timecourse for intrinsic and 
extrinsic affordances; perhaps intrinsic affordances elicited a later LRP effect because the 
affordance was an implicit part of its shape and so was detected very rapidly and reflected 
in the main effects of object category detected in N1 for grip-type stimuli.  This would 
reduce time pressure to extract the object affordance and prepare the afforded action.  
This would mean that LRP for grip-type stimuli would appear later and the lateralised LRP 
appeared earlier due to increased imperative to extract the orientation information.  That 
said the lack of a compatibility effect in visual components for the grip-type stimuli 
undermines the notion that the grip-type affordances are being extracted at this stage, 
because main effects of response were also detected and these did not interact with 
object category in a compatibility effect in the way they did for lateralised stimuli.  The lack 
of a compatibility effect in visual components for grip-type stimuli implies that whatever 
supports the RT effect is occurring further downstream, however the lack of an LRP effect 
for the masked grip-type experiment suggests that this is not occurring in motor cortex.  
These possibilities are discussed in greater detail in the general discussion. 
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Another potential explanation comes from considering the differences between the 
experiments.  The lateralised SR pair is a binary pairing of left and right lateralised objects 
and left and right lateralised responses, whereas grip-type is continuous with no clear 
point at which a grip begins or ceases to be a power or precision grip.  This offers a 
potential explanation because that ambiguity could explain the later LRP effects for grip-
type affordances.  However, in context of the present experiments the stimuli were 
selected so that there was no ambiguity in terms of what grip would be required to 
interact with each object, with clear differences between power and precision compatible 
objects.  This means that even for grip-type stimuli the relationship between stimulus and 
response was still effectively binary.  So, this practical concern for real-world object use is 
less informative in the present laboratory setting.   
A key difference between the experiments is what participants were doing with their 
bodies during the experiments.  As discussed in the introduction, embodied cognition 
holds that bodily states have a profound effect on cognition and relevant evidence for this 
comes from Symes et al. (2008), who demonstrated a large RT advantage in a visual search 
task when participants prepared the grip required to interact with the target object 
compared to when they prepared a different grip.  This finding seems particularly pertinent 
to the present thesis, which used the same response devices that Symes et al. (2008) used 
to show that the grips participants used to hold the devices affected their perception of 
the affording object stimuli.  This opens up another potential interpretation of the present 
data; perhaps the differences observed between grip-type and lateralised affordances are 
a product of the response devices employed and the effects they had on the perception of 
the stimuli?  Indeed other studies such as Van Elk, Van Schie, Neggars and Bekkering (2010) 
have shown that action intentions affected visual N1 amplitudes, providing physiological 
evidence to support Symes et al.’s (2008) behavioural study.  Supporting evidence for this 
proposition may be drawn from the main effect of response detected in grip-type stimuli in 
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N1 for grip-type experiments as well as for lateralised experiments.  These main effects of 
response in early visual component N1 indicate that the responses (action intentions for 
lateralised experiments, prepared actions for grip-type experiments) were exerting an 
influence during the early stages of visual perception and support Symes et al.’s (2008) and 
Van Elk et al.’s (2010) findings.  This focus on the response challenges the typical view on 
SRC affordance, which tends to focus on the stimulus as the critical part of the SR pair (e.g. 
Derbyshire et al., 2006 focuses on classifying stimuli without reference to responses) 
because that is what should elicit the affordance, however the current line of argument 
also suggests that the bodily states of participants may influence the visual interpretation 
of the stimuli.  This fits with discussions such as Hommel et al. (2001) or Ellis (2009) as well 
as experiments such as Ellis and Tucker (1998) that suggest a two-way relationship 
between vision and action, where bodily states affect visual processes. 
These potential explanations are not mutually exclusive and generate a complicated set of 
questions and predictions.  One key question raised by both approaches is couched in the 
relationship of response to object; Derbyshire et al. (2006) suggest that extrinsic 
affordances such as the present lateralised affordances are contingent on a relationship 
with participants’ bodily states (e.g. prepared responses) in order to afford an action.  The 
suggestion that prepared actions affect what affordances are generated is also couched in 
the relationship in the SR pair.  Each of these questions the notion of automaticity; 
Derbyshire et al.’s (2006) suggestion that extrinsic affordances are generated based on the 
relationship with the agent suggests that were there no relationship, an affordance may 
not be generated.  Similarly, if the participant is not preparing an action then it will not 
shape the perception of the stimulus into yielding an affordance, also suggesting that 
response may affect automaticity.  In order to address these differing potential 
explanations in a straightforward manner the following experiments will attempt to 
address this question directly, by removing the response from one experiment and 
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manipulating the temporal proximity of the response to the affording stimulus in the other 
in an effort to address this fundamental question about a core assumption in the 




6. Chapter six 
Assumptions in the affordance literature 
6.1 Outline 
The experiments so far have raised questions on the equivalence of different classes of 
affordance in terms of the visual, motor and behavioural responses that they elicit.  The 
different combinations of effects observed over masked and unmasked affordance SRC 
experiments question the notion of automatic affordance generation because for some no 
effect was detected in RT and in others, no motor activity was detected to support a 
subsequent RT effect.  In order to begin to tease apart the unexpected differences 
between grip-type and lateralised affordances the following experiments will examine the 
core assumption of automaticity by manipulating response and presentation parameters.   
Having established that lateralised affordances consistently elicited an LRP effect from 100-
200ms this chapter will use this LRP effect to investigate the assumption of automaticity.  It 
will focus on lateralised affordances over grip-type affordances because the LRP effect for 
grip-type affordances was not obtained in the masked experiment, implying a greater 
difference between lateralised and grip-type affordances than may have been previously 
predicted.  Although the difference between lateralised and grip-type affordances is 
certainly interesting, a full explanation of the differences is beyond the scope of this thesis 
which nonetheless provides a novel indication of the differences in processing affordance 
classes.  So, this final experimental chapter will use the visual and LRP findings from 
previous experiments to check two core assumptions in the behavioural literature that 
have so far gone unaddressed, primarily because behavioural investigations would be 
unable to offer conclusions on them.  The first assumption is automaticity; that viewing 
objects is sufficient to yield preparation of the actions that they afford, even in the absence 
of the intention to act on the objects.  This assumption may be traced back to Gibson’s 
(1979) early treatments on affordance which state this is part of the core concept of 
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affordance, however little or no direct evidence of this has been demonstrated.  Most 
evidence for this has been indirect, being drawn from speeded RT to matched SR pairs 
however this does not preclude the possibility that the forced-choice, bimanual responses 
may affect the way the simple binary SR pairs are perceived.  This is not outlandish, 
because the literature is peppered with examples such as Symes et al. (2008) or Lindemann 
and Bekkering (2009) (discussed above) who found that not only does viewing objects 
prepare actions but also preparing actions affects object perception.  This chapter will 
assess this claim by determining whether merely viewing objects in a go, no-go paradigm 
will yield the same LRP effect as in experiment one.  This is of course unavailable to 
behavioural investigations because if the participants do not make a response, there is no 
behavioural data to collect but when using LRPs, data may be collected without response 
allowing us to see whether merely viewing the same stimuli will elicit the same preparation 
as experiment one.  
The second assumption also relates to automaticity.  It is universally assumed that the 
categorical judgement does not exert an influence on the generation of these affordance 
effects and indeed the choice of categorical judgement is intended to demonstrate 
automaticity because participants are asked to make their judgements on object 
characteristics that are not action-relevant, allowing authors to claim for automaticity 
because the action-relevant object properties were not task relevant.  This has been 
implicit in almost all affordance research to date, however Tipper et al. (2006) and 
Pellicano et al. (2010) have demonstrated that whilst a category judgement will elicit an 
affordance effect with affording stimuli, a colour judgement will not.  This is attributable to 
a levels of processing type argument, where colour judgements do not require sufficiently 
deep processing to elicit the affordance, but this in itself implies that perhaps merely 
viewing an object is not sufficient to elicit its affordance.  In order to assess both 
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assumptions, experiment six will attempt to separate categorical judgement and response 
in a novel, two object version of the SRC paradigm. 
The nature of the experiments in this chapter mean that trial durations will be longer than 
in previous experiments, so in order to accurately assess the claim, as well as to control for 
multiple comparisons, the literature and previous experiment will be considered to provide 
a priori temporal constraints on epochs for analysis.  Due to the nature of these 
assumptions the first 500ms of any trial will be of primary interest, chiefly because these 
are questions of motor preparation and not of response execution.  Chapter three saw a 
body of evidence presented that showed that motor preparation occurs well before 
500ms, which incidentally has been roughly the mean RT for lateralised experiments in this 
thesis as well as in the literature.  For example, Grezes et al. (2003) found mean RTs of 
approximately 560ms with others clustered around it, such as Ellis and Tucker (2000) who 
found 380-435ms RTs or Tucker and Ellis (1998) who found mean RT of 600-630ms.  The 
RTs in the present thesis fall within this range too.  These RTs make for a sensible upper 
temporal boundary when assessing the above claims about affordance generation and 
motor preparation because these processes must occur before response deployment in 
order to have an effect.   
Also supporting this upper boundary are the latencies observed in relevant 
electrophysiological investigations which indicate that action preparation/ affordance 
generation actually takes place well before 500ms, with this thesis indicating 100-200ms as 
the critical epoch.  Examples from the literature include Proverbio et al. (2007) who found 
LRP and visual effects from 100-400ms and Hohlefeld et al. (2010) who found motor 
effects beginning at 120ms.  Looking at older evidence with abstract stimuli, Osman et al. 
(1992) found effects from 100-300ms on go trials in their spatial compatibility go, no-go 
experiment and these findings were replicated by Miller and Hackley (1992).  Eimer and 
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Schlaghecken (1998) also found motor effects from 100-400ms using abstract stimuli.  
Evidence from single cell recordings put motor preparation effects in a similar period, with 
Requin and Riehle (1995) finding a motor component from 113-173ms and Riehle, 
Kornblum and Requin (1997) found effects in two distinct populations of motor cortex 
neurons from 100-400ms. Also, Zhang et al. (1997) found motor effects at 160ms and 
260ms.  Converging evidence from the studies presented here as well as a variety of 
studies that used a range of electrophysiological measures have found effects commencing 
at around 100ms after stimulus onset.  For that reason, the experiments in this chapter will 
not analyse beyond 500ms and seem unlikely to find effects before 100ms in LRP, though 
this epoch will be assessed.   
6.2 Experiment five – lateralised affordance in a go, no-go paradigm 
6.2.1 Introduction 
This experiment sought to test the assumption of automaticity, which states that viewing 
an object is sufficient to elicit its affordance regardless of any intention to act on the 
object.  In doing so, it also tested whether or not the affordance effect is contingent on a 
response being made.  Put another way, this experiment sought to show that the SRC 
affordance effect is not contingent on the kind of forced choice manual response observed 
almost universally in SRC research and really is a product of the observed action 
possibilities and that the action preparation by observed action possibilities is not 
entwined with the preparation of a manual response.  In turn, this will confirm that the LRP 
effect observed in the previous experiments is indeed a marker of the action possibilities 
contained within the viewed stimuli and is not merely detecting the preparation of the 
task-based response.  Separating afforded and task-based action preparation is a challenge 
for studies of affordance, which have typically made deep claims about action preparation 
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by seen objects by using paradigms that also entailed participants prepare and execute 
actions.  
In order to assess the assumption of automaticity, this experiment used a novel variation 
on the SRC affordance paradigm.  No behavioural responses were collected and instead a 
go, no-go format was used where participants made a categorical judgement on the stimuli 
that was declared verbally, but only for one category.  A verbal response ensures no 
lateralised motor activity may interfere with the LRP.  For the other category, no response 
was made.  A go, no-go paradigm was chosen because it allows the monitoring of the LRP 
effect in the absence of any sort of response, i.e. by removing the motor response, we 
remove any motor preparation associated with response and so any observed motor 
activity is attributable to viewing the stimulus.  Given the dissociation of LRP and RT effects 
in the masked studies, the go, no-go experiment will give direct evidence of what (if any) 
motor activity observed in LRP was due to the stimulus and what was due to the response.  
If the ERP and LRP findings from experiment one are replicated, it may be concluded that 
viewing objects gives rise to their affordance and this is not a product of the response.  So, 
because this experiment is seeking to replicate the LRP effect observed in the previous 
experiments without having participants make a response, all other features must be the 
same as those used in experiment one to ensure parity between experiments.  If the same 
100-200ms effect is detected in the absence of the intention to make a motor response 
then it may be attributed to an effect of the handle affordance cuing motor cortex.  If it is 
not obtained, then it may be concluded that the LRP effects observed in previous 
experiments represent an effect of overlap between visual input and motor preparation.  






40 (25 male) students from the University of Plymouth were recruited.  All were right 
handed, aged 18-28 (mean = 22, SD = 2.74), with normal or corrected vision and no known 
history of neurological problems.  Ten participants were removed from the analysis due to 
problems with the recording or excessive artefact, defined as greater than one third of 
segments rejected due to ocular, muscular or other artefact.  The verbal response was 
responsible for the high rejection rate due to muscular artefact, showing great individual 
variation in amplitude and causing most rejections.   
Stimuli 
Participants were shown the same colour images as in experiment one.  
Procedure 
The procedure from experiment one was replicated here, with two critical changes.  
Participants responded only to kitchen items by making the verbal response “kitchen” and 
tool objects required no response.  As per experiment one, half of the trials consisted of 
tools and the other half of kitchen items.  This format was chosen because tool stimuli 
elicited a stronger effect in experiment one.  The other change was the use of a 
microphone connected to the response box used in experiment one.  Participants 
completed a practice period of 15 trials up to three times in order that their responses 




EEG was recorded using the same amplifiers and references as previous experiments, but 
with a new montage consisting of 29 actively amplified electrodes (ActiCap, Brain 
Products) arranged in a montage conforming to the 10/10 system, consisting of FP1, FP2, 
AFz, F7, F3, F4, F8, FC5, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC6, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T9, CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, P7, P8, 
O1, Oz and O2 electrode sites.  A higher sampling rate of 5kHzwas used, downsampled 
offline to 500Hz. 
ERP Analysis 
The same analysis procedures were applied as in experiment one.  The only exception 
being a wider artefact rejection amplitude criterion range of 100µV to -100µV was 
employed here due to greater amplitudes in muscular artefacts caused by the verbal 
response.  The automatic artefact rejection was again manually checked as in the previous 
experiments and so does not represent a significant deviation from experiment one.  
6.2.3 Results 
Behavioural Data 
The mean error rate for left oriented kitchen items was 13.38%, for right oriented kitchen 
items was 13.91%, for left oriented tools was 0.58% and for right oriented tools was 0.43%.  
ANOVAs revealed no significant differences between left or right oriented kitchen items.  
For the tool items, the error rate was extremely low with a total of 19 false positive 
responses (verbally declaring a tool item as a kitchen) throughout the experiment, out of a 
total of 3780 tool trials.   
LRP data 
Replicating LRP analysis from experiment one 
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The lack of a manual response in this experiment requires reconsideration of the structure 
of LRP analyses in order to make them comparable to previous lateralised experiments.  In 
previous lateralised experiments (one and three), compatible LRPs were calculated as: 
[Mean(C4 − C3)𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 ha𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒 + Mean(C3 − C4)𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒]
2
 
And incompatible LRPs were calculated as: 
[Mean(C4 − C3)l𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ha𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒 + Mean(C3 − C4)𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒]
2
 
With these calculations the LRPs had opposite polarities during the critical 100-200ms 
epoch, when compatible trials were negative-going and incompatible trials were positive-
going.  As can be seen from these LRP calculations, one interpretation of this effect is that 
it is contingent upon the relationship between the SR pair, that is, the handle of the object 
and the hand used to respond in the task. However as discussed above, it is also possible 
that the differences in LRP were born purely by an affordance generated by the stimulus, 
not by the relationship between stimulus and response. In this experiment these two 
explanations are disambiguated by removing the manual response from the experiment, 
and from the LRP calculations. Thus, in the LRP calculations used in this experiment the 
response factor is simply removed, resulting in:  




[Mean(C4 − C3)𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒 + Mean(C3 − C4)𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒]
2
 
Note that the order of operations from experiment one is preserved with respect to the 
salient object feature, the handle.  If the same 100-200ms effect is found in this 
experiment using these LRP calculations, then we can attribute the effect to the 
orientation of the handle, suggesting that the lateralised handle affordance is cuing 
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ipsilateral motor cortex.  Another way to view this in the context of a normal LRP 
calculation is that the handle orientation of the object is being used as a proxy to the 
response hand to determine whether the handle alone is sufficient to elicit the effects. 
It is important to note that these calculations do not represent arbitrary assignment of 
conditions to LRPs, instead they preserve the order of operations applied to the LRP in 
experiments one and three (lateralised and masked lateralised).  In each lateralised 
experiment, right handle is subtracted from left handle to create one LRP, and left handle 
is subtracted from right handle to create the other LRP.  As in previous experiments, 
subtracting the right from left handle will yield a negative potential from 100-200ms and 
subtracting the left handle from the right handle will yield a positive potential during that 
epoch.   
Following the findings of previous experiments analyses were conducted over four 100ms 
epochs from 100-500ms, including a fifth epoch from 150-200ms based on visual 
inspection of the data.  Five epochs were analysed so the Bonferroni corrected alpha is set 
at α = 0.01. 
The main LRP effect from experiment one was replicated from 100-200ms (F (1,29) = 
7.185, p= .012) with waves adopting the same polarity as experiment one during this 
epoch.  However, when interpreted using the Bonferroni corrected alpha (0.01) this 100-
200ms effect is only borderline significant.  Based on visual inspection of the data another 
epoch was analysed from 150-200ms (F (1,29)=9.936, p= 0.004) which yielded a significant 
result, in line with the findings from the unmasked affordance SRC experiment (one).  The 
100-200ms tendency and the 150-200ms significant effect indicates that viewing the 
objects was sufficient to give rise to this early activity and confirms the suggestion that this 
100-200ms activity reflects motor preparation cued by object orientation (i.e. affordance) 
and is free from influence by the motor response.   
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Subsequently, a second phase of effects occurred, with a reversal of the polarity of the 
earlier effects occurring at around 250ms (figure 15).  Following this reversal, from 300-
400ms the compatibility effect was nonsignificant (1,29) = 5.234, p= 0.030) when 
interpreted with the Bonferroni correction, however it still represents an interesting 
tendency that fits with Zhang et al.’s (1997) and Miller and Hackley’s (1992) finding that as  
 
Figure 15. Grand average LRP for go, no-go experiment five.  The red trace plots the data 
for left handled kitchen objects minus right handled tools and the blue trace plots the data 
for right handled kitchen objects minus left handled tools.  The black trace plots the 
difference between red and blue. Significant effects were detected from 100-200ms and 
later from 250-450ms.  Most notable is the reversal of the effect around 250ms that 
appears to reflect a suppression of the earlier effects.  
long as an object is visible it will continue to elicit motor preparation.  The polarity change 
entailed in this continued preparation suggests that this represents a suppression of the 
earlier effect that may be attributed to the generated affordance not being deployed.  This 
was not observed in previous experiments where response-related activity dominated the 
LRP after around 250ms, offering a novel insight into what happens when afforded motor 
activity is not deployed. Given that this is the first demonstration of this, further 
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investigation would be required to ascertain whether the 300-400ms tendency toward a 
reversal of the afforded motor preparation is a genuine effect, but it still provides an 
interesting first indication of what becomes of undeployed afforded motor preparation. 
Finally, a third phase of activation saw another change in polarity, this time a negative 
inflection in both waves commencing at around 500ms and persisting until the end of the 
segment.  During this time RM ANOVA did not reveal any significant differences between 
the waves (p > .235).  Single sample t-tests also failed to yield a significant effect (p’s 
<0.058) but did reveal a tendency.  This implies that sub-threshold tendency towards 
activation of the hand cued by the object was occurring late in these trials, long after the 
response is usually deployed.  The nonsignificant tendency does not allow great concluding 
power but both these and the 300-400ms effect appears to be analogous to Zhang et al.’s 
(1997) observation that as long as action relevant stimuli persist on screen, motor 
preparations will continue.  Zhang et al. (1997) used primates in their study however Miller 
and Hackley (1992) showed found a similar effect in human participants. 
One consideration here is that LRPs are calculated using both go and no-go trials, so a 
comparison of go and no-go activity is required to understand whether this affected the 
results. 
Comparing go LRP and No-go LRP 
As discussed above, the reversed effects around response time require further analysis to 
understand whether the polarity of the LRPs was influenced by the verbal response.  The 
above analysis mimicked experiment one, however it required that both go and no-go 
trials were used to generate each LRP.  This introduces a possible confound because the go 
trials contained a verbal response and this may have exerted an influence, particularly on 
the later effects.  In order to rule out this possibility another set of LRPs were calculated.  
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This time C3 was subtracted from C4 for left oriented kitchen items and C4 subtracted 
from C3 for right oriented kitchen items, yielding the go LRP: 
[Mean(C4 − C3)𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 + Mean(C3 − C4)𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚]
2
 
And C3 was subtracted from C4 for left tool items and C4 from C3 for right tool items, 
forming the no-go LRP: 
[Mean(C4 − C3)𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 + Mean(C3 − C4)𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚]
2
 
With these calculations, each LRP will index asymmetry within a stimulus type and so 
comparing them will look for differences between go trials and no-go trials.  In this way it 
tests whether there was an effect of the verbal response or whether go and no-go trials 
were equal.  Any significant differences here would indicate that the verbal response had 
an effect.  As above, five epochs were analysed so the Bonferroni corrected alpha is set at 
α = 0.01.  RM ANOVA was conducted with a factor of trial type (go vs. no-go) on all epochs.  
No significant effects were found during any epoch (all p’s > 0.517) demonstrating that 
there was no influence of trial type on the LRP effects.  This is as expected with the present 
calculations, where all symmetrical activity is subtracted out (detailed above). 
ERP data 
Figure 16 shows averaged ERPs across parietal electrodes P7, P8 and occipital electrodes 
O1 and O2.  Averaged ERP amplitudes were calculated for the visual P1 from 80-120ms and 
for N1 from 120-180ms.  In the absence of response the factor of ‘proxy mapping’ was 
determined based on experiment one; this is effectively a dummy variable that acted as 
substitute to the response hand factor from previous experiments in order to ensure the 
data were subject to identical transformations and statistical procedures, similar to the LRP 
analyses.  This acted as a proxy to response hand and again, tested whether the effects 
observed in the previous lateralised experiments were products of the visual affordance 
137 
 
alone generating visuomotor activity, or whether the observed visuomotor activity is borne 
of an interaction of the SR pair.  Again the goal was to determine whether the P1 and N1 
effects were contingent on a relationship between stimulus and response or elicited by 
merely viewing the affording stimulus.  The transformations were based on the response 
mapping from the masked lateralised experiment (three), where participants responded to 
tool objects with a right handed button press.  This mapping also obtained a slightly 
stronger effect in experiment one.  This was chosen in order to ensure comparability.  So, 
the factor of response mapping is effectively a dummy variable with a binary value 
designed to ensure that the data were subject to the same transformations as in previous 
experiments.  In practice, this was accomplished by simply coding trials based on whether 
they required a left or right response in the equivalent mapping in experiments one or 
three and using this to construct the conditions in the analysis so they were comparable to 
previous experiments.  With this factor, an interaction of proxy mapping and handle 
orientation would indicate the same effect observed in the interaction of response hand 
and handle orientation observed in experiment one.  However, since there is no response 
to define compatibility such an interaction will be referred to as a ‘visual affordance’ effect.  
Repeated measures ANOVA was employed with factors of proxy mapping (left vs. right), 
handle orientation (left vs. right), electrode hemisphere (left vs. right) and electrode 
position (parietal vs. occipital).   
For P1, a main effect of category (F (1,29) = 8.521, p = 0.007) demonstrated kitchen items 
elicited greater positive amplitudes.  A main effect of hemisphere (F (1,29) = 13.425, p = 
0.001) indicated greater amplitudes on left-hemisphere sensors. A main effect of electrode 
position (F (1,29) = 62.438, p < .001) indicated significantly greater activity on occipital 
sensors than parietal.  Visual affordance effects were observed in P1 in an interaction of 
handle orientation, proxy mapping and electrode hemisphere (F (1,29) = 5.107, p = 0.032) 
indicating a left-hemisphere locus for the visual affordance effect, and an interaction of 
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handle orientation, proxy mapping and electrode position (F (1,29) = 7.784, p = 0.009) that 
indicated greater amplitude on occipital sensors than parietal, similar to previous 
experiments such as masked, lateralised experiment three.  An interaction of handle, 
electrode hemisphere and electrode position (F (1,29) = 7.566, p = 0.010) showed that 
handle orientation elicited greater activation in left occipital cortex, similar to the visual 
affordance effect.  This interaction likely reflects much of the same variance as the 
interactions of visual affordance with electrode hemisphere and position, with the handle 
orientation offering the affordance which –in the absence of a response to shape 
perception (e.g. Symes et al., 2008) – appears to be handled by left occipital cortex.   
Figure 16. Plot of averaged ERP activity for P1 and N1 components across sensors O1, O2, 
P7 and P8, which were used for the visual component analysis.  Separate waveforms are 
displayed for each handle orientation.  The black trace plots the activity for left orientated 
kitchen items.  The red trace plots activity for right orientated kitchen items.  The blue 
trace plots activity for left orientated tool items and the green trace plots activity for right 
orientated tool items.   
No visual affordance effects were observed in N1.  However N1 demonstrated a significant 
main effect of electrode position (F (1,29) = 7.415, p = 0.011), indicating greater activity on 
occipital sensors than parietal.  An interaction of handle orientation and electrode 
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hemisphere (F (1,29) = 43.247, p < .001) revealed greater activation in left hemisphere, as 
per P1 analyses and previous experiments.  A significant interaction of electrode 
hemisphere and position (F (1,29) = 5.582, p = 0.025) demonstrated a tendency to greater 
amplitudes on left occipital sensors.  A significant interaction of handle, electrode 
hemisphere and electrode position (F (1,29) = 8.953, p = 0.006) was also detected in N1, 
however no visual affordance effect was detected in N1, only an effect of handle.  This 
suggests that N1 is sensitive to the action intentions of the agent because when the 
participants had no action intentions, no visual affordance effect was detected.   
6.2.4 Discussion 
Motor effects 
This experiment confirms the assumption that viewing an object potentiates the actions 
that may be performed on it by demonstrating preferential activation of motor cortex by 
the affordances of common object stimuli.  Even in the absence of a response the LRP 
effect from previous experiments was still observed from 100ms.  These findings confirm 
assertions from across the behavioural literature (e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Craighero, 
Fadiga, Rizzolatti & Umiltà, 1998, 1999; Rumiati & Humphreys, 1998) and theoretical 
literature (e.g. Gibson, 1979; Hommel & Prinz, 1997) that viewing objects is sufficient to 
elicit a motor preparation consistent with their afforded actions.  This suggests that this 
early activation is elicited by merely viewing the stimulus, regardless of the intention to act 
on or toward it.  This supports the notion of automaticity and suggests that this early LRP 
activity actually reflects the preparation of the afforded action and confirms that the LRP 
does not reflect motor preparation related to manual responses.  Put differently, this 
experiment confirms that a response is not a necessary component for seen objects to 
generate motor activity.  Previous experiments have shown that it is unreliable to 
generalise across different affordance classes, so these conclusions are limited to 
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lateralised handle affordances but nonetheless represent some of the first direct evidence 
for automatic activation of object affordance with lateralised affordances.   
An experiment by Proverbio et al. (2011) obtained similar findings with manipulable tool 
and non-tool stimuli in a passive viewing experiment.  They found a greater anterior 
negativity (including sensors C3 and C4) around 250ms and 550ms for tools than non-tools 
without a manual response to those stimuli.  One obvious difference emerges however; 
their motor effects were detected considerably later than the present experiment however 
this may be explained by their stimuli.  The stimulus set consisted of manipulable tools of 
many more types than seen here and was not simply limited to objects with lateralised 
handles.  Instead, objects such as typewriters and puzzle cubes were presented that do not 
necessarily yield affordances in the same way as each other or as the stimuli here.  In some 
cases stimuli were more comparable to those seen in experiments two and four, which 
also found later effects.  They also did not necessarily cue a particular hemisphere similar 
to the stimuli used in experiment two, which also saw effects emerging during a similar 
epoch.   
A novel finding in the present experiment is the later reversal of the effect from 300-
400ms which has not been shown so far.  Zhang et al. (1997) and Miller and Hackley (1992) 
found that as long as action relevant stimuli remain on screen then effects remain 
detectable in motor cortex.  Proverbio et al. (2011) also detected late effects, although 
they were not detected in LRP or over motor cortex but rather represented a centro-
parietal P300 component.  Nevertheless, this combined with other studies such as Adamo 
and Ferber (2009) who found similar later effects indicate that the additional attention-
capturing properties of affording stimuli may be responsible for these later effects.  Later 
effects in Proverbio et al. (2007) are attributed to semantic integration and cognitive 
updating processes and this may explain why later effects are observed here in the 
141 
 
absence of response.  Considering the reversed polarities during this epoch and the kind of 
task and stimuli used, semantic integration seems poorly supported and would not explain 
the polarity reversal.  That said, given the obvious and consistent left/right affordances 
throughout the stimulus set, this reversal may be attributable to the lack of response 
causing a suppression of the previously generated affordance after it was determined that 
the affordance developed from 100-200ms will not be deployed.  This explanation is 
consistent with Proverbio et al.’s (2007) suggestion of cognitive updating processes being 
used to rapidly generate and suppress affordances in order to aid real-time action.  It is 
also consistent with the real-world usefulness of affordance as a rapid but disposable 
means of dynamic preparation for motor actions in real-time however this is a novel result 
and so further research is required to draw firm conclusions on this.   
Overall, the motor effects elicited by this simple experiment replicate the core LRP finding 
from experiment one in the absence of the intention to act.  This confirms a claim core to 
the concept of affordance; that viewing objects alone is sufficient to prepare the actions 
that may be performed on them.  It also validates the assumption that making a motor 
response does not influence affordance preparation in the same way that prepared actions 
affect the detection of affordances; this is a critical consideration given the vast majority of 
the affordance literature has made deep claims about affordances eliciting particular 
patterns of motor preparation, and have done so whilst having participants prepare motor 
responses.  This introduced a potential confound wherein it is difficult to separate the 
afforded motor preparation from the motor preparation required by the rule-cued 
response, however the presence of motor preparation in the absence of response seen in 
this go, no-go experiment allays any such concern.  In turn, motor preparation in the 
absence of an intention to act shows that a response is not required to elicit affordance 
preparation despite considerable evidence that prepared actions can affect affordance 
generation/ object detection (cf. Fagioli, Ferlazzo, & Hommel, 2007; Fagioli, Hommel, & 
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Schubotz, 2007; Symes et al., 2008;  Lindemann & Bekkering, 2009; Van Elk et al., 2010).  
Additionally, it demonstrates a novel reversal of the effect after 200ms in line with Miller 
and Hackley’s (1992) go, no-go experiment and Zhang et al.’s (1997) comparative study, 
which also found that while an action-relevant stimulus persists on screen it will continue 
to elicit action-preparations.  The polarity reversal observed after 200ms suggests that this 
continued action preparation in LRP appears to represent suppression of the afforded 
action, likely because participants had no intention to make a motor response, rendering 
the afforded action as surplus to the task requirements.  Or put differently, the absence of 
intention to make any motor response may be the cause of the reversed polarity because 
participants had no intention to deploy the afforded action.  However, given that this is a 
novel demonstration of the later affordance reversal/ suppression effect this discussion 
must exercise caution in interpreting these novel results and additional evidence is 
required before strong conclusions may be reached on these later effects (discussed 
further in delayed response experiment six).  Nonetheless, the afforded action (and its 
subsequent reversal/suppression) is still detectable in LRP and VEPs in the absence of the 
intention to act, supporting the notion of automaticity by directly demonstrating that 
affording objects elicit motor activation regardless of participants’ intentions.   
Visual P1 and N1 
A ‘visual affordance’ (defined above) interaction was again elicited in P1, mirroring the 
compatibility effect from experiments one and three, only this time in the absence of a 
response.  This essentially means that when subjected to the same transformations, the 
visual P1 associated with viewing affording objects without response is similar to visual P1 
when viewing affording objects with the intention to make a manual response to them.  
Although it is more difficult to interpret the visual effects than motor effects in the absence 
of response, detecting a visual affordance effect in visual P1 in the absence of a response 
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does imply that the P1 compatibility effects are not full compatibility effects in the sense of 
processing being facilitated by SR match.  This is simply because without a manual 
response, there are no grounds for an SR match.  Also, these effects occur too early (80-
120ms) to reasonably be expected to reflect a compatibility effect that comes from relating 
SR pairs in full.  Instead, the detection of a compatibility effect in P1 both with and without 
response suggests that this component is not sensitive to response parameters and instead 
seems to be only concerned with the visual input.  This interpretation is supported by the 
lack of a compatibility effect in N1, which suggests that N1 may be sensitive to response 
parameters or planned actions.  This begins to offer a differentiation of the role of P1 and 
N1 in processing affordance SRC paradigms; P1 appears to be insensitive to response 
parameters and N1 appears to be sensitive to response parameters, offering a potential 
subject for investigation related to Symes et al.’s (2008) findings that prepared actions 
affected visual search times, although this is conjecture and requires further investigation 
to confirm.  
It is important to note that the visual affordance effect did not emerge in P1 as a two-way 
interaction as in experiment one but rather a three-way interaction with electrode 
hemisphere as in the masked lateralised experiment three.  There was also a three-way 
interaction of visual affordance and electrode position, revealing greater activation on 
occipital sensors than parietal. The detection of a compatibility effect in P1 in the absence 
of a response could be seen to suggest an automatic component to early compatibility 
effects in visual P1, however it is unclear what automaticity might mean in terms of visual 
effects where viewing any stimulus should elicit this component (e.g. Luck, 2005; Van 
Voorhis & Hillyard, 1977).  The idea of automaticity in relation to visual activity is also 
complicated by the lack of compatibility effects in P1 in the grip-type studies and more 
research is required to explore these early indications of previously unconsidered 
differences between affordance classes.  The notion of automaticity does not appear to be 
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appropriate to visual N1 either because no visual affordance effects were elicited in N1 in 
the absence of response, suggesting that N1 compatibility effects are contingent on a 
response and that N1 indexes a relation of body to environment that makes N1 an 
excellent candidate for exploring the findings of Fagioli et al. (2007a, 2007b), Symes et al. 
(2008), Van Elk et al., (2010) and others (discussed variously) that have shown bodily states 
affect object perception.  
Conclusion 
The go, no-go experiment demonstrates that responses are not essential to the motor 
effects observed with lateralised affordances in this thesis and suggests that the LRP 
effects may indeed reflect the afforded motor preparation from 100-200ms and that 
influences of task or response do not appear to occur until after 200-300ms.  This is 
supported by examining the figures from previous experiments where response-related 
activity did not become apparent in LRP until around 250-300ms, and was roughly equal 
for both compatible and incompatible waveforms.  The go, no-go data also offer a novel, 
functional differentiation of P1 and N1 effects; P1 and N1 compatibility effects have been 
detected in all lateralised experiments so far and all of these had manual responses, 
however the lack of an N1 effect in the go, no-go experiment (where there was no manual 
response) suggests that N1 effects may have a relationship with manual responses, in line 
with data from Van Elk et al. (2010).  Overall, this experiment provides direct evidence for 
automaticity and supports the notion that the prepared motor response has not influenced 
the early LRP effects observed in this thesis.   
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6.3 Experiment six – effects of delayed response on lateralised affordance generation 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Following from the examination of the assumption of automaticity in go, no-go experiment 
five, experiment six sought to provide additional confirmation for this by approaching the 
question of automaticity from a different angle. As described above, this experiment 
sought to test the assumption that categorical judgements do not have a specific role in 
the generation of an affordance effect.  Typically, every SRC paradigm from Fitts and 
Seegar (1953) to modern affordance SRC paradigms has used a categorical judgement of 
some kind, the deployment of which usually constitutes the grounds for compatibility with 
the stimulus.  However, Tipper et al. (2006) and Pellicano et al. (2010) provide evidence 
that different categorical judgements will elicit different effects with the same affording 
stimuli.  This questions the notion of automaticity and introduces the idea that categorical 
judgements could be affecting the way the stimulus is parsed and in turn, what effects are 
generated. This is another critical question hanging over the affordance literature; if 
participants are required to attend an object by a task such as a categorical judgement, 
then this clouds assertions of automaticity because, as discussed by Vainio, Symes, Ellis, 
Tucker and Ottoboni (2008), identifying a graspable object will entail visually processing 
various aspects of the object in order to identify it, and in the process will necessarily 
include processing of any action cues contained in the stimulus.  This makes it difficult to 
assert automaticity (i.e. that it is the mere presence of the object that gives rise to its 
affordance) because completing the categorical judgement task entails a particular means 
of considering the object.   
Tucker and Ellis (2004) used masking to show that it is not necessary for the affording 
stimulus to be visible during response deployment in order to yield a compatibility effect.  
The present experiment will work along similar, but inverted logic by attempting to 
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separate the categorical judgement from the affording stimulus, which will be presented 
only at the point of response.  No lateralised affordance will be present when participants 
make their categorical judgement.  This will be accomplished by presenting the first 
stimulus in a neutral rotation with its handle following the midline of the image in order to 
avoid cuing a particular hand.  While this stimulus does not provide a lateralised 
affordance, it does provide all the information required for the participant to select and 
prepare the rule-cued response hand as dictated by the task (the standard categorical 
judgement from previous lateralised experiments; identify whether the stimulus is a 
kitchen implement or a tool). After this the same object will be displayed in a second 
image, but will then be oriented to the left or right to provide lateralised affordance. 
Participants are instructed to respond with their categorical judgement by deploying their 
rule-cued lateralised response only at the onset of this second image.  This separates any 
influence of the categorical judgement from the response and tests the notion of 
automaticity in a novel way by removing any impetus to consider the content of the image 
of the affording stimulus at the point of response.  This represents a change from typical 
affordance SRC experiments (e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001; Ellis &Tucker, 2000, 2004; 
etc.) which normally use the categorical judgement as a means to have participants 
examine the object and thus observe the affordance (as discussed in Vainio et al., 2008); 
instead, participants will have no impetus to examine the contents of the affording 
stimulus because they will have already made their categorical judgement.  This allows a 
different approach to examining automaticity, because if any affordance/ compatibility 
effect is found, it can only be attributed to the mere visual presence of the stimulus and 
not to any feature of the categorical judgement (e.g. Pellicano et al., 2010; Tipper et al., 
2006).  This is unlike Tucker and Ellis (2004), as the affording stimulus will be on screen 
whilst the response is deployed but has similarities in temporally separating components 
of the task.  Tucker and Ellis (2004) used masking to separate stimulus and response 
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however the present experiment will deliberately avoid masking or rapid stimulus array 
changes due to their association with negative compatibility effects (see also masked, 
lateralised experiment three and Klapp and Hinkley, 2002).  In order to control any effects 
of apparent motion and to control for rapid display changes, there will be an 800ms 
interval between the first and second stimulus on each trial.   
By presenting the first stimulus in a neutral rotation we can examine the possibility of an 
interaction between making the categorical judgement and lateralised information 
contained within the stimulus, free from potential interference by laterality information in 
the first object.  Participants will prepare their response well ahead of time and without 
interference by visual action information, meaning that any affordance effects detected 
during the presentation of the second stimulus should be free from influence by the 
categorical judgement, which itself should also not be influenced by visual affordances 
interacting with the response rule.  This allows the examination of the assumption outlined 
above.  This also means that we can predict shorter RT’s in this experiment than in the 
single object experiments because the participants will simply be waiting for the second 
object to appear in order to deploy their response.  This effectively renders the second 
stimulus as merely a go cue to deploy a rule-cued response that is generated when viewing 
a neutrally rotated stimulus, giving this experiment the ability to unpick the relationship 
between automaticity and task-judgements. 
6.3.2 Method 
Participants 
29 participants (16 female) formed the sample.  All were right handed, aged 18-28 (mean = 
21.06, SD = 2.01), with normal or corrected vision and no known history of neurological 
problems.  No participants were removed from the analysis due to excessive artefact, with 
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the largest proportion of artefacts rejected at 30% and the mean artefacts rejected at 9%.  
However two participants were removed due to equipment failure.  
Stimuli 
A new stimulus set was generated because the previous one did not contain neutrally 
rotated objects however it was deliberately designed to be as similar as possible to the 
previous lateralised stimulus set.  The new stimulus set consisted of 100 colour 
photographs of common household objects classifiable as kitchen or tool items.  There 
were 25 objects in each category, each photographed with the handle rotated left or right, 
similar to the stimuli from experiment one (see appendix for a complete stimulus list).  
Each object was also photographed in a neutral rotation, with the handle pointing 
vertically down.  Objects were carefully selected for the neutral images in order to ensure 
that implicit laterality could not have introduced a confounding variable.  For example, the 
orientation of the blade of a knife indicates a usage preference and a hammer has a clearly 
defined flat head used for striking on only one side of the object.  Therefore only stimuli 
that were vertically symmetrical, such as serving spoons and paintbrushes were included.  
Note that whilst there were different examples of the same kind of object (e.g. small and 
Large frying pans) no single image appeared any more than another.   
Procedure 
Data were gathered in the same location and using the same equipment as previous 
experiments.  Participants were asked to respond to the second stimulus only, with the 
first stimulus acting as a kind of explicit prime.  Participants viewed a fixation point for 
1000-1200ms before the first stimulus, an object in a neutral rotation, was presented for 
1000ms.  This was followed by a blank screen for 800ms, intended to control any apparent 
motion or masking-type effects, before the onset of the target stimulus, a lateralised image 
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of the first neutrally rotated object that remained onscreen for 1000ms.  After this target 
stimulus offset participants viewed a blank screen for 400-600ms before the blink symbol 
appeared on screen for up to 1400ms after which the trials commenced again with a 
fixation point.  This procedure is visualised in figure 17. 
EEG Acquisition 
Continuous EEG was digitised at a sampling rate of 500Hz by Brain Products MR Plus 
amplifiers connected to Brain Visions Recorder software (Brain Product GmbH).  The same 
64 electrode montage was used here as in experiment two. 
 
Figure 17. Visualisation of the timecourse of the trials in experiment six.  Each pane 
represents a change in the display, with six such changes occurring per trial.  Participants 
knew that the second stimulus would always be the same object as the first.  Participants 
made their categorical judgement whilst viewing the first, non-lateralised stimulus and 
selected and maintained their rule-cued response until the onset of the second stimulus, 





Using Brain Vision Analyser 2 (Brain Products GmbH) a 0.5-40Hz Butterworth filter was 
applied and a notch filter was applied at 50Hz.  The data were then re-referenced offline to 
a reference consisting of an average of the two mastoids and a 200ms baseline correction 
was applied in the 200ms before the onset of the first (neutral) stimulus.  An automatic 
artefact rejection procedure was conducted on all of the segmented data from scalp and 
EOG electrodes using the inbuilt module in Brain Vision Analyser 2 with an amplitude 
criterion range of -150µV to 150µV and a gradient criterion of 50µV/ms in order that the 
procedure only marked artefacts.  The automatic rejection procedure was manually 
checked for all participants to ensure that no good segments were removed and that no 
bad segments were allowed into the averaged data.  LRPs were calculated as per previous 
experiments.  The LRP data were time locked to the onset of the first image.  For each 
analysis RM ANOVA with a two-level factor of compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) 
was used to compare findings for both waveforms.  To understand the direction of the 
effects during the presentation of the second, affording stimulus t-tests were conducted 
on each waveform against a hypothetical baseline of zero. 
6.3.3 Results 
Behavioural data 
Participants responded only to the second image, having made the categorical judgement 
during the presentation of the first, non-lateralised image and maintained this decision 
until the presentation of the second, lateralised image.  This led to greatly reduced RTs 
than in previous experiments on both compatible (mean = 298ms) and incompatible (mean 
= 306ms) trials.  Behavioural responses were analysed using repeated measures ANOVA 
with a factor of compatibility (compatible vs incompatible) obtaining a significant effect of 
compatibility (F (1,26) = 5.878, p < .023). The same analysis was conducted on the 
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The LRP for this experiment is roughly three times the length of previous experiments and 
has three distinct stages; the first, neutral stimulus presentation, the blank screen period 
and the second, affording stimulus presentation.  Based on the previous experiments, it is 
possible to predict that the experimental effect should only be detected during the 
presentation of the second, affording stimulus.  It is difficult to predict an effect during the 
presentation of the first, neutrally rotated stimulus and there is no reason to predict any 
action effects during the blank screen period.  The inclusion of a neutrally rotated stimulus 
offers an opportunity to determine whether a stimulus that fails to cue a particular hand 
will yield any motor activity.  Analysing the first, neutral stimulus presentation will also 
ensure no earlier effects exist that may affect the presentation of the second, affording 
stimulus.   
It is possible to make predictions on the presentation of the second, affording stimulus 
based on previous experiments, specifically that there will be a compatibility effect in LRP 
100-200ms after the presentation of the affording stimulus that will adopt polarity changes 
consistent with previous experiments (greater positivity for incompatible trials during this 
epoch, greater negativity for compatible trials during same epoch).  Based on the go, no-go 
data one may also predict that later effects will be detected too because stimuli again 
persist on screen after response, and that a reversal of the polarity of each waveform will 
be observed after the initial compatibility effect (i.e. around 200-300ms).   
Neutral stimulus presentation stage 
152 
 
The LRP is pictured in figure 18.  From 0ms to 1000ms no significant effects were detected 
(p > 0.103), in line with the expectation that a neutrally rotated stimulus should not 
produce a compatibility effect.  No preparation of the rule-cued response was detected.  
Although not the subject of this investigation this is interesting in its own right, 
demonstrating no particular hand preparation by neutrally rotated stimuli and so indirectly 
confirming the suggestion that it is the object orientation that produces lateralised 
compatibility effects, free from predispositions to use a particular effector with a particular 
object.  The lack of effects during this stage of the trial confirms that there was no motor 
preparation that may have affected the later stages of the trials.   
Figure 18. LRP for the neutral stimulus presentation stage.  LRPs were calculated separately 
for compatible (red trace) and incompatible (blue trace) waves.  Participants viewed an 
image of a common household object in a neutral rotation, with the handle pointing 
directly toward the participant’s midline.  This meant that the handle did not afford a 





Figure 19. LRP for the second, affording stimulus presentation, time locked to onset of first, 
neutrally rotated stimulus. LRPs were calculated separately for compatible (red trace) and 
incompatible (blue trace) waves. The black trace plots the difference between compatible 
and incompatible waves.  From 100-200ms the typical LRP compatibility effect was 
observed. Following this, LRP polarity reversed and the compatible wave returned to 
baseline for the remainder of the trial.  The incompatible wave demonstrated negative 
activity for the remaining duration of the trial, consistent with the preparation of the rule-
cued response. 
Analysis of second, affording stimulus stage 
The second, affording stimulus onset 1800ms after the first, neutral stimulus, so the critical 
100-200ms epoch occurred from 1900-2000ms when timelocked to the first, neutral 
stimulus onset.  The stimulus was visible for one second, generating ten 100ms epochs for 
analysis, generating a Bonferroni corrected alpha of (0.05/10) α = .005. 
Consistent with the short RTs, the most rapid LRP activity was observed in this experiment; 
a tendency was observed in the first 100ms after the onset of the second stimulus from 
1800-1900ms (F (1,26) = 3.255, p =0.083) that failed to reach significance.  One-sample t-
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tests reveal that during this epoch, only the compatible wave was significantly different 
from zero (t(26) = -2.763, p = 0.01) with no effect in the incompatible wave (p = .987).   
The typical SRC affordance effect is obtained from 100-200ms after the onset of the 
second image (F (1,26) = 28.335, p < .001) at 1900-2000ms in this analysis (timelocked to 
the onset of the first stimulus).  However, figure 19 shows that both compatible and 
incompatible trials elicited a negative wave during this critical epoch, which using the 
current LRP calculations signals the preparation of the hand cued by the response rule.  For 
incompatible trials, despite the typical positive inflection associated with the incompatible 
affordance, the activation in this period was overall negative-going, which typically 
indicates a preparation of the rule cued response.  However, the typical 100-200ms effect 
may still be observed in the positive inflection in the [overall negative] incompatible 
waveform between 100-200ms and it was this positive inflection for incompatible trials 
that was sufficiently different from the negative inflection in the compatible trials to  
generate the significant ANOVA result for this epoch, just as in previous experiments.  The 
positive inflection in the incompatible LRP and the negative inflection in the compatible 
LRP appear to reflect the typical compatibility effect, which in previous experiments has 
occurred during this epoch.  However the peak value for this positive inflection remained 
below zero, where in previous experiments (one & three) the peak value for the 
incompatible LRP was significantly greater than zero during this epoch. Nonetheless, the 
typical dipolar formation across LRPS from 100-200ms observed in previous experiments 
was significant during this critical epoch, demonstrating a compatibility effect in LRP.  
Overall it appears that greater activity was elicited by the compatible wave during this 
epoch, consistent with the idea that SRC affordance effects are facilitatory by nature (e.g. 
Galpin et al., 2011).  No differences between conditions were observed from 2000-2100ms 
(F (1,26) = .120, p =0.732) (200-300ms after affording stimulus onset), however both 
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compatible (t(26) = -6.154, p < .001) and incompatible (t(26) = -6.631, p < .001) were 
significantly different from zero during this epoch.  Examining the figure, these waves were 
both significantly and approximately equally negative-going during this epoch, probably 
signalling activity related to deploying the response (mean RT 302ms). 
Following this, a second phase of effects developed after response (mean RT 302ms), as 
predicted by the go, no-go experiment, persisting until stimulus offset (2800ms).  During 
this second phase each of the compatible and incompatible LRPs were still negative, but 
now the difference in voltage between these conditions was the opposite to that of the 
earlier phase (100-200ms). That is, the waveform for compatible stimuli was more positive 
than that of the incompatible stimuli. The second phase of effects commenced with a 
significant effect from 2100-2200ms (F (1,26) = 15.165, p =0.001) (300-400ms after second 
stimulus onset) with a significant deviation from baseline for both conditions, compatible 
(t(26) = -2.486, p = 0.020) and incompatible (t(26) = -5.177, p < .001).  This effect is the 
opposite of the typical 100-200ms LRP compatibility effect, with the incompatible LRP 
being more negative-going than the compatible LRP.  This marked the return of the 
compatible LRP to baseline for the remainder of the trials (see below).  Following this 
2100-2200ms effect the RM ANOVA results did not pass the Bonferroni corrected alpha 
(0.005), but represent interesting tendencies toward preparation of the rule-cued response 
until the stimulus offset at 2800ms.  The t-tests show that these effects were located only 
in the incompatible wave, with no further differences between the compatible wave and 
baseline (p’s > .146).  They were as follows; 2200-2300ms (F (1,26) = 7.433, p =0.011) 
driven by the incompatible wave only (t(26) = -4.467, p < .001), 2300-2400 (F (1,26) = 
7.477, p =0.011) with an effect detected in the incompatible wave only (t(26) = -2.706, p 
=0.012),  2400-2500ms (F (1,26) = 6.894, p =0.014) detected in the incompatible wave only 
(t(26) = -2.034, p = 0.052), 2500-2600ms (F (1,26) = 3.532, p =0.071) in the incompatible 
wave only (t(26) = -7.973, p = 0.059), 2600-2700ms (F (1,26) = 3.264, p =0.082) in the 
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incompatible wave only (t(26) = -2.135, p = 0.042), and 2700-2800ms (F (1,26) = 4.248, p 
=0.049) in the incompatible wave only (t(26) = -2.252, p = 0.033). 
LRP Summary 
There were significant differences between LRPs in two distinct phases; the typical effect 
was detected from 100-200ms.  Following this a second phase of LRP effects commenced 
after responses had been deployed (mean RT 302ms) from 2100-2800ms (300-1000ms 
after the onset of the affording stimulus).  Occurring after response, these were not the 
typical LRP compatibility effects seen elsewhere in the thesis and they adopted the 
opposite polarities to the earlier LRP compatibility effects (demonstrating greater 
negativity in the incompatible LRP, rather than the compatible LRP).  This was in line with 
predictions from the go, no-go experiment (five) that saw a polarity reversal after 250ms 
whilst stimuli remained visible.  The second phase of effects also differ from the earlier 
(100-200ms after affording stimulus onset) compatibility effects because there were no 
effects in the compatible LRP; t-tests showed that after the compatible response was 
deployed, from 400ms no further effects were detected in the compatible LRP.  After 
400ms, only the incompatible wave was significantly different from zero, with a negative 
amplitude consistent with the preparation of the rule-cued response.  The t-test results for 
epochs from 2200-2800ms show that these were not compatibility effects in the sense of 
compatibility facilitating responses because there were no effects in the compatible LRP; 
rather the second phase of effects was a product of the incompatible LRP being 
significantly different from the compatible LRP, which did not differ from zero during these 
later epochs.  So, the later ANOVA and t-test results were not compatibility effects in the 
typical sense but instead demonstrated continued preparation of the rule-cued response 
only for the incompatible LRP.  As discussed above, these persistent effects are explained 
by the finding from Zhang et al. (1997) and Miller and Hackley (1992) that when action 
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relevant stimuli remain visible, action preparation will continue to be detectable in motor 
cortex.  A novel finding is that this appears to be unique to incompatible trials, where the 
rule-based preparation and the object-based preparation conflict.  After the afforded 
action was deployed on compatible trials activity returned to baseline however this was 
not true for incompatible trials, where the overall negativity indicates a continued 
preparation of the rule-cued response.   
In summary, the typical LRP compatibility effect was observed 100-200ms after onset of 
the affording stimulus.  Subsequently, LRP polarities reversed; after the compatible 
response was deployed (mean compatible RT 298ms) the compatible LRP returned to 
baseline, but after the incompatible response was deployed (mean incompatible RT 
306ms) a second phase of effects developed wherein the incompatible LRP continued to be 
significantly negative going consistent with the preparation of the rule-cued response. 
ERP data 
As in previous experiments RM ANOVAs with factors of response hand (left vs. right), 
handle orientation (left vs. right), electrode hemisphere (left vs. right) and electrode 
position (parietal vs. occipital) were conducted over data from parietal electrodes P7, P8 
and occipital electrodes O1 and O2.  P1 was measured from 100-140ms and N1 was 
measured from 140-190ms, both were measured from second stimulus onset.   
P1 revealed a significant main effect of electrode position (F (1,26) = 119.981, p < .0001), 
revealing greater activity on occipital sensors than parietal sensors, consistent with 
previous experiments.  A significant compatibility effect was observed in a three-way 
interaction of handle orientation, response hand and electrode hemisphere (F (1,26) = 
12.356, p = 0.002) again indicating a left-hemisphere locus for the compatibility effect, 
consistent with previous experiments and literature discussed above (e.g. Cisek, 2007).  A 
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tendency toward an interaction of response hand and electrode position (F (1,26) = 4.189, 
p = 0.051) indicated tendency toward greater activation on occipital sensors overall, as in 
previous experiments.  A significant three-way interaction of handle orientation, electrode 
hemisphere and electrode position (F (1,26) = 22.664, p < .0001) reflected the same left 
occipital preference seen in the previous experiment. An interaction between electrode 
hemisphere and electrode position (F (1,26) = 4.911, p = 0.036) indicated overall imbalance 
of activity across the sensors, indicating greater activation on left occipital sensors, 
consistent with previous experiments.  A weak, four-way interaction of handle orientation, 
response hand, electrode hemisphere and electrode position (F (1,26) = 4.379, p = 0.046) 
was observed.  Additional tests revealed a significant interaction of handle orientation, 
response hand and hemisphere on occipital sensors (F (1,26) = 14.438, p = 0.001, 2
p
=0.357), and a weaker interaction on parietal sensors  (F (1,26) = 8.180, p = 0.008, 2
p
=0.239), indicating that the effect was stronger on occipital sensors.  An interaction of 
handle orientation, response hand and electrode position (F (1,26) = 11.968, p = 0.002, 2
p
=0.315) was significant in left hemisphere, but not in right hemisphere (p = .168).  This 
supports the idea that the P1 compatibility effect had a left occipital locus, with a weaker 
interaction on parietal sensors, fitting with Cisek (2007) and others asserting a left-
hemisphere network for handling object properties.  
N1 revealed a significant main effect of electrode position (F (1,26) = 4.941, p = 0.035) 
showing greater activity on occipital than parietal sensors.  A significant interaction of 
handle orientation and electrode hemisphere (F (1,26) = 27.90, p < .001) indicated a 
tendency toward preferential activation on ipsilateral sensors by object handles, but with 
overall bi-hemispheric activation as in previous experiments.  A significant compatibility 
effect was again observed in a three-way interaction of handle orientation, response hand 
and electrode hemisphere (F (1,26) = 11.150, p = 0.008).  As in P1, an interaction of handle 
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orientation, electrode hemisphere and electrode position (F (1,26) = 4.960, p = 0.035) in N1 
reflected the same left occipital locus seen in previous experiments three and five.  Also as 
in P1 significant interaction of response hand and electrode position (F (1,26) = 10.472, p = 
0.003) indicated greater activation on occipital sensors overall.  This left occipital locus was 
also conspicuous in the masked experiments, suggesting that the left-hemisphere network 
for object representation is enlisted in experiments where stimuli disappear from the 
screen during the trial as the first, neutrally rotated object did here.  This fits with the 
functions of the left-hemisphere object network as proposed by Cisek (2007) or Johnson-
Frey et al. (2005).   
6.3.4 Discussion 
The delayed-response experiment (six) showed that the categorical judgement does not 
appear to be a necessary factor in generating an affordance effect in LRP or RT, and shows 
that merely viewing an affording stimulus is sufficient to elicit preparation of the actions 
associated with that stimulus.  This experiment was intended to confirm the findings of the 
go, no-go experiment five which found action effects in the absence of response, but 
included a categorical judgement that experiments such as Tipper et al. (2006) and 
Pellicano et al. (2010) have suggested are related to the generation of affordance effects.  
This section will discuss the results of this novel variation on the SRC affordance paradigm 
before considering their relationship with the findings of Tipper et al. (2006) and Pellicano 
et al. (2010): 
This experiment showed two distinct phases of effects similar to the previous experiment, 
offering a novel view on what occurs after response but when an object is still visible. The 
first phase of LRP effects from 100-200ms confirms the assumption that a categorical 
judgement is not required to elicit the familiar affordance effects by showing a significant 
behavioural and LRP effect even when categorical judgement is separated from response.  
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However the LRPs for both compatible and incompatible trials were negative going, 
indicating a preparation of the rule-cued response hand for both trial types.  This overall 
negativity is attributable to participants having almost two seconds to prepare the rule-
cued response having made the categorical judgement on a neutrally rotated stimulus long 
before the target appeared.  This is supported by the reduced RT (mean RT 302ms) and the 
1800-1900ms (0-100ms after affording stimulus onset) tendency in LRP, both of which 
suggest that participants were prepared to respond more rapidly than in previous 
experiments.  Of course, it is possible that the shorter RT is merely a product of 
participants having made their categorical judgements in advance, but that does not 
explain the greater motor activity from 0-100ms here compared with previous 
experiments.  The overall negativity shows a dissociation of the effect of response rule and 
of object affordance because, despite the preparation of the rule-cued response eliciting 
overall negativity, the typical affordance effect was still obtained; a sub-threshold positive 
inflection in the [overall negative] incompatible waveform signalled a brief (100-200ms) 
preparation of the visible affordance for incompatible trials.  The 100-200ms (1900-
2000ms) LRP effect adopted the same polarity changes as previous experiments during the 
same epoch, but did not reach the same overall polarity.  Even at its peak the positive 
inflection in the incompatible wave still had a negative value, however the positive 
inflection was sufficiently different from the negative inflection in the compatible wave to 
yield a significant difference between the trial types during the critical 100-200ms LRP 
epoch, as seen during this epoch in previous experiments.  This similarity to previous 
experiments suggests that this was the typical LRP affordance effect observed previously 
and the overall negative polarity was merely a factor of the prolonged preparation of the 
response rule (discussed in greater detail below).  
This variation on the SRC affordance paradigm also demonstrates the affordance effect in a 
novel way because the affording stimulus was not relevant to the task, whereas most 
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experiments have participants examine the affording stimulus when making a categorical 
judgement.  Here, participants were able to make their categorical judgement well in 
advance of the second [affording] stimulus and as the extremely short RT (approximately 
300ms) shows, were prepared to deploy their response extremely rapidly at the onset of 
the target image, certain that the category of the first stimulus predicted the category of 
the second stimulus.  This means that an effect based on the affordance of the second 
object still developed despite participants knowing that they did not have to examine the 
second stimulus at all in order to deploy a correct response.  This shows not only that the 
effect is not contingent on a categorical judgement, but this format also provides novel 
support for automaticity because not only was the affordance a non-task property (e.g. 
Tucker and Ellis, 1998 and the majority of SRC affordance research, handle laterality was 
not relevant to task), but in this experiment only the onset of the second stimulus was 
task-relevant (acting as a cue to respond) and the affordance contained in the second 
stimulus was not relevant to the task.  Importantly, the task placed no impetus on 
participants to consider the content of the stimulus as exists in typical affordance SRC 
experiments where participants must attend the stimulus (and therefore its affordance) to 
make their categorical judgement.  This was discussed by Vainio et al. (2008), who argue 
that identifying a graspable object necessarily includes processing the action possibilities 
contained in the object and here, there was no imperative to identify that object to elicit 
that mode of processing in the way seen in other affordance SRC experiments.  Put 
differently, participants made their categorical judgement on the first, neutrally rotated 
stimulus and simply waited to deploy it, meaning that the second (affording) image had no 
bearing on their selected response hand.  Despite this the action-relevant information in 
the non-task relevant second (affording) stimulus still exerted an effect.  Finding an effect 
of an irrelevant affordance has provided the basis for claims of automaticity so the finding 
is not novel. However this delayed-response SRC paradigm is a novel means of showing 
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this without contamination by the categorical judgement and so compliments the existing 
literature by showing an effect not only of an irrelevant affordance, but of an irrelevant 
object with no impetus to attend it.  In this experiment it was not necessary to attend the 
second image that contained the irrelevant affordance yet the affordance effect still 
emerged, speaking to the surreptitious nature of affordance generation, often treated as 
occurring in a vacuum, free from interference from intention, necessity or planned actions.  
Although these factors have been shown to affect affordance generation (e.g. Tipper et al, 
2006; Pellicano et al. 2010), experiments five and six from this thesis provide evidence that 
these are supplementary concerns for affordance generation, which will occur without 
these influences.  This provides a stronger case for automaticity because it suggests that 
the mere visual presence of the affordance is sufficient to elicit an effect, without the need 
for a task-device such as a categorical judgement to encourage participants to attend the 
features of the stimulus, as has been commonplace in the literature.  
This conclusion is supported by the findings in visual P1 and N1 components, which 
showed the same overall effects as previous experiments.  This shows that the rapid visual 
computation of action possibilities indexed by compatibility effects in P1 and N1 still 
functions without an explicit task-goal to examine the affording object to determine its 
category.  As in the go, no-go experiment this finding supports the notion that these early 
visual compatibility effects occur regardless of action intentions or prepared actions (which 
were already determined by the time the second, affording stimulus was displayed) and 
the presence of an N1 compatibility effect also supports the assertion from the go, no-go 
experiment that N1 bares a relationship with response, potentially indexing the effect of 
response on visual perception (e.g. Van Elk et al., 2010; others discussed above).  As in the 
masked and go, no-go experiments the compatibility effect occurred in an interaction with 
left-occipital sensors, supporting previous recommendations to reconsider the role of 
occipital cortex in the visuomotor processes elicited by viewing action-relevant stimuli.  
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The left-hemisphere locus of these effects was again consistent with the notion of a left-
hemisphere network for representing object characteristics as suggested by Cisek (2007), 
Johnson-Frey et al. (2005) and others (discussed in introductory chapter three) however 
the occipital preference in these effects recommends some revision to these proposed 
networks to include early occipital areas directly.  Overall, these visual data appear to 
reflect the same processes as in previous experiments, extracting action possibilities from 
the earliest stages of stimulus perception.   
Later effects 
A second phase of effects occurred in LRP from 200-500ms which saw the compatible wave 
return to baseline whilst the incompatible wave developed greater negativity after 
response (mean incompatible RT 306ms), leading to significant effects in ANOVA from 300-
500ms that were solely attributable to the incompatible LRP because the compatible LRP 
no longer differed from baseline.  As discussed above, Zhang et al. (1997) have shown that 
while action-relevant stimuli remain on screen motor preparation will continue.  However, 
this does not explain why t-tests showed that the effects were restricted to the 
incompatible waveform.  One possibility may be drawn from Zhang et al. (1997) being a 
comparative study where the abstract stimuli did not have the same valence to their 
primate participants as affording objects do to human participants so perhaps the 
restriction of these effects to incompatible cases may be a feature of affordance.  Perhaps 
this can be attributed to whether the afforded response is actually deployed in the task.  
On a compatible trial the afforded response is also the rule-cued response and so the 
affordance is always deployed. But on an incompatible trial the afforded response is never 
deployed. So perhaps, because the affording stimulus persists after response the later 
effects in the incompatible wave represent a suppression of the undeployed affordance 
according to the response rule.  This was not visible in previous experiments because 
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there, afforded LRP activity and LRP activity related to deploying the response occurred in 
distinct phases, with the response-related LRP activity occurring during the same epoch as 
these later effects.  This leaves two possible explanations for why these later effects were 
not detected; either the response-related LRP activity was of sufficient amplitude to 
obscure any later effects, or they merely did not occur because the stimulus offset with 
response, meaning there was no stimulus visible to elicit a later effect.  It is not possible to 
separate these possibilities without further investigation however based on the present 
data alone, it seems likely that this is attributable to the stimulus remaining on screen after 
response, given the occurrence of these effects in two experiments where the stimulus 
remained on screen and their absence in two experiments where stimuli offset with 
response. 
The negative polarity precludes a preparation of the afforded response which would have a 
positive polarity with these LRP calculations.  However it is impossible to separate the 
suppression of the affordance from a protracted preparation of the rule-cued response 
based on these data alone.  Galpin et al. (2011) may offer some insight on this point; they 
found a significant facilitation effect on compatible trials compared with neutral and 
incompatible trials, which were not significantly different from each other.  They used this 
to suggest that affordance effects are driven by facilitation by action-relevant stimulus 
properties and not by inhibition.  This could be seen to provide an indication that the 300-
500ms effects represent suppression (according to the response rule) of the undeployed 
afforded response that was being constantly primed by the stimulus remaining visible after 
response, unlike previous experiments.  However this is not clear cut and because typical 
SRC affordance paradigms see stimuli offset with response, other relevant experiments are 
scarce.  As such, further investigation is required to disentangle these two potential 
explanations of these novel late effects. 
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Another possibility exists in considering the structure of the task; because participants had 
already made their categorical judgement and prepared their responses, response 
deployment is not delayed by the categorical judgement as it was in the previous 
experiments, as shown by the reduced reaction times (approximately 200ms faster than 
previous experiments).  This means that the afforded LRP activity is overlaid on the rule-
cued motor activity.  This is unlike previous experiments (one and three) where the 
afforded preparation and response deployment were visible in the LRP in distinct phases, 
with afforded activity visible from 100-200ms and being overtaken by response activity 
after approximately 250ms.  These phases were demonstrated in the go, no-go experiment 
too, where an inversion of the 100-200ms effect occurred during the same epoch as 
response in previous experiments (commencing around 250ms).  This leads to the 
suggestion that the task-related and afforded LRP activity were no longer presenting 
serially in the LRP, but instead were overlaid on each other and visible in parallel.  This 
interpretation then characterises the overall negative polarity not as a product of 
participants maintaining their responses, but of the rapid preparation of the prepared, 
rule-cued response in the epochs immediately preceding the onset of the second image, 
without being delayed by making the categorical judgement in order to determine the 
rule-cued response.  Again, this requires further investigation to disentangle from the 
previous possibilities but receives some support from the findings of the masked, 
lateralised experiment three, which showed that afforded LRP activity can be dissociated 
from the LRP effect.   
Common among these differing suggestions is the idea that these later effects are due to 
the stimulus persisting on the screen after response and this is the fundamental difference 
between experiments five and six (go, no-go and delayed response lateralised affordance 
experiments) when compared to experiments one and three (typical lateralised SRC 
affordance and masked, lateralised experiment, respectively).  In experiments one and 
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three, objects offset with response and found the same 100-200ms effect without any later 
effects; only when objects persisted after response were later effects detected.  This is a 
crucial detail because after response, the participant’s goal states change and this recalls 
other evidence on the automatic suppression of affordance when goal states change.  For 
example Vainio (2009) has suggested that the negative compatibility effects observed 
when an affording stimulus offsets are consistent with the automatic inhibition of 
affordance according to goal states.  Vainio (2009) had participants complete two versions 
of an affordance SRC paradigm in which they reached toward the location of a stimulus; 
when the stimulus remained onscreen they found a typical affordance SRC facilitation 
effect however when the stimulus offset after 300ms the compatibility effect reversed.  
They suggest that constant online updating of action possibilities in accordance with goal 
states means that when an affording stimulus (that typically facilitates compatible actions) 
offsets (or is masked), the typical facilitation effect becomes inhibition and produces the 
negative compatibility effect.  This was observed in LRP in masked, lateralised experiment 
three.  As discussed above, Vainio et al. (2011) also demonstrated similar effects with brief 
object presentations and reached a similar conclusion.  This idea of automatic inhibition of 
afforded motor responses has been extended by McBride et al. (2013) to explain the 
involuntary motor actions associated with Alien Hand Syndrome, where McBride suggests 
that these involuntary motor actions are products of faulty automatic inhibition processes, 
which fail to sufficiently inhibit afforded actions and ultimately produce the involuntary 
actions.  Sumner and Hussain (2008) have suggested that when goal states change the 
automatic suppression of afforded responses is beneficial because it allows an agent to act 
without interference from low-level object properties and in their words, maintains a level 
playing field for alternative actions.  Taken with the present data, these arguments suggest 
that the later effects observed in experiments five and six may be explained in terms of the 
automatic suppression of the action afforded by the object when it persists on screen but 
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is no longer relevant to the task (i.e. after participants’ goals have changed) and the 
present use of LRP data extends these behavioural findings to show that the observed RT 
differences appear to be driven by inhibition of the incompatible affordance, in-line with 
the response rule.  Further research will aid in disentangling the mechanisms and 
parameters underlying this suppression, however these findings offer a framework in 
which to explore this element of object perception.  In particular, further research could 
examine whether the reversal of the effects is still observed when stimuli persist on screen 
but remain task relevant.  This could be achieved either by a pure passive viewing task or 
alternatively, by displaying an affording stimulus for a full second whilst participants 
complete an unrelated task with no relationship to lateralised affordance. 
Categorical judgements 
The introduction to this experiment described experiments from Tipper et al. (2006) and 
Pellicano et al. (2010) that showed different judgements on the same stimuli elicited 
different effects, with a categorical judgement eliciting an affordance effect but no such 
effect found for colour judgements.  The present data indicate that a categorical 
judgement is not required at the point of response in order to generate an affordance 
effect and suggests that Pellicano et al.’s (2010) effects are due to features of the colour 
judgement.  Iani, Baroni, Pellicano and Nicoletti (2011) developed Pellicano et al. (2010) 
using upright and inverted stimuli with handles orientated left or right, similar to Tucker 
and Ellis (1998) except that they were pictured to the left or right of fixation.  They 
dissociated Simon and affordance effects by having participants make button presses or 
reaching movements to the stimuli and found that both Simon and affordance effects 
emerged in RT.  They attributed their observations to stimuli generating different codes for 
object location and object affordance.  The present experiment extends the findings of 
both of these experiments by showing converging evidence that the categorical judgement 
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is sufficient but not necessary to elicit an affordance effect and so shows that (if one 
accepts their code-based explanation) these codes appear to be generated regardless of 
categorical judgements or intention to act on the objects, fitting with the assumption of 
automaticity; that viewing an object is sufficient to yield its affordances.   
Overall this experiment confirms the assumption that the categorical judgement is not a 
crucial part of the generation of an affordance effect and moreover, supports the 
assumption that viewing objects is sufficient to yield their affordances, regardless of 
intention or task factors.  It supports the dissociation of RT and LRP effects proposed in 
masked lateralised experiment three.  It also offers some interesting insight into the 
automatic suppression of an affordance that is not deployed but remains visible, 
something unavailable to previous behavioural investigations.   
6.4 Chapter discussion 
The experiments in this chapter confirm two implicit assumptions that pervade the 
literature on affordances; that viewing objects is sufficient to yield their affordances and 
that the categorical judgement is not critical to affordance generation.  This was achieved 
by developing two novel variations on the SRC affordance paradigm.  Experiment five 
showed that viewing objects is sufficient to yield their affordance by removing the manual 
response and replacing it with a verbal response in a go, no-go version of the paradigm.  
This serves a dual purpose in context of this thesis by also showing the affordance effects 
observed in LRP really are due to the lateralised affordances within the stimuli and clearly 
separating them from the motor preparations necessarily entailed by the bimanual 
responses seen in the previous experiments.  Experiment six showed that the categorical 
judgement that is prevalent in the literature and that was shown to affect processing by 
Tipper et al. (2006), Pellicano et al. (2010) and Iani et al. (2011) is not critical to affordance 
generation.  This experiment also served a dual purpose by showing the typical SRC 
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affordance effect not only when the handle rotation was not task-relevant, but also when 
the entire stimulus was not task-relevant and merely served as a cue to deploy their 
prepared, rule-cued response.  This shows that whilst categorical judgements do entail the 
processing of affording object properties (e.g. Vainio et al., 2008) they are not necessary to 
elicit the effects.  Taken together, these demonstrations of the 100-200ms LRP affordance 
effect provide convincing evidence that supports the findings from experiment one that 
indicate that affordance has a rapid effect on motor cortex around 100ms after viewing an 
object and that this effect is borne simply by viewing the action possibilities contained 
within the objects.   
Given the volume of converging evidence, confirming the assumption that the categorical 
judgement does not affect affordance generation is perhaps unsurprising.  However this 
possibility had not previously been addressed directly and has been assumed implicitly in a 
great deal of evidence for the affordance account.  By showing this by investigating the 
effects in motor cortex, experiment six serves to underline and expand upon the findings 
of the wealth of experiments that have come before it (e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Craighero, 
Fadiga, Rizzolatti & Umiltà, 1998, 1999; Rumiati & Humphreys, 1998).  Moreover, in the 
later LRP effects it has demonstrated for the first time a differential effect of response rule 
and object affordance on the motor activity derived by an SRC experiment, another 
element of the SRC paradigm that has generally gone unconsidered.  Similar later 
activation was observed in the go, no-go experiment too, supporting the idea that as long 
as an undeployed affordance is visible, action preparation will continue to be detectable in 
motor cortex.  In addition, the present data suggest that if participants’ goals change 
during this time (i.e. they complete the task and await commencement of the next trial), 
the action possibilities contained within the incompatible stimulus seem to be suppressed. 
The confirmation of the assumption that merely viewing objects is sufficient to yield their 
affordances is another result that whilst unsurprising on its own serves to confirm and 
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expand a long-held and under-investigated belief about the nature of affordance.  By 
providing direct evidence of motor activation in the absence of the intention to act on a 
seen object the experiment demonstrates that it is possible to dissociate motor 
preparation caused by affordance and motor preparation caused by the task or rule-based 
response.  The experiment also shows that even when the affording stimulus merely serves 
as a go signal, the affordance still exerts a measurable effect on motor cortex.  These 
findings are extended by the go, no-go results which show that the effects in experiment 
six would still be predicted even in the absence of an intention to act, or indeed make any 
response at all.  Together, the novel LRP effects from these experiments provide clear 
support for the fundamental assumptions and assertions in the affordance literature (cf. 
Ch. 1-3). 
Unique to this chapter are the extended stimulus durations of up to a full second.  This 
measure was taken to avoid confounding results with rapid display changes or mask-like 
effects (seen in experiments three and four), however it also demonstrated some 
previously unseen effects that affording stimuli have on motor cortex after the initial phase 
of affordance generation.  For instance experiment six shows that having already made 
their categorical judgements, participants began to prepare their rule-cued responses 
ahead of the onset of the second stimulus, speeding response deployment.  Although this 
is difficult to separate from the temporal advantage gained by simply having made the 
categorical judgement in advance, the trial structure (first object predicts category, 
response maintained until second stimulus onset), the LRP effects from 1800-1900ms (0-
100ms after affordance onset) and the reduced RT all support the idea that participants 
were preparing responses ahead of time.  Another previously unobserved effect was 
detected in both experiment five and six, a reversal of the effects in motor cortex after the 
initial 100-200ms affordance effect that appear to be due to the suppression of an 
afforded action that has not been deployed as a response.  This is most clear in the go, no-
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go data where both compatible and incompatible waves reversed at approximately 200ms 
immediately after the generation of the LRP affordance effect.  It seems that once the 
affordances –which participants knew they would not deploy in a manual response– were 
generated they were immediately suppressed, as shown by a reversal of the polarity for 
both waveforms around 200ms.  A similar effect occurred in experiment six however it was 
restricted to the incompatible wave, leading to the suggestion that the reversal constitutes 
a suppression of the undeployed afforded response because when the compatible 
response was deployed, the wave returned to baseline but when the affordance was not 
deployed, preparation continued as in the incompatible wave in experiment six and both 
waves in the go, no-go experiment (five).  As discussed above, behavioural studies have 
shown the automatic inhibition of affordances when goal-states changed (such as after 
response deployment in an SRC experiment) by using RT methods (e.g. Sumner & Hussain, 
2008; Vainio, 2009; Vainio et al., 2011; McBride et al., 2013) and although several potential 
explanations are offered above, minimally the LRP data in this thesis suggests that where 
participants do make a manual response (in the context of SRC paradigms) this suppression 
is primarily associated with undeployed affordances on incompatible trials, with the 
deployed (i.e. compatible) affordances yielding no further effects after response.  When 
there is no manual response, as in the go, no-go experiment, both affordances would go 
undeployed and both compatible and incompatible LRPs reversed, as seen over the 
experiments in this chapter.  Although these experiments offer some of the first evidence 
on this, the pattern of reversed LRP effects over experiment five and six seem to indicate 
that this suppression is not dependent on the experimental condition, but rather the 
relationship between visual input and goal states. These effects are unavailable to 
behavioural RT investigations because these effects come after a response is deployed in 
experiment six and after the initial phase of affordance generation in experiment five, 
where no typical manual responses were used at all.  This means that without using a 
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technique for recording neurophysiological data, it is impossible to obtain data on these 
processes with behavioural paradigms alone.  As mentioned above, it is not possible to 
separate the effect in the incompatible wave in experiment six from an extended 
preparation of the rule-cued response without further investigations however the effects 
in experiment five do lend a degree of support for this interpretation.  It is conceivable that 
the later (200-500ms) effects observed in both experiments represent different processes, 
however it seems unlikely and is difficult to explain based on the present data.  One barrier 
to this interpretation of the later effects comes from their absence in experiment one, 
however as mentioned above these later effects were detected unexpectedly and appear 
to be by-products of leaving the stimulus on screen for longer than usual in these irregular 
versions of the experiment that also employed quite different response parameters.  Also, 
in the earlier experiments the large, response-based inflections in the waveform could 
easily have muted the effects that are only visible here due to differences in the paradigms 
generating more rapid responses or no responses at all.  Three possibilities were discussed 
in relation to the delayed-response experiment (six) that were all contingent on the notion 
of automatic inhibition of object affordance following goal-state changes (e.g. Sumner & 
Hussain, 2008; Vainio, 2009; Vainio et al., 2011) and based on the present data alone, this 
automatic inhibition of undeployed affordances that conflict with task parameters appears 
to be a likely candidate.  However, this thesis provides some of the only evidence of these 
effects when the goal-state change is comprised of actually deploying a response so 
ultimately, these possibilities must be the subjected to further investigation. 
Overall this chapter provides novel insight into both the early stages of affordance 
generation and the later stages of motor activity when viewing affording stimuli for 
extended periods.  In providing these insights the experiments also confirm two implicit 
assumptions found throughout the literature, providing direct evidence for them by 
directly examining the associated motor activity.   
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7. Chapter seven 
 General Discussion 
This thesis used event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the timecourse of object 
based affordance by employing and adapting the methods from some of the key 
behavioural studies in the SRC affordance literature.  The temporal acuity offered by the 
ERP technique was ideal to examine the rapid and transient visuomotor activation 
indicated in those key behavioural studies and so to investigate the assumptions of rapidity 
and automaticity commonly asserted in the literature (cf. Ch.1-3).  This was done initially 
by employing analogues of the affordance SRC methods seen in key behavioural studies in 
order to expand on their findings.  Experiments one to four were based around the 
methods and findings of Tucker and Ellis (1998), Ellis and Tucker (2000), Tucker and Ellis 
(2004) and Vainio et al. (2011) before later experiments used novel variations on the SRC 
paradigm by varying the response parameters.  This chapter will draw these experiments 
together and consider their implications for understanding neural aspects of affordance, 
how they compare to the literature and what the consequences are for future treatments.  
This will commence by restating the key points, studies and issues identified in the 
introduction, followed by a discussion of the motor effects before visual effects are 
handled separately in section 7.5.1.  Finally, some new avenues of research will be 
considered.  
7.1 Neural correlates of affordance 
As detailed in chapters one to three, the idea of affordance is fundamentally about 
supporting real-time actions in a complex world of action possibilities both familiar and 
novel (Gibson & Gibson, 1955; Gibson, 1977).  The concept of affordance rests on two key 
points; firstly, that merely viewing objects is sufficient to potentiate the actions that they 
afford, regardless of any intention to act on them.  This has also become known as 
automaticity, which means only that there is no requirement for explicit action intentions 
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to be formed in order for an affordance to be generated; hence they are generated 
automatically.  Secondly, generating these affordances, also described as potentiating 
actions, has a measurable effect on executing actions.  This measurement has typically 
been done in SRC affordance paradigms, such as Tucker and Ellis (1998), who 
demonstrated a measurable influence of visual affordance on lateralised manual 
responses.  However others such as Symes et al. (2008) have shown improved RTs in a 
visual search task when participants prepare a response that is compatible with the target 
object, demonstrating a two-way relationship between action and perception. 
These core points underpin the entire affordance literature.  However, as seen in chapter 
two, some researchers have gone further, using behavioural studies to make deeper 
inferences about the brain activity underpinning these points.  Many of these have been 
pinned on ideas such as the ventral/ dorsal distinction advanced by Ungerleider and 
Mishkin (1982) and developed by others such as Milner and Goodale (1995) and Goodale 
and Milner (1992). In context of affordance, dorsal representation of objects has been 
described by Gallese, Craighero, Fadiga and Fogassi (1999) as ‘pragmatic,’ meaning dealing 
with aspects of objects that are relevant to action, as opposed to other aspects such as 
their semantic features.  Examples of affordance effects and explanations couched in these 
terms may be drawn from some of the references that are most important to this thesis, 
such as Tucker and Ellis (1998) or Ellis and Tucker (2000) who assert that the salient object 
features for affordance generation –those that produced their effects– are represented in 
the dorsal stream, such as size, shape and orientation.  Others have taken it further, such 
as Norman (2002) who has suggested that all affordance effects are dorsal in nature and 
proposed revising the ventral/ dorsal dichotomy into a constructivist/ ecological dichotomy 
to account for the different approaches to vision and their similarities to the ventral/dorsal 
distinction, effectively subsuming all behavioural affordance effects into the dorsal stream 
in one fell swoop.   
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Others have made similar claims without the ventral/ dorsal distinction; Edwards, 
Humphreys and Castiello (2003) also claim that viewing objects directly generates motor 
activity based only on behavioural evidence and secondary evidence from other 
publications.  Witt, Proffitt and Epstein (2005) argue from behavioural evidence that 
whether an object is in reach or not has a distinct neurological effect, although they do not 
specify this effect clearly.  Fischer and Dahl (2007) examined bimanual button press RTs to 
an animation of a rotating cup and found that RT changed continuously with the stimulus 
rotation.  Beyond these summary references, a great deal of behavioural research 
studies(cf. Ch. 1-3) make the fairly general claims that the motor effects associated with 
viewing objects (or even object names) must be detectable rapidly (e.g. Fischer, Prinz, & 
Lotz, 2008; Sumner & Husain, 2008; Pavese & Buxbaum, 2002) and automatically (e.g. 
Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Grezes & Decety, 2002; McBride et al., 2012) as products of 
visuomotor processes (e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 2004; Vingerhoets et al., 2009; Buxbaum & 
Kalénine, 2010).  Conversely, despite the volume of behavioural studies with brain claims 
there are limited models around them.  Cisek (2007) offers one of the few however his 
fMRI-centred approach offers a poor fit with the electrophysiological data, with no 
provision for the occipital or early visual effects observed in ERP studies and in this thesis 
and a focus on frontal and parietal cortices that is not borne out in ERP. 
The existing evidence on this is limited and was summarised in chapter three.  The 
evidence overwhelmingly indicated fairly rapid motor activation by object affordance, 
however the variety of stimuli employed across the different studies did not yield a 
consistent timecourse, with different affordance classes and indeed paradigms yielding a 
range of motor effects from 100ms up to 400ms.  For example, Proverbio et al. (2011) 
found effects at around 250ms in a passive viewing paradigm with a stimulus set consisting 
of a wide variety of manipulable tools (e.g. typewriter, paintbrush, puzzle cube) that 
afforded a wide variety of actions involving one or both hands.  This means that the results 
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may have better ecological validity than studies which use only a single affordance (e.g. 
lateralised teacup handle affordances in Tucker and Ellis, 1998), however it highlights 
another issue with the existing literature on neural processes in affordance; it can be very 
difficult to attribute particular effects to particular characteristics of the SR set because 
many of the experiments had stimulus sets containing a mixture of affordances.  This 
difficulty is compounded when other studies using similarly mixed stimulus sets find quite 
different timecourses, such as Proverbio et al. (2007) who found a motor effect with 
similarly diverse stimuli from 130-160ms.  To alleviate this and to get closer to the 
behavioural results that underpin this literature, the experimental work here focussed on a 
particular affordance for each experiment and included a within subjects experiment using 
both lateralised and grip-type affordances.  Although a number of localisation experiments 
such as Grezes et al. (2003) have found effects elsewhere (particularly parietal cortex) that 
appear to relate to affordance processes, most electrophysiology on the subject has only 
considered motor and visual cortices (as detailed in Ch.3) and that was adopted as the 
approach here too because the claims from the behavioural literature tend to describe 
“motor activity” or refer to processes as “visuomotor”.  So restricting the analysis in this 
way allowed for more clear assessment of the behavioural claims of visuomotor processing 
and motor activation by visual objects described in the SRC affordance literature.   
7.2 Experimental summary 
This summary and discussion of the experimental work will follow the order of 
experiments as presented in chapters four to seven.  Sections 7.2 to 7.4 will focus on the 
motor effects, with a separate section (7.5) to discuss the visual effects across all 
experiments.  These will finally be brought together in section 7.6. 
177 
 
7.2.1 Chapter four; the core effects 
Chapter four featured two experiments designed to replicate the behavioural SRC 
affordance effects observed in Tucker and Ellis (1998) and Ellis and Tucker (2000) with ERPs 
to better understand the visual and motor processes underlying them.  As discussed above, 
these studies found reduced RT and errors when SR pairs were similar compared to when 
they were dissimilar, regardless of whether they shared a spatial relationship (Tucker & 
Ellis, 1998) or physical characteristics (Ellis & Tucker, 2000), even though similarity was not 
task relevant.  They concluded that viewing the stimuli automatically activated 
representations of the afforded actions in the dorsal stream, which led to the effects due 
to the role of the dorsal stream in the online control of actions.  Experiment one used 
lateralised affordances similar to Tucker and Ellis (1998) and experiment two used the grip-
type affordances from Ellis and Tucker (2000).  Both experiments observed the typical SRC 
affordance effect in RT however quite different results were observed in LRPs and this 
difference will be the subject of this section.  Experiment one’s lateralised stimuli yielded a 
compatibility effect with a bimanual button response, detectable over motor cortex from 
100-200ms however the grip-type stimuli of experiment two did not yield an effect until 
200-300ms on the same sensors.  All later experiments using lateralised stimuli also found 
their effect from 100-200ms however the only other experiment (experiment four) using 
grip-type stimuli failed to find an LRP effect, yielding only a behavioural RT effect.  In the 
visual components (discussed in 7.5.1) the lateralised stimuli elicited compatibility effects 
in P1 and N1, however the grip-type experiment failed to yield any compatibility effects in 
visual components. 
7.2.2 Intrinsic vs. extrinsic affordances; a representational explanation 
The different LRP timings found in the grip-type and lateralised experiments must be due 
to the different kinds of affordance used in each experiment, because other than the SR 
pair utilised the paradigms are ostensibly the same.  Only a handful of studies have 
178 
 
addressed this difference; Derbyshire, Ellis and Tucker (2006) discussed this issue and 
suggested a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic object properties.  They define 
intrinsic object properties as invariant object characteristics such as size or shape that do 
not vary based on presentation parameters and will always be part of viewing a particular 
object. These features necessarily co-occur with object presentation and so will always 
produce motor preparation, regardless of how the object is presented.  Extrinsic properties 
are those that are based on the physical relation of viewer and object and so may vary with 
presentation parameters, such as handle orientation.  These properties are called extrinsic 
because they are not a necessary part of the object representation.  So, unlike intrinsic 
object properties the extrinsic object properties will not always yield the same affordance 
and instead their affordance is contingent on the way they are presented and the 
relationship of that presentation with the agent’s effectors.  Derbyshire et al. (2006) 
illustrate the difference as follows; objects with intrinsic affordances are those whose 
action-relevant properties are known when the objects identity is known, with no need to 
see the object. For example, one does not require visual input to know that the apple 
stimulus used in the grip-type experiment (experiment two) affords a power grip or that 
the nut affords a precision grip.  In contrast, the lateralised affordances do require visual 
input to yield an affordance because their identity alone does not necessarily confer use by 
a particular hand without being oriented in a particular direction.  So unlike objects with 
intrinsic affordances, these extrinsic affordance objects would not generate an affordance 
based on their identity alone.  They suggest that this instantiation of object 
representations is compatible with Marr’s (1982) suggestion that visual representations do 
not preserve non-identity properties such as orientation or colour but do include an 
object-centred spatial description of the object, preserving invariant object properties such 
as size, shape and other identity-critical features.  This defines the compatibility effect 
observed in lateralised experiment (one), which found a compatibility effect in LRP at 100-
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200ms, as a product of an extrinsic object property.  In turn, it defines the compatibility 
effect observed in the grip-type experiment (two), which found an LRP effect from 200-
300ms, as a product of an intrinsic object property.  This does not however lead directly to 
an explanation of the observed differences; why would extrinsic object properties activate 
motor cortex sooner than intrinsic ones?  Distinguishing between extrinsic and intrinsic 
object properties is dependent on the way stimuli are presented, offering a possible 
explanation based in presentation parameters; experiment two saw the grip-type stimuli 
centred in the stimulus image and mostly symmetrical around the midline, however in 
order to have lateralised stimuli experiment one necessarily had functional (e.g. hammer 
head, pan) and graspable parts (i.e. handles) of the stimuli on different sides of each 
image.  This means that lateralised stimuli always cue a hand because the handle is always 
lateralised, regardless of whether it is the correct hand according to the response rule.  So, 
when the object is identified and the rule-based response is determined one of two things 
will occur depending on the type of trial; on a compatible trial the compatible response 
that has already been primed by the visual input will be immediately deployed for the 
object-cued hand.  On an incompatible trial, the response hand cued by stimulus laterality 
is not correct so the response primed by handle orientation must be abandoned and re-
planned according to the response rule.  In the grip-type experiment, the stimuli do not 
cue a particular response hand until the object has been identified and the response rule is 
parsed simply because the stimuli do not contain any laterality information.  So according 
to Derbyshire et al.’s (2006) account, with grip-type SR pairs the process does not differ for 
compatible and incompatible trials as it does with lateralised stimuli, simply because there 
is no extrinsic affordance to cue a particular hand before object identification has taken 
place.  This distinction makes clear predictions as to the source of the differences but does 
little to explain the mechanisms by which they may come about, a weakness of this 
explanation.  So, experiments using intrinsic object properties (like the grip-type 
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affordances from experiment two) might always yield a later LRP effect because 
compatibility is reliant on the object being categorised before a response hand is cued or 
selected, unlike lateralised stimuli which cue a response hand before the rule-based 
response is determined.  This is similar to the explanation given elsewhere for slower 
responses on incompatible trials; the response is contingent on the categorisation being 
completed before the appropriate response can be cued and on incompatible trials this will 
always be mismatched leading to the longer RT.  However, recent research has indicated 
that affordance effects are products of facilitation of compatible responses more than an 
influence of incompatibility (Galpin et al., 2011).  Other studies have shown that the notion 
of inhibition by incompatible responses applies to spatial SRC experiments but not with 
affordance SRC experiments (Pellicano et al., 2010) where effects are driven by facilitation, 
so another explanation that accounts for the facilitatory nature of compatibility is required.  
An alternative explanation within the remit of Derbyshire et al.’s (2006) intrinsic vs 
extrinsic dichotomy may be drawn from the types of objects used in each experiment.  The 
extrinsic, lateralised affordances used in experiment one were binary, with all stimuli 
orientated along the same rotation to the left or right.  However for the intrinsic, grip-type 
experiment (experiment two), the dimension for compatibility was the variation in size 
(and therefore associated grip) which is a continuum.  This could conceivably delay the 
processing of grip-type stimuli because their relationship with response is not binary, 
introducing an extra layer of processing to determine the relative scale of the object to the 
woodgrain background or other stimuli.  This is necessarily conflated with the idea of 
intrinsic vs extrinsic affordances because size is an intrinsic object property, making it hard 
to isolate and address directly based on these data alone, but it does represent another 
difference between affordance classes that has received little attention and that could 
merit further investigation. 
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7.2.3 Affordances of function and geometry 
Another view on different sources of affordance comes from Zhao and Zhu (2013) who 
attempt to distinguish different affordances classes in terms of a computational model for 
parsing visual scenes.  They draw a distinction between functional and geometric 
affordances and suggest that functional affordances are critical to defining usable objects; 
the function of an object determines its use and often other characteristics too (e.g. 
materials), as well as how to interact with the object.  Geometric affordances are described 
similarly to Derbyshire et al.’s (2006) intrinsic object properties in that they are invariant 
and contingent on the structure of an object and will be the same regardless of viewing 
angles, modes of presentation or other factors.  However Zhao and Zhu (2013) go further 
than Derbyshire et al. (2006), saying that geometric properties necessarily subserve the 
functional properties because it is the shape of the objects that aids their use in goal-
directed actions.  By Zhao and Zhu’s definition, man-made objects contain both functional 
and geometric affordances, with the geometric affordances indicating how to employ the 
functional affordances for goal directed actions, whereas most natural objects (or man-
made objects without explicit functions) may only offer geometric affordances.  In turn, 
they say that the functional affordance of an object is what connects man-made objects 
and human actions.  On Zhao and Zhu’s (2013) account, the lateralised affordance effect 
found both in the RT and LRP data in experiment one offers a good example of how 
geometric properties serve functional properties because the lateralised stimuli contained 
both functional and geometric affordances.  The effects arose from a combination of the 
functional properties of the object, specifically the location of its manipulable component 
(usually the handle), and that components geometric orientation (left vs. right) with 
respect to the participant.  By Zhao and Zhu’s (2013) distinction the geometric 
configuration of the [functional affording] lateralised handles offered a geometric 
affordance (that was compatible or incompatible with left and right responses) that was 
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critical to extracting the functional affordance (because it determined the orientation of 
the functional parts).  However, breaking down the dichotomy with real lateralised objects 
in this way becomes quite self-contradictory, with geometric affordances yielding 
functional affordances that are still contingent on the geometric configuration of the 
objects, making a very unclear picture.  This exposes another shortcoming in their 
distinction between functional and geometric affordances; the geometric affordance (that 
–on this model– subserves the functional affordance and which together generated the 
observed effects) in the lateralised stimuli is a variable object property.  However their 
dichotomy states that geometric properties should be invariant.  Moreover, it is the 
geometric configuration of the functional parts that yield the compatibility effect with the 
lateralised (i.e. geometric) responses, despite the variable object property of handle 
orientation being a variable property of the functional part of the objects.  This 
demonstrates that Zhao and Zhu’s (2013) dichotomy struggles to capture all of the 
dimensions involved in lateralised affordance SRC with real objects.   
The grip-type stimuli share a similar problem to the lateralised stimuli; in the natural 
category the objects have no functional properties, instead offering only geometric 
affordances based on their size and shape and it was these geometric affordances that 
yielded the compatibility effect for the natural objects. However, the man-made objects 
lacked this clarity; some of the man-made objects in the grip-type experiment (two) 
offered both functional and geometric affordances that were the same (e.g. holding and 
drinking from a soft drink can requires the same grip).  However others were not so clearly 
distinguished; for example, the pen stimulus was compatible with a precision grip, 
however this is not the grip that one would use to write with a pen.  This same problem 
also applied to other stimuli such as the rolling pin or screwdriver.  Similarly, the drinking-
straw stimulus was compatible with a precision grip however its function (drinking) does 
not require any manual grip whatsoever.  This suggests that whilst this distinction may be 
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useful for explaining the hierarchy of functional and geometric properties that yield 
affordances, it is insufficient to handle the complexities of an affordance SRC paradigm 
with common household objects, at least with the SR pairs used in experiments one and 
two.  This may be due to the paradigm being somewhat contrived compared to the real-
world vision Zhao and Zhu (2013) set out to model.  Their intention to model scene parsing 
in real rooms also entailed them considering very different objects in their modelling, such 
as wardrobes, chairs and stairs without reference to particular bodily states.  These bodily 
states of course are critical to yielding compatibility in SRC paradigms.  So to summarise, 
according to Zhao and Zhu’s (2013) dichotomy, the affordances that yielded the observed 
effects in the lateralised and grip-type SRC affordance experiments (one and two) were 
mostly geometric, even when based on functional parts.  And the distinction is further 
confounded because some of the man-made grip-type stimuli had the same functional and 
geometric affordances (e.g. soft drink can, bottle) whereas others were quite different (e.g. 
writing with a pen compared with merely picking one up).  So, this does not offer a clear 
interpretation of these data. 
Zhao and Zhu’s (2013) study represents one of few attempts to distinguish different classes 
of affordance, meriting its inclusion here.  However they did not set out to offer a model of 
affordance SRC, rather they attempted to model different classes of affordance for a 
computational model of scene parsing and so their model lacks sufficient reference to 
bodily states.  In this way their model does not account for the full dimensions entailed in 
the relationship of stimulus and response that are critical to produce the observed effects 
and their dichotomy appears to put the quite different grip and lateralised affordances 
together in a single category.  Whilst this distinction may be useful elsewhere, the lack of 
reference to responses by Zhao and Zhu (2013) make for a poor explanation of affordance 
in the context of SRC where effects arise due to a combination of affordance and body 
position.  On this subject, it is notable that although Derbyshire et al.’s (2006) dichotomy 
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was developed around behavioural affordance SRC data, it also gives little credence to the 
response.  A third explanation will now be considered that focuses on the properties of the 
response in shaping the observed differences. 
7.2.4 An embodied explanation 
Neither Zhao and Zhu’s (2013) or Derbyshire et al.’s (2006) distinction lead to a fruitful 
explanation of the later LRP effect for grip-type affordances compared with lateralised.  
However both share a common feature; both are primarily concerned with the nature of 
the stimulus and do not consider the response, a strange characteristic for attempts to 
distinguish affordances, especially given the evidence cited above (e.g. Ellis & Tucker, 2000; 
Symes et al., 2008) that responses affect the way objects and affordances are perceived.  
This is an issue highlighted by Stins and Michaels (1997), who said that SRC effects are best 
characterised as compatibility between visual information and available actions and 
suggest that the role of the response (the available action) is typically underemphasised.  
This is particularly pertinent here where –as detailed above– the grip-type responses in 
experiment two were very different to the button press responses of experiment one, 
yielding a later LRP effect at 200ms instead of 100ms.  With this in mind, a third, more 
comprehensive means of addressing this difference –one that also accounts for the 
differences in response– may be drawn from embodied cognition.  As described in the 
introduction, embodied cognition seeks to offload cognitive effort onto the body in order 
to facilitate real-time interactions and reduce the complexity required to model cognition.  
Invoking the body in cognition is clearly in line with Stins and Michaels’ (1997) suggestion 
that responses merit greater consideration.  There is also a movement within embodied 
cognition to de-emphasise the role of complex and detailed mental representations in 
cognition (of the type that are problematic for Derbyshire et al., 2006) and instead focus 
on more direct accounts of perception that involve the body (embodied cognition) or the 
local environment (often called situated cognition).  This makes an ideal candidate for 
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explaining the compatibility and affordance effects, which were generated by 
interrelations between body and stimulus.  An ideal explanation may be based on the 
Philosophical work of Andy Clark, an advocate of the embodied approach who suggests 
that the generation of complex internal representations is too costly to represent an 
effective strategy for real-time cognition (Clark, 1989; 1998).  Instead, he cites what he 
calls the ‘007 principle’ which states that agents (human or otherwise) need only acquire 
the information required to complete their goal and do not need to build detailed, complex 
mental representations to perform simple tasks and actions (Clark, 1989).  Most important 
to this discussion, Clark (1989; 1998) suggests that this is mainly gathered from and 
supported by environmental features or the agent’s body (Clark, 1998).  He calls this 
support ‘scaffolding’1, referring to physical support for mental processes.  This idea is 
particularly pertinent to distinguishing lateralised and grip-type affordances because each 
has participants make quite different responses which bear quite different relationships 
with the stimuli.  The grip-type SRC experiment (two) saw a direct match between 
response grips and the grips required to interact with the stimuli and indeed had 
participants maintain the grips required to interact with the stimuli throughout the 
experiment and found a compatibility effect in LRP at 200-300ms.  This was not true of 
lateralised SRC experiment one which found a compatibility effect in LRP at 100-200ms 
based only on a spatial relationship between the lateralised handles and the bimanual 
button press response; this SR pair shared spatial compatibility but did not share the 
identical action affordances seen in the grip-type experiments.  Considered in terms of 
embodied cognition, these different body positions belie greater differences underlying 
                                                          
1 The origins of scaffolding can be traced to Vygotsky’s approach to developmental psychology, 
although he did not use this moniker (Stone, 1998) and originally described the possibility of 
improving learning by making specific interjections to aid children in learning how to complete 
novel and complex tasks that may otherwise be beyond their ability. Incidentally, this fits with 
the Gibsonian notion of affordance aiding interactions with novel objects, where the 




the LRP timing differences between experiments one and two than other accounts given 
above and begin to offer a basis for the observed differences in ERP: 
Examined in embodied terms, the maintenance of the grips throughout the grip-type 
experiment (two) suggests that the initial phase of affordance generation differed from the 
lateralised experiment because the participant’s body position already reflected the 
afforded action.  This means that participants’ motor cortices also reflected the afforded 
action because it was supporting their hand position.  This eliminates the need to generate 
an affordance when objects were presented because that affordance had effectively 
already been generated because maintaining the response grips was already producing 
and maintaining the motor activity afforded by the stimulus.  Whereas in the lateralised 
experiment, the participants maintained their thumb over the response button which 
shared no physical characteristics with the handle affordances they were viewing, 
necessitating the generation of new affordance based on the visual stimulus.  Approached 
in this way, two different courses of action open up for processing each different object 
affordance; the grip-type affordances match the body position of the participant, so the 
visual affordance is rapidly found to match the prepared response, reducing the temporal 
and computational demand to generate a new affordance because the affordance was 
already prepared and being maintained in motor cortex by virtue of the response devices. 
On this embodied account, maintaining grips reduces the pressure to generate an entirely 
new affordance because maintaining the grips activates many of the same populations of 
neurons that would generate an affordance effect upon viewing an object, scaffolding 
perception of the afforded grip (e.g. as in Symes et al., 2008).  So effectively, maintaining 
the grips is scaffolding cognition by embodying elements of the visual input and provides 
stronger activation of the grip associated with the affording object than would be 
generated by the visual input alone, which would only be expected to generate quite low 
levels of activation of the afforded grip.  This follows because that the affordance only 
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generates a baseline level of activation of the afforded grip in order to facilitate using that 
grip, and so the status of this this facilitation as a precursor to an action may be reasonably 
suggested to be a smaller effect than the activity generated by actually making the grip, 
which means actually performing the afforded action.  This is critical to the notion of 
affordance as being rapidly generated to facilitate action in real-time, but also rapidly 
disposed of in order to avoid interfering with actions or generating excess computational 
load.  So, this offers a possible explanation where maintaining the grips alleviates the 
temporal pressure and explains the later effects for grip-type (200-300ms) compared to 
lateralised stimuli (100-200ms) that fits well with the present data and the relevant 
literature.  This requires further investigation, but if this suggestion is correct it implies that 
the different LRP effects could even reflect different processes such as determining rule 
cued responses or facilitating responses, however this is merely conjecture at this stage.   
In contrast, this idea suggests that the difference between the lateralised handle 
affordance and the button press responses in experiment one meant that the lateralised 
SR pair did require participants to rapidly generate the stimulus affordance within a motor 
system that was primed to make a different response.  Because participants were primed 
to make a different response, when they received the visual input from the stimulus which 
did not match their prepared actions, the motor system rapidly and automatically 
generated the newly presented affordance in the absence of body position to support it.  
Indeed the early activity may represent the motor system determining the spatial 
compatibility of the SR pair during this 100-200ms activation however this is currently 
difficult to ascertain.  Either way, these data indicate that the earliest stage of affordance 
generation is conducted very differently with grip-type SR pairs when compared with 
lateralised SR pairs and accounting for embodied factors such as hand position offers a 
reasonable starting point to explain the ERP/LRP differences between these behaviourally 
equivalent affordances.  Indeed, the idea that different affordances may be processed 
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differently opens up new possibilities in terms of how affordances are handled in general. 
In particular, the embodied explanation suggests that the 200-300ms ERP effect seen in 
the grip-type experiment (two) is not merely a delayed version of the activity seen in the 
lateralised experiment (one).  Rather, it could represent something different to the 100-
200ms effect seen in the lateralised experiment (one), which appears to index affordance 
generation because activity varied systematically with handle laterality.  One possibility is 
that the later (200-300ms) activity observed in the grip-type experiment (two) reflected 
the motor system detecting compatibility between stimulus grip and response grip.  
Another possibility is that the activation was associated with determining the category of 
the stimulus in order to complete the task, which would necessarily involve parsing the 
whole object and according to some accounts given above, should activate the associated 
actions in the process.  That the maintenance of a particular grip may influence visual and 
motor processing is not a new suggestion and is supported by Symes et al.’s (2008) change 
blindness study, which found improved change detection in complex, rapidly changing 
scenes when maintained grip was compatible with the target object.  This study was 
conducted using the same grip-type response devices as experiment two and 
demonstrates that maintaining a hand posture affects the way stimuli are processed and 
perceived, with stimuli that are similar to body position subject to more rapid processing 
(detection in this case) compared with those that are dissimilar to body position.  In this 
study the hand position embodied the goal for the visual search leading to shorter search 
times when hand position and target object shared an affordance.  Other support may be 
gathered from Van Elk et al. (2010) who found that grasping compared with pointing at a 
power-grip response device elicited a different visual effect, much like the present thesis 
where lateralised affordance experiments all detected compatibility effects in visual 
components but grip-type experiments detected none.  These references, considered 
alongside the results of the grip-type and lateralised experiments support the notion that 
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hand position and its relationship with the stimuli not only produced the familiar SRC 
affordance effect but moreover that these behaviourally equivalent effects are potentially 
very different at a motor level simply due to the responses employed. 
So, the LRP differences between experiments one and two provide an early indication that 
the differences between affordances theorised (Derbyshire et al., 2006; Zhao & Zhu, 2012) 
and described above also have measurable differences in the way that they are processed 
and this appears to be best accounted for by the embodied notion that prepared actions 
scaffold perception.  This mode of explanation offers a starting point to further explore 
differences between affordance classes whilst accounting for an under-emphasised (Stins 
& Michaels, 1997) component of the affordance SRC paradigm, the response.  It offers 
novel considerations for future work in the area and highlights some novel avenues for 
research which will be discussed later.  However, before that is possible further clarity is 
required.  Having been conducted on separate samples, these experiments offer relatively 
slim insights into the deeper questions raised by these differences and the use of separate 
samples leaves open the possibility of individual differences confounding the results.  For 
that reason, experiments three and four probed this further by using a within subjects, 
rapid backward masking variation on experiments one and two in order to verify the 
differences observed in chapter four.   
7.3 Masked experiments summary 
7.3.1 Key references and results 
In order to expand on the LRP timing differences observed between lateralised and grip-
type SRC affordance paradigms in chapter four, the experiments in chapter five adopted a 
backward-masking variation on the paradigms.  A within-subjects design was used in order 
to verify that the differences discussed in section 7.2 were not merely a product of using 
different samples and reflected genuine differences in the handling of different affordance 
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classes.  With most affordance SRC paradigms the direction of behavioural results are the 
same, finding reduced RT and error rates in compatible SR pairs compared with 
incompatible,  regardless of the SR pair employed (e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Ellis & Tucker, 
2000).  The lateralised experiment (one) and grip-type experiment (two) in this thesis 
supported this, however the ERP data found considerable differences underpinning these 
behavioural effects.  Unexpectedly, the timecourses of the LRP effects were very different, 
with lateralised stimuli eliciting earlier effects than grip-type stimuli.  Additionally, only the 
lateralised affordances elicited any interactions/effects in visual components N1 and P1.  
This suggests that although the lateralised and grip-type affordance SRC effects may 
manifest in the same behavioural effects, they appear to be products of quite different 
processes.  These unexpected differences in ERP metrics motivated experiments three and 
four to try to confirm and expand upon these differences using a within-subjects design.  
Looking to the literature, Tucker and Ellis (2004) and Vainio et al. (2011) employed masked 
paradigms on grip-type and lateralised stimuli, also revealing differences between the 
processing of these affordance classes.  For reference, this evidence was reviewed in 
section 5.1. 
A difference between grip and lateralised affordances was observed again in experiments 
three and four in line with the behavioural results cited above; experiment three 
(lateralised stimuli) found a negative compatibility effect in LRP commencing at 100ms, the 
same time as lateralised affordance SRC experiment one.  The negative LRP effect is in line 
with the prediction from Vainio et al. (2011) who also found a negative compatibility effect 
with masked, lateralised affordances at similar SOAs.  However no behavioural effect was 
detected, demonstrating that the LRP effect appears to occur when merely viewing an 
object but that this can be disrupted by masking without producing an RT effect. This 
experiment demonstrates that the early affordances observed in the LRP effect do not 
necessarily lead to a behavioural compatibility effect.  This conclusion is supported by the 
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masked, grip-type affordance SRC experiment (experiment four), where no LRP effect was 
detected but a typical SRC affordance effect was observed in RT for grip-type stimuli.  The 
typical compatibility effect observed is in line with Tucker and Ellis (2004), who also found 
a positive compatibility effect with masked grip-type stimuli at similar SOAs.  However, the 
lack of an LRP compatibility effect suggests the downstream influence of early motor 
activation is not the only route to generating a behavioural compatibility effect.  These 
experiments form a double dissociation of the observed LRP and RT effects from the 
lateralised (experiment one) and grip-type (experiment two) experiments in a within-
subjects design, confirming the differences observed between LRPs in experiment one and 
two are reliable and not attributable to the use of different participants.  This dissociation 
shows that the RT effect is not necessarily contingent on the LRP effect and that an LRP 
effect doesn’t necessarily cause an RT difference.  This generates two questions; firstly the 
idea that the RT is not contingent on the LRP is interesting because in experiment one and 
two they both reflect the same compatibility effect and it appeared that the LRP effect 
caused the RT effect.  This begs the question of what leads to this RT effect if not the LRP 
seen in previous experiments?  Secondly, the idea that LRP does not necessarily cause an 
RT difference speaks to the assumption of automaticity; merely viewing an object is 
supposed to automatically yield its affordance, which should influence downstream 
processing and produce a compatibility effect.  This was not the case in the masked, 
lateralised experiment (three) where an LRP effect was obtained, indicating that viewing 
the object produced a motor effect but without eliciting an RT effect, demonstrating that 
under backward-masking conditions, early LRP effects do not necessarily influence RT.  Put 
another way, these data show that this influence may be disrupted by changes in the visual 
input.  This section will first address the question of the RT effect found in the masked, 
grip-type experiment (four) where the LRP was absent,  before returning to the question of 
automaticity at the end of this section and in 7.4.  
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Taken at face value, the masked, grip-type experiment (four) could be seen as indicating 
that the RT effect is not contingent on the early LRP effect. Whilst this may be true it is 
unsatisfactory, not least because no other significant LRP effects were observed in 
experiment four to explain how the RT effect occurred, suggesting there are other factors 
at work.  In order to explain the differences between results the differences in the 
paradigms must be considered first; presentation, participants and all other characteristics 
were the same. The only difference between experiment three and four was the SR pair.  
As discussed in section 7.2, typically explanations focus on the stimulus affordance and do 
not consider the response or the correspondence in the SR pair, however as we will see, 
the response may be the most important factor in accounting for the unpredictable 
pattern of results observed in experiments three and four.  
7.3.2 Returning to the representational account 
The intrinsic vs. extrinsic affordance dichotomy advanced by Derbyshire et al. (2006) 
(described in 7.2.2.) offers one possible view on this that is embedded in the typical 
explanation from stimulus affordance alone.  On this account, the lateralised experiment 
obtained a reversed LRP effect because the extrinsic affordances are not represented in 
the same way as the grip-type stimuli because it is not integral to the object.  This point is 
both a strength and weakness of this explanation; a strength because it invokes the same 
object properties to explain the different results, with each explanation couched solely in 
the physical structure of the object.  However, it is a weakness because it makes large, 
poorly-evidenced assumptions about the nature of mental representations, a notoriously 
elusive concept and one subject to considerable debate.  For example, Ballard (1991) 
described in detail the problems with representational accounts, particularly with 
attempting to model phenomenological vision (the experience of vision) in robots capable 
of actions.  The argument was pinned on the computational expense of generating, 
maintaining and referring to such representations and the necessary temporal costs of 
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such extravagant models of the world.  Ballard said, “it may be the case that maintaining 
such elaborate representations is unnecessary, since they can be rapidly and incrementally 
computed on demand.”  She points out that when models move away from Marr’s (1982) 
notion of viewer-centred representations (integral to the intrinsic vs extrinsic dichotomy) 
and become world-centred, i.e. focus more on the agent’s environment, then locally 
effective features such as object colour –which by Marr’s (1982) account are not integral to 
an objects representation– are able to guide actions more cheaply and with greater 
efficacy in computational models.  This idea about colour applies equally to object 
orientation; this is a variable feature that is not crucial to identifying an object but is a 
necessary consideration when directing behaviour towards an object because its 
orientation relative to the observer affects how the observer will interact with it.  This is 
similar to the principle demonstrated in the literature on peripersonal space and 
affordance; affordance generation is contingent on factors that determine the immediate 
usefulness or usability of an object.  For example, Costantini, Ambrosini, Tieri, Sinigaglia, 
Committeri (2010) conducted a series of experiments where they presented a lateralised 
affordance stimulus (a mug, similar to Tucker & Ellis, 1998) so that it appeared to be within 
reach or too far away to reach.  They found that when the object appeared too far away to 
reach, no affordance effects were generated and that this remained true when controlling 
for visual angle subtended by the stimulus.  They assert that affordances are not only 
reliant on what they call the ‘mutual appropriateness’ of affordance and available actions 
that the affording objects ability to produce motor activation is tightly bound to an 
individual’s opportunities to interact with it.  This is echoed by other authors such as 
Chemero (2001; 2003; 2009) who contend that when accounting for factors such as 
reachability affordance generation becomes conditional on a three-way relationship 
between object properties, available actions and the agent’s environment, introducing 
features such as reachability or interference from the local environment as considerations 
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in developing an ecologically valid understanding of affordances and object interaction in 
the wider sense.  This supports the idea presented here that environmental considerations 
such as object orientation compared with effector location are critical to the generation of 
affordance and further questions the usefulness of Marr’s (1982) emphasis on identity-
related features in object representations.  
Referring to the idea that object representations depend on these local, environmental 
and individual concerns (e.g. object orientation or location), Clark (1997) calls these 
‘personalised representations’ because they are developed to meet an individual need of 
an individual agent in a particular situation.  This is in contrast to the notion of generalised, 
fixed representations that focus on identity-related characteristics described by Marr 
(1982) and Biederman (1987) and found in Derbyshire et al. (2006).  Clark extends the idea, 
suggesting that representational accounts tend to neglect the human tendency to 
structure environments to reduce computational loading and that accounts that allow for 
more direct reference from agent to environment offer equal or greater explanatory 
power at a much lower computational cost.  On these accounts, properties defined by 
Marr (1982) as non-essential to a representation (e.g. colour, orientation) become more 
essential in terms of the practical aspects of guiding and executing the actions.  One of the 
critical problems with representational accounts such as Derbyshire et al.’s (2006) 
dichotomy was described by Port and Van Gelder (1995), who suggest that 
representational accounts of cognition struggle to meet the temporal constraints of real-
time behaviour due to the spiral of increasingly complicated and abstract ideas invoked to 
explain cognition.  This point is critical to this thesis which was begun in the spirit of 
embodied cognition, a framework chiefly concerned with explaining real-time interaction 
(Wilson, 2002) and one that in many cases eschews representational accounts in favour of 
more direct accounts of perception.  When considered in this framework the direction and 
temporal characteristics of the LRP and RT effects do not support the representational 
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account because a reversal of the compatibility effect was observed in masked, lateralised 
experiment three where no effect should be observed if no laterality information was 
represented.  Instead the reversed compatibility effect obtained in LRP indicates that some 
laterality information persisted and was suppressed. These points question the account 
offered by Derbyshire et al. (2006) because they show that affordance is not generated 
solely based on identity-critical features, as shown by the effect of the extrinsic property of 
orientation in the absence of the stimulus object.  However the real problem for this 
account of the results comes from the data itself; if the results of the masked, grip-type 
experiment are to be explained in this way then it stands to reason that a compatibility 
effect should be detectable in LRP to corroborate the idea that the RT effect is a product of 
a mental representation, however no such effect was detected.  Put another way, the 
motor advantage observed in RT for the masked grip type experiment was detected 
without a corresponding effect in motor cortex, implying that something else must be 
supporting the observed RT effect.  That said, Derbyshire et al. (2006) does not make 
predictions about areas outside of the dorsal stream that might support this cognition and 
no other effects were detected in visual ERPs to support this (see section 7.5).  Also, 
reiterating the criticism from section 7.2.4, this explanation of affordance SRC focuses 
exclusively on the stimulus with little to no reference to the response, something 
emphasised by Stins and Michaels (1997) and Chemero (2001; 2003; 2009).  These factors 
cast Derbyshire et al.’s (2006) representational account of different affordance classes in a 
difficult light because there are several serious insufficiencies in the explanation when 
considering these data.  This leads back to the embodied explanation advanced in section 
7.2.4 which suggests, based on embodied principles (e.g. Anderson, 2003; Wilson, 2002) 
that the maintenance of the grips throughout the experiment is scaffolding perception of 
the stimuli and is likely to be effective in producing the compatibility effects, as evidenced 
by studies such as Symes et al. (2008) or Van Elk et al. (2010) who showed very different 
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effects with affording stimuli that were modulated by participants’ hand position.  This 
explanation seems stronger when considering the lack of an LRP effect to correspond with 
the RT effect in this masked, grip-type experiment.  The following subsection will discuss 
this. 
7.3.3 Returning to the embodied account   
On the embodied account advanced in 7.2.4, a compatibility effect is observed in the 
masked, grip-type experiment (four) due to the nature of the response devices because 
participants maintained the grips required to interact with the stimuli, scaffolding the 
perception of the stimuli by partially activating populations of neurons associated with 
handling the object (e.g. Hommel et al., 2001).  This account suggests that the motor 
preparation caused by maintaining the grips effectively embodies the object 
characteristics, scaffolding cognition and leading to the compatibility effect observed in RT 
in the masked, grip-type experiment (four).  The compatible response is primed during the 
brief object presentation and because the grips are maintained the effect is detectable as a 
positive compatibility effect even after object offset.  In turn, this explanation suggests that 
the negative compatibility effect observed in the masked, lateralised experiment (three) 
occurs because the lateralised SR pair does not have the same degree of overlap as the 
grip-type stimuli and so lacked the relevant features to still obtain a compatibility effect 
after the object had offset.  Instead, as suggested in Vainio et al. (2011) the partial 
information gathered from the brief stimulus presentation is suppressed, producing the 
negative compatibility effect.  This suggestion is borne out by the LRP data, which shows 
the incompatible wave does not differ from baseline and that the observed compatibility 
effect is a product of the statistically significant suppression of the compatible LRP.   
This explanation is not necessarily at odds with the representational explanation advanced 
above but could subsume it; the differences in what is represented could be a product of 
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the response employed in the different paradigms.  However it may also be the case that 
this is better explained by a more straightforward account from embodiment alone and 
differentiating these possibilities is extremely difficult without a great deal of further 
experimentation.  Nonetheless, the intrinsic vs. extrinsic dichotomy provides an 
unsatisfactory explanation of the results here for the reasons given above whereas the 
embodied explanation accounts for all facets of the data.  This explanation receives wider 
support from other research in embodied cognition; Lakoff and Johnson (1999) suggest 
that cognition is inherently embodied due to human physiology; they posit direct neural 
connections between visual areas, motor areas and effectors to support real-time 
interactions by speeding interactions between brain and body, effectively extending the 
visuomotor claims discussed previously to include the effectors.   Support for this may be 
drawn from Strigaro et al.’s (2015) demonstration that TMS pulses administered occipitally 
could produce motor facilitation or inhibition depending on their latency.  Similarly 
Cantello et al. (2000) demonstrated a cortico-cortical connection between occipital and 
motor cortex with a transit time of 15ms by showing a visual flash stimulus excited motor 
cortex.  This idea fits with the current data (where effector position affected perception) 
and is widely supported in the theoretical literature (e.g. Clark, 1998; Wilson, 2002; 
Johnson, Spencer & Schöner, 2008; Robbins & Aydede, 2009).  This offers a view on 
physiology that is consistent with the observations here and elsewhere (e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 
2000; Symes et al., 2008; Fagioli et al., 2007a; Van Elk et al., 2010; etc.) that body position 
is able to influence visual perception.  When viewed in this way masked lateralised and 
masked grip-type experiments three and four demonstrate the principle behind Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (1999) assertion that embodied cognition is fundamentally implied by the 
structure of the body and supported by direct connections between visuomotor areas and 
effectors because body/ hand position has been shown to have a profound effect on 
viewing affording stimuli.  They go further, suggesting that in order to understand higher-
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order functions like reasoning the minutiae of the visual and motor systems must be 
understood first because all behaviour and higher-order cognition, including abstract 
concepts, is grounded in concrete physical and/or action concepts that rest on these tight, 
reciprocal connections between vision, action and effectors.   
On this account affordance SRC paradigms represent a direct demonstration of these 
principles, however their characterisation as implicit elements of perception also make it 
difficult to tease out the precise mechanisms underlying embodiment.  There is however 
considerable evidence that these interactions occur.  Outside of the affordance SRC 
domain, Hommel et al. (2001) provide a convincing demonstration that viewing objects 
activates some of the same neural processes as using them.  The present data extend this 
to show that a two-way relationship exists where the objects are viewed differently based 
on correspondence between the body position of the observer and the object affordance, 
as seen in Symes et al. (2008), Van Elk et al. (2010) and others.  Bach and Tipper (2006) 
demonstrate the allied idea that even without explicit references to action, viewing the 
faces of sports stars activates areas used to control the actions that they are famous for.  
This is often called simulation and although several operational definitions exist a strong 
one may be drawn from Svensson, Lindblom and Ziemke (2007); in embodied cognition, 
simulation refers to the invocation of sensorimotor states to facilitate higher-order 
cognition, making use of partial simulations or emulations of sensorimotor processes 
through the reactivation of the neural circuits involved in previous or imagined 
instantiations of those processes.  This is precisely the principle demonstrated in Symes et 
al. (2008), Fagioli et al. (2007a), Van Elk et al. (2010) and Hohlefeld et al. (2011) and in the 
present data.  The idea of simulation by sensorimotor states accounts for the differences 
between the results of masked lateralised and masked grip-type experiments three and 
four, where the key difference was the SR pair employed in each experiment, including the 
use of the same response devices that produced the effect in Symes et al. (2008).  Here the 
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response devices made participants simulate the actions required to interact with the 
objects, invoking their associated sensorimotor states which persisted after stimulus offset 
simply because the grips were still maintained.  This simulation offers a basis for the 
compatibility effect observed in the masked, grip-type experiment (four).  In contrast, the 
negative compatibility effect in the masked lateralised experiment (three) can be explained 
just as the behavioural compatibility effect seen in Vainio et al.’s (2011) study of masked 
lateralised stimuli. That is, the motor activity elicited by viewing the stimulus is interrupted 
by the mask, leading to a suppression of incomplete visual information and an associated 
negative compatibility effect. This is shown in the timecourse of the LRP which became 
nonsignificant 50ms earlier in the masked lateralised experiment than in the unmasked 
lateralised experiment, despite using the same stimulus set.  This does not occur for the 
grip-type experiment because the affordances were embodied by the hand position before 
the stimulus was presented, whereas the lateralised experiment shared no such physical 
relationship (only an arbitrary spatial one) meaning that there was nothing to embody or 
scaffold the lateralised affordance, leading to its suppression and the observed negative 
compatibility effect. 
One of the difficulties of this embodied explanation is that it offers little in the way of 
explicit mechanisms for embodiment; instead it says that simply by virtue of our 
evolutionary history our perceptual and motor systems are inextricably linked and form 
the basis for higher-order cognition (e.g. Johnson, Spencer & Schöner, 2008).  Sadly, it will 
require many experiments to fully understand the differences between grip-type and 
lateralised SR pairs however the experiments presented here form a valuable indication of 
underlying differences that are scarcely even implied by the behavioural data. The simplest 
way to expand on these differences would be to determine a way to reverse the SR pairs, 
using grip-type responses with lateralised stimuli and lateralised responses with grip-type 
stimuli in order to see if the effects were bound to stimulus or response.  However this 
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offers little chance of insight because these dimensions fail to yield comparable dimensions 
for compatibility when compared to the current experiments; grip-type stimuli contain no 
implicit lateralised information so lateralised responses would not work with them and 
although lateralised stimuli employed in experiments one and three were generally power-
grip compatible there were few precision-grip compatible stimuli, again leaving no direct 
SR relationship even before controlling for laterality.  This suggests that in order to 
understand these differences a different approach must be adopted, one removed from 
the typical SRC affordance paradigm.  To move toward a complete explanation of these 
unexpected differences a better understanding of the parameters for affordance 
generation must be developed.  This is particularly pertinent given the questions about 
automaticity raised by the dissociation observed in masked lateralised and masked grip-
type experiments three and four.  Automaticity has also been recently raised in the 
literature; Tipper et al. (2006) and Pellicano et al. (2010) questioned automaticity when 
they found that when viewing the same stimuli, a Simon or affordance effect could be 
elicited simply by varying the judgement that participants performed on a stimulus.  When 
asked to make a colour discrimination a Simon effect was observed and when asked 
whether an object was upright or inverted an affordance effect was observed with the 
same bimanual keypress response used in both findings.  The authors suggested that this 
was a product of which object features were being processed in order to answer the 
question.  As they point out, this questions the notion of automaticity which states that 
merely viewing an object is sufficient to yield its affordance, regardless of action 
intentions.  This finding is one of few against automaticity, also showing a difference not 
apparent in the behavioural literature.  This is not dissimilar to the different results 
observed in experiments one to four, where laterality and grip-type object properties 
produced different visuomotor effects.  This similarity indicates that this is a useful area to 
refocus attention in order to better understand affordance generation, with a view to 
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explaining why grip-type and lateralised affordances are processed differently.  This will 
follow on from Pellicano et al. (2010) with an examination of the assumption of 
automaticity and the SRC task structure focussed on manipulating the relationship 
between stimulus and response.  The dissociation of RT and LRP effects also questions 
automaticity because no LRP effect was observed in masked, grip-type experiment four 
suggesting that viewing objects may not be sufficient to activate their associated actions, 
regardless of action intentions.  For this reason the response was removed for experiment 
five to determine whether an affordance would be generated in the absence of the 
intention to act on it, investigating the assumption of automaticity. 
7.4 Testing assumptions in affordance SRC 
Experiments one to four revealed unexpected differences between grip-type and 
lateralised affordances that are best explained by the response devices employed.  This 
emphasis on response questions the assumption of automatic activation of affordances by 
visual information alone, particularly considering the dissociation of RT and LRP effects in 
the masked experiments.  So, to better understand these unexpected differences 
experiment five and six manipulated response conditions to test two pervasive 
assumptions about affordance.  Experiment five tested the assumption of automaticity, the 
idea that merely viewing an object is sufficient for it to yield its affordance, regardless of an 
intention to act on it.  This assumption indicates that task factors (e.g. action intentions) 
should not influence the automatic generation of an affordance. However, what do we 
classify as evidence of affordance? Experiment three (masked lateralised) provided 
evidence for lateralised affordance in LRP, but not in RT measures. While in the masked, 
grip-type experiment (four), there was evidence for grip-type affordance in RT but not in 
LRP.  Given that most of the evidence on automaticity comes from RT studies, does the 
detection of an LRP effect in the absence of an RT effect qualify as automatic affordance 
generation? Equally, what does the lack of an LRP affordance effect mean for automaticity 
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in the presence of an RT effect?  The dissociation of grip-type and lateralised affordances 
observed in the masked experiments appears to be attributable to the response devices; as 
described in 7.2.4.  It is this task-specific difference that raises questions on the 
automaticity of affordance, which would suggest that the mere observation of an object 
should generate motor affordance, irrespective of task.  Support for the influence of grip-
maintenance on object perception may be drawn from Symes et al. (2008) or Fagioli et 
al.(2007a&b)(discussed above), who both show that body position affects how objects are 
perceived, suggesting that it is possible for task factors such as response to interact with 
affordance generation, just as shown by the dissociation observed in the masked 
experiments.  The key evidence questioning automaticity may be drawn from Tipper, Paul 
and Hayes (2006), Pellicano et al. (2010) and Iani et al. (2011) (described in detail in section 
5.4), who showed that it is possible to view an affording stimulus without eliciting an 
affordance effect, simply by varying the judgement or response parameters.  So, in order 
to address this issue of response parameters in affordance generation, experiment five 
modified the usual forced-choice manual-response used in the lateralised SRC paradigm of 
experiment one to a go/no-go vocal response to see if the same LRP effects were detected 
in the absence of an intention to make any motor response to the stimuli.  Experiment six 
also looked at response parameters and automaticity but from a different perspective; 
experiment six saw a novel variation on the SRC affordance paradigm where participants 
saw a neutrally rotated stimulus roughly two seconds before the target stimulus appeared.  
Participants were told that the neutrally rotated stimulus was always the same as the 
target stimulus, signalling the category of the target.  This sought to determine whether 
the LRP or RT effect was still detected when participants had already completed the 
categorisation required by the task.  This followed the logic from Pellicano et al. (2010) 
where different categorical judgements produced different effects with the same affording 
stimuli.  Experiment six will be discussed in greater detail later. 
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7.4.1 Affordance generation in the absence of response 
Experiment five is unique in its approach to automaticity, looking for direct evidence of 
motor activation by seen objects in the absence of a response.  As discussed, most SRC 
affordance studies conclude in favour of automaticity, however they do so when 
participants are making motor responses to every stimulus.  This creates a potential 
confound where researchers investigating motor preparation by seen objects have their 
participants prepare motor actions as part of their tasks.  This also suggests that the results 
typically observed in SRC affordance experiments may be products of the response 
affecting perception as much as the correspondence in the SR pair or the automatic 
potentiation of afforded actions.  So, experiment five took the form of a go, no-go 
experiment; on go trials participants were asked to detect and verbally announce when the 
objects conformed to the category of kitchen items, for the remaining ‘tool’ items the 
participants made no response. Therefore participants made the same categorical 
judgement employed throughout this thesis and in the literature, but did not respond with 
any manual responses.   
The results of this experiment showed the familiar 100-200ms LRP compatibility effect was 
observed even in the absence of the intention to make a response to the objects, just as 
observed in lateralised experiment one and masked lateralised experiment three with 
bimanual responses.  The direction of the effect was the same as experiment one, 
indicating a preparation of the compatible effector for all trials, varying with the 
orientation of the stimulus.  These data show that merely viewing an object in the absence 
of the intention to act on it is sufficient to yield an affordance and supports the case for 
viewing objects automatically activating their associated actions.  That said, given the 
differences discussed in section 7.3 this conclusion only applies to lateralised affordances 
because grip-type affordances have been shown to behave differently in the earlier 
experiments in this thesis, and this is argued to be due to the response devices employed.  
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These data also inform the discussion from 7.3 by showing that the LRP activity elicited by 
lateralised affordances is not contingent on a response being deployed because the same 
effect has been observed with and without response when viewing the same stimuli.  This 
supports the differentiation of grip-type and lateralised affordance effects along the lines 
of the relation between each SR pair advanced above, where grip-type affordance effects 
appear to be driven by maintaining the response grips which are identical to the seen 
objects.  In contrast, lateralised affordance effects appear to be visually driven because the 
spatial SR relationship was not inherently about properties of the objects, rather the 
lateralised stimuli simply provided a visual cue to which effector to use.  The occurrence of 
an LRP affordance effect in the absence of response provides clear evidence in favour of 
the proposition that lateralised affordance effects are visually driven.   
This finding indicates that the results from Fagioli et al. (2007a), Symes et al. (2008), Van 
Elk et al. (2010) and others cited above (that demonstrate the phenomenon of prepared 
grip affecting visual perception) may be bound to grasping affordances only and that hand 
position is a not prerequisite for generating lateralised affordance effects because 
participants prepared no manual response at any point during this experiment.  This 
highlights another key difference between grip-type and lateralised affordances and 
supports the differentiation of grip and lateralised affordances based in body position 
discussed in 7.2.4 and 7.3.3.  The LRP effect in the absence of the intention to make a 
manual response to the objects suggests that lateralised responses are not scaffolding 
perception in the way that grip-type responses are suggested to in the previous sections, 
where LRP and RT effects were dissociated using a masking procedure.  This is unsurprising 
given the abstract, non-specific relationship in lateralised SRC compared with the direct 1:1 
relationship seen with grip-type SRC.  Instead, the occurrence of an LRP effect 
corresponding to the object in the go, no-go experiment suggests that these lateralised 
effects are visually driven. 
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7.4.2 Representational and embodied accounts 
Following on from the discussion in 7.2 and 7.3, the extrinsic vs. intrinsic dichotomy 
advanced by Derbyshire et al. (2006) offers little insight into the findings of the go, no-go 
experiment because their explanation of extrinsic affordance requires a response to satisfy 
the criteria of “depend[ing] on some relation with the viewer or viewing conditions”.  
Instead the go, no-go experiment (five) finds that merely viewing a lateralised object yields 
the same LRP effect that was observed in a typical lateralised affordance SRC experiment 
(one). By Derbyshire et al.’s (2006) definition of an extrinsic affordance, changing the 
response set means that the LRP effect should not be detectable in go, no-go experiment 
five as it was in the earlier lateralised experiments.  This is because on their definition, the 
changed response set would no longer offer the same ‘relation with the viewer’ which is 
required to generate the effects.  Instead, the go, no-go effects suggest that it is not the 
response set but the visual input that is critical to these lateralised affordance effects; if 
the effects are products of the viewer relating the visual input to the immutable presence 
of their left and right hands (instead of the specific responses afforded by the experimental 
response set) then this offers better fit with an embodied model over a representational 
model because this explanation is still fundamentally couched in a tightly bound 
visuomotor process, focussed on the role of the body in cognition and not based in 
overlapping mental representations of the SR pair.  Put another way, the presence of 
affordance effects in the absence of manual responses undermines Derbyshire et al.’s 
(2006) emphasis on SR relations in affordance generation.  The visual effects bear this out 
too; the go, no-go experiment yielded a P1 effect, which appears to be associated with the 
visual extraction of action possibilities from a stimulus but critically, was the only 
lateralised experiment to fail to detect an action effect in N1, a component that has been 
indicated to have a relationship with action intentions generated by response sets (Van Elk 
et al., 2010; visual effects discussed in detail in 7.5).  This shows that merely viewing an 
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object results in detection of its action relevant features without requiring a relationship 
with a response, but also indicates that response sets exert an influence on later processes 
(i.e. N1). 
The poor fit of the representational account of different sources of affordance from 
Derbyshire et al. (2006) again leads back to the embodied explanation advanced above.  
There it was argued that the critical difference between lateralised experiments (one and 
three) and grip-type experiments (two and four) was the hand position adopted in the grip-
type experiments, which was said to scaffold cognition by shaping perception, in line with 
the literature (e.g. Symes et al., 2008; etc.).  In turn, this description suggests that the 
lateralised affordance SRC effect was due to compatibility between the SR pair, even along 
the abstract dimension of orientation.  However that is not borne out here where no 
response existed to lend a dimension for compatibility.  Instead, following the logic from 
7.2 and 7.3 a distinction may be drawn between affordance classes; the lateralised effects 
appear to be visually driven where the grip-type effects were response driven.   
On this basis, these effects are best explained by the embodied view that cognitive effort is 
offloaded to body and world and that using vision to constantly reference and re-reference 
the world is more efficient than building complex internal representations (Brooks, 1990; 
Wilson, 2002; Anderson, 2003).  In the go, no-go case (and potentially the wider lateralised 
affordance literature as a whole) lateralised affordances appear to be grounded in the 
visual system, elicited by laterality cues from the stimulus only.  This does not preclude the 
possibility of participants’ effectors still playing a role in the go, no-go effect because the 
presence of the effectors cannot be muted, however the key finding here is that visual 
input alone is sufficient to elicit the LRP effects seen in earlier experiments.  
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7.4.3 Comparing findings on automaticity 
Pellicano et al. (2010) and Tipper et al. (2006) (described in 5.4) concluded that their colour 
judgements did not entail attending to the action relevant object properties whereas their 
judgements of inversion and shape did.  Their categorical judgements on inversion and 
shape are similar to the kitchen vs. tool and organic vs. manmade categorical judgements 
employed in this thesis insofar as they require participants to examine the entire object 
before they can complete the judgement; each of the experiments show that participants 
must make a judgement on the whole object (not merely a single element such as colour) 
in order to elicit the affordance. Proverbio et al. (2011) (detailed above), the most similar 
study to the go, no-go experiment (experiment five), can be explained this way too.  They 
used a passive viewing experiment and also found an affordance effect in ERP without 
response on their passive-viewing trials.  Their results can be explained as a product of the 
categorical judgement participants had to make to determine whether to respond or not; 
to identify a catch trial they had to identify the object and determine whether it was a 
plant or a tool, forcing them to consider the entire object and its properties, just as in 
Tipper et al. (2006) and Pellicano et al. (2010).  It is worth considering whether the 
different results of different judgements are a product of categorical judgements inducing 
participants to access semantic object information, or whether it comes from colour 
judgements operating at a lower-level; semantic access has been typically associated with 
the N400 component, occurring “remarkably consistently” at around 200-600ms after 
stimulus onset (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011).  Although typically associated with semantic 
violations in linguistic stimuli, recent evidence has shown N400-like effects with visual 
object stimuli too; Van Elk, Van Schie and Bekkering (2010) found a larger anterior N400 
for the preparation of meaningful compared with meaningless actions.  Participants were 
instructed to perform an action (moving stimulus object toward their mouth or toward 
their eye) on one of two objects that would be meaningful (e.g. moving a cup toward their 
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mouth or a magnifying glass toward their eye) or meaningless (e.g. moving a cup toward 
their eye or a magnifying glass toward their mouth).  Their N400 effects were detected 
between 280ms and 590ms over central electrode locations.  This shows that whilst 
semantic effects do occur with object stimuli, they do not occur rapidly enough to affect 
the results in the present thesis.  These findings are supported by Supp et al. (2005) who 
reported that N400 varied with the recognisability of their common household object 
stimuli.  They found unrecognisable or meaningless objects elicited greater N400 
amplitude from 400ms to 550ms and suggested that this was related to increased 
processing difficulty due to the lack of semantic information contained within the stimulus.  
They concluded that their finding of an N400 effect with objects fits with the linguistic 
literature on the component and suggests that N400 is generalizable as a component 
marking semantic access.  Balconi and Caldiroli (2011) support these findings, showing 
increased N400 amplitude when actions depicted in a video were incongruous with a 
target object compared to when they were congruous.  They suggested that although 
N400 has typically been associated with semantic mismatch with linguistic stimuli, their 
experiment (and others cited here) show that N400 semantic mismatch effects may also be 
obtained with non-linguistic (object) stimuli and may be better characterised as indexing 
the difficulty in accessing semantic memory, regardless of modality.  Goto et al. (2009) also 
used N400 to index cultural differences in object perception by placing objects over 
congruous backgrounds (e.g. a crab over a beach scene) or incongruous backgrounds (e.g. 
a crab over a car park) and elicited greater negativity in N400 for Asian-Americans than 
European-Americans when background and object were incongruous.  Van Elk, Van Schie 
and Bekkering’s (2010), Supp’s (2005), Goto et al.’s (2009) and Balconi and Caldiroli’s 
(2011) N400 semantic effects with objects are considerably later than the LRP effects 
which have consistently commenced at 100ms after stimulus onset in this thesis, 
suggesting that semantic access is not required in order to elicit an affordance effect in 
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LRP.  In turn, colour judgements do not require this semantic access and are typically 
handled very in early in the visual cascade; e.g. Conway, Hubel and Livingstone (2002) 
demonstrated colour discrimination in macaque V1, an area associated with processing the 
first wave of colour information from the eyes at around 60-80ms in humans (Thorpe, Fize 
& Marlot, 1996).  This indicates that the colour information is available considerably earlier 
than the observed motor effects or semantic access and lays the emphasis for the 
differences observed in Tipper et al. (2006) and Pellicano et al. (2010) on the colour 
judgement being completed before any action or affordance-related processes 
commenced at around 100ms, downstream in motor cortex.  It appears then that the rapid 
availability of colour information compared with semantic or action-information means 
that the task-goal of making a colour identification can be completed before affordance 
detection and given the lack of an affordance effect in Tipper et al. (2006) and Pellicano et 
al. (2010), this presumably halts the processing of the affording aspects of the object.  
Further investigation would be required to confirm this, but it appears that the reason for 
a lack of an affordance effect with the colour judgement comes down to a distinction in 
levels (and latencies) of processing between the rapidly processed, lower-level colour 
judgements and the (only slightly) later, higher-level action preparations.   
So, taken together these experiments suggest that affordance generation is contingent on 
what stimulus features are attended and implies that affordance generation has only 
appeared automatic in the literature to date because the majority –if not all– studies that 
have found for automaticity have had participants make a categorical judgement that has 
entailed participants attend the whole object.   
This emphasis on attended object features returns the discussion to the findings from 
Symes et al. (2008), Van Elk et al. (2010), Hohlefeld et al. (2011) and others (described 
above), who have demonstrated that prepared actions influence what action-relevant 
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features of a scene are attended.  This clearly feeds into the assertion from Tipper et al. 
(2006) that affordance generation is contingent on what object properties are attended.  
Taken with the present experiments this suggests a three-stage, looping, system where 
bodily states affect what is attended (e.g. Symes et al., 2008; masked grip-type), what is 
attended (whether due to task or bodily state) affects what affordances are generated (e.g. 
go, no-go; Tipper et al., 2006; Pellicano et al., 2010) and what affordances are generated 
affects bodily states in terms of deploying responses (e.g. experiments one and two; 
Tucker & Ellis, 1998) as well as what motor activity they generate (e.g. dissociation seen in 
masked experiments compared with grip, lateralised and go,no-go experiments).  This 
forms a loop where bodily states and visual action possibilities are constantly influencing 
each other with no apparent prime mover, with prepared actions (as in Symes et al., 2008; 
etc.), visual input (Tucker& Ellis, 1998; etc.) or attending different aspects of a stimulus 
(Tipper et al., 2006; etc.) able to organically influence the following step(s).  Interestingly, 
this also offers a means to account for intentional actions as well as non-task influences 
like affordance because explicit action intentions also affect what is attended, as shown by 
Tipper et al. (2006) and Pellicano et al. (2010).  This idea of a loop draws support from a 
variety of sources (cited above) in the affordance literature and offers a means of 
crystallising the explanation of the difference between grip and lateralised response 
advanced above; in this loop, grip-type SRC affordance effects are driven by the prepared 
grips and lateralised SRC affordance effects are driven by the salient visual features, but 
each uses the same system to handle the effects but each affordance class ‘joins' the loop 
at different stages, also (pending further investigation) offering a mechanism to explain the 
different ERP timecourses.  This explanation is still couched in an inherently embodied 
notion of constant referencing and re-referencing of the relationship of body and space 
(e.g. Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook & Rao, 1997) but clarifies this notion by showing that this may 
be influenced by three things; body position, attended stimulus properties and goal states. 
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7.4.4 Considerations from the literature for go, no-go experiment five 
The idea that lateralised affordances are driven by visual input and that grip-type 
affordances are response driven is consistent with the discussion in 7.2.4 and 7.3.3, 
revealing more about the influence of response parameters on afforded motor activity 
from different sources.   
As mentioned above, Proverbio et al.’s (2011) passive viewing experiment is similar to go, 
no-go experiment five and supports the idea that what object features are attended 
determines whether an affordance is generated, however the study raises other issues too.  
They found a greater motor effect when viewing tools than non-tools, significant at 
approximately 250ms after stimulus presentation.  This result supports the findings of the 
go, no-go experiment insofar as demonstrating affordance effects in ERP in the absence of 
response.  However, their 250ms effect is considerably later than in the go, no-go 
experiment (five) conducted in this thesis.  As above, this difference may be explained in 
terms of the variety of affordances contained within their stimulus set.  The key result here 
is the detection of affordance effects in ERP in the absence of response and the timing 
difference is explicable in the same way as the different timing with grip and lateralised 
experiments in this thesis (experiments one to four); on the basis of the stimuli (i.e. 
affordances) employed.   
Wider support for this kind of interpretation of the results and surrounding experiments 
may be drawn from the literature; as discussed above, embodied cognition holds that 
constructing costly mental representations is unnecessary because a more efficient 
strategy is to use the world as its own best model (Brooks, 1990), suggesting that the visual 
system is well suited to extracting this kind of action possibility from the environment.  
Here, object laterality is not critical to identifying the stimulus object or its function 
(important to cognitivist and representational accounts) but the go, no-go experiment 
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demonstrates that this property still yields an affordance effect in LRP merely by viewing it.  
As discussed above Clark’s (1997) notion of ‘personalised representations’ would suggest 
that this is because the visual system extracted the most relevant object property to 
initiate the action of using the object; which effector would allow the participant to pick it 
up.  This marries the notions of affordance and embodiment, where both are concerned 
with speeding interactions in a complex world of novel and familiar objects without 
appealing to mental representations or stored object knowledge but by referencing the 
action relevant information available in the environment.  Indeed others argue that 
humans are uniquely well equipped to operate in this way; Ballard et al.’s (1997) model 
suggests that saccadic eye movements are a critical part of this kind of strategy of rapid 
visual referencing to the environment in order to relieve the computational expense of 
detailed mental representations.  This suggestion is supported by studies from Thomas and 
Lleras (2007) who found improved task performance when guiding participants’ eyes via a 
tracking task or Grant and Spivey (2003) who go as far as suggesting a direct, implicit 
connection from eye-movements to cognition, saying that whilst it is intuitive to think that 
cognition directs eye movements it may be more accurate to describe a two-way 
connection where information gathered during eye movements guides cognition too.  This 
suggestion goes hand in hand with findings from Symes et al. (2008), Van Elk et al. (2010), 
Fagioli et al. (2007), Ballard et al. (1997) and others (including this thesis) that indicate that 
bodily states (visual or motor) have a two-way relationship with cognition, which also 
represents a core tenet of embodied cognition (Anderson, 2003).  The LRP affordance 
effect in the absence of a response fits too because participants generated the afforded 
response when viewing the object, without reference to responses, bodily states, or other 
factors.  The effector afforded by the object lateralisation was activated on each trial in a 
way that is not predicted by representational accounts of object perception (e.g. 
Derbyshire et al., 2006; Marr, 1982; Biederman, 1987) that suggest that features such as 
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orientation do not yield an affordance because they are contingent on a response or 
because critical features are not represented without a response due to the nature of the 
affordance.  The preparation of effectors by visual input alone observed in the go, no-go 
experiment is consistent with references that suggest that physical features of the visual 
system (e.g. saccades) and motor system (e.g. effector posture) guide perception toward 
similar action-relevant information (such as affordances) in order to aid real-time 
cognition.  Put another way, the results are fundamentally incompatible with any account 
that states that lateralised affordance SRC effects require a response to occur.  This is all 
consistent with the loop idea advanced above, where action intentions and prepared 
actions may well generate an affordance effect, however as these data and other 
experiments discussed here show, what is attended will also produce an effect. 
7.4.5 Closing remarks on the go, no-go experiment 
Sadly it was not possible to conduct a comparable go, no-go experiment with grip-type 
stimuli for a variety of reasons.  Chiefly because grip-type stimuli do not implicitly cue a 
particular hand in the same way that lateralised stimuli do.  To achieve this participants 
would have had to hold the response devices, which is the very thing suggested here to 
produce the effects.  Indeed Symes et al.’s (2008) core finding was that maintaining those 
very grips elicited a compatibility effect with viewed objects.  Without using the response 
devices, the lack of a hemisphere cue on the stimuli would preclude the use of LRP 
measures too, making it difficult to compare directly with the rest of the experiments here 
and potentially introducing a new confound.   
This experiment shows direct evidence for automatic affordance generation by seen 
objects, as long as participants attend the entire object and this is not contingent on a 
response.  The lack of a response here supports the argument that lateralised affordance 
effects are driven by visual cuing of the effectors.  However it is restricted to lateralised 
214 
 
affordances by the earlier findings of this thesis.  One issue here is that this experiment 
used the same categorical judgement as the previous experiments and the key findings 
from Tipper et al. (2006) and Pellicano et al. (2010) were that different judgements yielded 
different effects with the same affording stimuli.  For this reason, experiment six 
attempted another manipulation of this in order to address the question from another 
angle; experiment six saw participants make the categorical judgement ahead of time on a 
neutrally rotated stimulus.  Participants then deployed their categorical judgement using a 
bimanual button press response some two seconds later when a lateralised version of the 
same stimulus provided the cue to respond.  By removing the judgement from the 
stimulus, we can see if Pellicano et al.’s (2010) findings demonstrate a requirement for 
deeper processing to generate an affordance than a Simon effect, or whether affordance 
effects occur when attending to anything other than superficial features like colour.  It also 
affords an opportunity to tests the claim that lateralised SRC affordance is visually driven, 
as the lateralised stimulus operated purely as a cue to deploy the prepared response. 
7.4.6 Delayed response 
The final experiment (six) sought to probe the results from go, no-go experiment five on 
the assumption of automaticity and the role of the categorical judgement in generating 
affordances.  The go, no-go experiment demonstrated direct evidence for automatic 
affordance generation by demonstrating that viewing affording stimuli elicits motor 
activity even in the absence of a motor response, similar to Proverbio et al.’s (2011) 
findings with passive viewing.  However, Tipper at al. (2006) and Pellicano et al. (2010) 
(described above) questioned automaticity by showing that different judgements on the 
same affording stimuli elicit different effects.  The go, no-go experiment (five) found in 
favour of automaticity by detecting an affordance effect in LRP in the absence of a 
response, but still required participants to make the same categorical judgement used in 
experiments one to five and throughout the literature (discussed in detail previously).  For 
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example, Vainio et al. (2008) suggest that making categorical judgements necessarily 
entails processing action-relevant aspects stimuli.  So, experiment six asked if the 
categorical judgement is imperative to generating an affordance or if affordance 
generation is simply automatic upon viewing an object, as suggested by the go, no-go 
experiment.   Thus, experiment six manipulated the temporal proximity of the categorical 
judgement and the response to determine whether the categorical judgement enlisted a 
particular manner of viewing and processing the stimuli that generated an affordance 
effect.   
 In doing this, this experiment sought to probe automaticity from another angle; by 
removing the imperative to examine the affording stimulus at the point of response for the 
task, suggested by Proverbio et al. (2011) and Tipper et al. (2006) to affect the generation 
of an affordance.  This does not mean that participants did not attend the second stimulus, 
merely that the task did not require them to do so at the point of response in the same 
way that previous tasks have done.  Participants saw a neutrally rotated image of an 
object, in which the handle was pointed directly down.  The stimuli were selected so that 
they did not indicate a usage preference in this orientation and so did not offer dimensions 
for compatibility with either lateralised response.  Participants viewed the neutral stimulus 
for one second and made their categorical judgement before waiting up to another full 
second to deploy their response using the familiar bimanual button press upon the onset 
of a second image of the same object, this time lateralised left or right.  This meant that 
the second stimulus was in no way relevant to response, so if Tucker and Ellis (1998) and 
other’s claim that object affordance is automatic because it yields an effect even as a non-
task property is true, then we should observe the same RT and LRP effects in this 
experiment too, because the affordance is still a non-task property and is still present at 
response, but is no longer conflated with the categorical judgement.  This design meant 
that there was no requirement to make a categorical judgement during the second, 
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lateralised presentation; it only served as a cue to deploy the judgement that was made 
during the presentation of the initial, neutrally rotated stimulus.  Doing this meant that 
participants made their categorical judgement on a stimulus that did not offer a lateralised 
affordance but deployed their judgement during the presence of a lateralised affordance, 
effectively separating these elements in time by up to two full seconds and removing the 
imperative to make a judgement at the point of response.  By separating these elements, 
this offered a chance to rule-out the possibility that it is necessary to perform a categorical 
judgement on an affording stimulus in order to elicit the correct kind of viewing or 
processing of the stimulus to detect an SRC affordance effect.  In turn, this design is able to 
show that the mere visual presence of an affording stimulus, acting only as a cue to deploy 
a response, is sufficient to elicit an affordance effect when deploying a pre-prepared 
response.    
This experiment showed the familiar LRP compatibility effect 100-200ms after the onset of 
the affording stimulus, along with a significant RT compatibility effect. This was found even 
though participants were making their categorical judgements to the first, neutral, 
stimulus, presented up to two seconds before deploying their responses to the second, 
lateralised, stimulus.  This supports the argument given above that lateralised affordance 
effects are driven by visual action-information cuing the effector ipsilateral to the handle 
orientation because the lateralised stimulus acted only as a cue to deploy the response. 
This means that the stimulus was able to generate an affordance effect even when the task 
did not require participants to attend to its properties, affording or otherwise.  The RT and 
LRP effects show that participants did attend the second stimulus and so shows that the 
mere presence of visual action information is sufficient to yield the affordance effect and 
that this is not reliant on a task judgement leading participants to examine a stimulus in a 
particular way. As discussed above, Tucker and Ellis (1998) and others have argued that 
because object affordances were non-task properties, their effect is automatic.  The 
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present findings support and extend this, showing that the mere visual presence of the 
object was sufficient to elicit an affordance effect and that there is no need for an explicit 
requirement (e.g. categorical judgement) to attend an affording stimulus for it to yield an 
affordance effect.  Instead it shows that merely fixating a lateralised affording object 
should be sufficient to yield its affordance.  However, Tipper et al.’s (2006) and Pellicano et 
al.’s (2010) experiments found that attending superficial object features, such as colour, 
will not generate affordances related to the object.  Thus, it would appear that the 
principle of affordance automaticity is broken if attention is trained to a specific low-level 
action-irrelevent property of an object such as colour. Affordances are otherwise 
automatically generated when the attention to the object is more ‘holistic’ and 
encompasses its functional properties, even if attending these properties occurs 
incidentally as shown by delayed-response experiment six.   
So the widespread assertion of automaticity appears to be due to the design of 
experiments that are intended to demonstrate automaticity; typically they have 
participants make a judgement on the object that is unrelated to the object affordance 
(e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Pellicano et al., 2010) which allows researchers to draw 
conclusions about automaticity, but also requires participants to attend the whole stimulus 
even if only a part of it yields the affordance (e.g. Ellis & Tucker, 2000), ensuring that 
participants attend the affording features and ultimately skewing experiments toward 
concluding in favour of automaticity.  That said, the go, no-go experiment and this delayed 
response experiment provide evidence in favour of automaticity when merely viewing 
objects, even without an intention to make a manual response (go, no-go experiment five) 
and also when merely viewing an affording object with no imperative to consider the 
object (delayed response experiment six).  So, these experiments suggest that affordances 
are effectively automatic, meaning that an affordance will be elicited from a seen object, 
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on the condition that participants do not have explicit intentions to attend to a low-level 
object property that is not action relevant (e.g. colour). 
This interpretation fits with what is known about the cascade of visual information through 
occipital cortex (also discussed in 7.4.3), where colour information is processed at the 
earliest stages including in V1 from 40-60ms in macaques (Conway, Hubel & Livingstone, 
2002).  In humans, this has been shown to occur a little later at around 60-80ms (e.g. 
Thorpe, Fize & Marlot, 1996) but still represents the extraction of colour information at the 
earliest stages of visual processing.  This suggests that colour information is available 
considerably earlier than semantic information that would help to determine category; 
work on the N400 component, which indexes semantic access, has consistently shown that 
the N400 is detectable in a range of 200-600ms (e.g. review by Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), 
commencing after the afforded (lateralised) LRP effects (100-200ms) in the experiments in 
this thesis had offset.  This suggests that colour information is available before affordances 
are generated in motor cortex and considerably more rapidly than semantic access, 
suggesting the lack of an affordance effect with a colour judgement is a product of 
directing attention to this lower level visual property and crucially, away from properties of 
the object itself.  Of course, more research is required and one interesting method would 
be to combine the method of Tipper et al. (2006) with the metrics used here to determine 
whether an LRP effect would still be detected in the colour judgement condition in the 
absence of a subsequent RT affordance effect.  However in lieu of additional data, the 
findings of this thesis in concert with the literature suggest that the categorical judgement 
is not required to elicit an affordance effect and neither is a manual response, but an 
affordance effect will not be elicited when participants are instructed to attend to lower-
level object features.   
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7.4.7 Later effects 
Some differences were observed when compared with the earlier experiments; mean RTs 
(306ms) were shorter than previous experiments.  This is readily explained by participants 
having made their judgement in advance and merely waiting to deploy it, however this had 
two effects on the LRP.  Firstly, because the second stimulus remained on screen after 
response and RTs were short, epochs which had been obscured by the response (300-
600ms) in the previous experiment could be examined.  Secondly, these epochs showed 
maintaining the response rule in the absence of an affording stimulus led to a strong and 
persistent preparation of the rule-cued response, even after response, for as long as the 
stimulus persisted on the screen.  So, this meant that although the typical compatibility 
effect was observed in LRP, all of the LRP activity was negative-going (indicating a 
preparation of the rule-cued response hand), with the affordance effect reflecting a sub-
threshold positive inflection in the LRP between 100-200ms.  This LRP effect adopted the 
same formation as it did in previous experiments except that the incompatible wave 
remained negative-going throughout, never reaching a positive value.  When the 
categorical judgement is made at the same time as response (as per experiments one to 
five), the incompatible wave has a positive polarity from 100-200ms (after affording 
stimulus onset) and the compatible wave has a negative polarity.  However in the delayed 
response experiment both waves were negative overall, with only a positive inflection in 
the incompatible wave in the critical 100-200ms epoch.   
The RT effect was still obtained as normal, which suggests that the affordance effect 
occurred as in previous experiments and that the overall negativity did not affect the 
behavioural output.  The LRP effect was also obtained as normal, suggesting that the 
overall negativity reflected a feature of the design that did not affect affordance 
generation.  Indeed, the overall negative values provide a novel demonstration of a task 
influence on motor processing; preparing the rule-cued responses for two seconds before 
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deploying them not only allowed participants to respond quicker, but this preparedness 
also saw them continue to prepare the correct response, even when faced with a 
conflicting stimulus on the incompatible trials.  This motor preparation appears to reflect 
the continued preparation of the rule-cued response in the presence of the conflicting 
incompatible affordance, showing that when the afforded response is not deployed then 
motor preparation continues, as suggested by Miller and Hackley (1992) and Zhang et al. 
(1997). This presumably did not happen on compatible trials because there was no conflict 
between the rule and the afforded response.  This continued preparation supports the idea 
of the facilitatory nature of affordance because the presence of the affording object 
continued to produce a motor effect only when participants had not deployed the afforded 
response.  This fits well with the argument from Galpin et al. (2011) and others (described 
above) that affordance effects are products of facilitation by compatible responses rather 
than inhibition by incompatible responses.   
The overall negativity observed here provides a cautionary tale to future research wishing 
to use LRPs with questions of affordance; although affordance generation may be 
effectively automatic (see above), affordance is not the only factor in determining the 
electrophysiological manifestation of the effect.  When determining analyses based on 
correct responses as in the LRP calculations in this thesis (using the derivation from Coles, 
1989), asking participants to maintain responses had a profound effect on polarities.  
Similarly, the LRP for the go, no-go experiment contained much more noise that the other 
experiments with bimanual responses.  However, that this overall negativity (a result of a 
task factor) did not affect the overall findings is more interesting; this provides an 
unexpected confirmation of the argument for automaticity because the same RT and LRP 
effects were obtained regardless of differing presentation and response parameters which 
yielded the negative polarity.  This shows that the visual action-information contained in 
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the lateralised stimuli will still generate motor activity as long as it is visible, even when 
task factors vary and yield artefacts in the data (e.g. overall negativity). 
7.5. Affordance effects in early visual processing 
This section will first offer a brief summary of the visual P1 and N1 effects before 
considering their broad implications and their relationship with the limited literature on 
the connection between these early visual components and affordances.  
7.5.1 Affordance effects in VEPs 
As discussed in the introductory chapters, a good deal of behavioural research has made 
the claim that in order for affordance SRC effects to arise there must be coaction of visual 
and motor areas  that are so tightly linked that they are better characterised as visuomotor 
than as discrete visual and motor modes of cognition.  This notion has not been widely 
challenged and like other brain claims from behavioural research that have been discussed 
above, there has also been little direct evidence for the claim.  Some fMRI studies of 
affording objects, such as Grezes et al. (2003) or Grezes and Decety (2002) have failed to 
find effects in occipital cortex when participants viewed affording objects.  However as 
discussed in the introduction, this may simply be a limit of the poor temporal resolution of 
fMRI combined with the low-level, transient nature of early visual components.  With this 
in mind, this thesis sought to employ the superior temporal resolution of ERPs to provide 
evidence on the visuomotor processes suggested in the literature.  Examining visual 
activity yielded some of the most startling observations in the thesis; effects of SR 
compatibility on early visual components P1 and N1, which show that even low-level visual 
processes are influenced by the relationship between the afforded actions and the 
observer during the earliest possible stages of perception.  However, this was only true for 
the lateralised stimuli, with no effects in visual components for any of the grip-type 
studies.  The go, no-go data extend this, demonstrating that the intention to act does not 
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influence the P1 component, but when there is no intended response compatibility effects 
were no longer observed in N1.  This provides another novel insight into the relationship 
between vision and action, indicating that action intentions, dictated by available 
responses, exert an influence over early stages of visual processing.  That these 
compatibility effects in visual components were limited to the lateralised stimuli furthers 
the distinction between grip and lateralised affordances advanced above, where it is 
suggested that the response devices used with grip-type stimuli caused participants to 
simulate on the actions afforded by the stimulus, affecting the timing of the LRP 
component and the generation of visual effects.  Also, when the typical SRC affordance 
paradigm was varied (experiments three, five and six) the two-way interaction of object 
category and handle orientation from experiment one was not detected and instead 
interactions with electrode hemisphere and/or position were detected (discussed in 
7.5.2.), all of which demonstrated a bias to sensors in the left hemisphere and/ or occipital 
cortex.  This suggests that different presentation parameters may have had an effect on 
the visual components too and as we shall see, these interactions are compelling when 
considered alongside the fMRI research demonstrating left hemisphere bias in object 
processing (Grezes & Decety, 2002; Grezes et al. 2003; Johnson-Frey, Newman-Norland 
and Grafton, 2005) because they represent agreement in the data from two different 
imaging modalities, one spatially acute and one temporally acute.  As will be discussed, 
these findings also recommend a reconsideration of the role of occipital cortex in attempts 
to model affordance processing. 
That an effect of compatibility would be detected in early visually evoked potentials (VEPs) 
is surprising because typically, these VEPs have been associated only with very simple 
visual stimuli and as described by Luck (2005), will always be elicited by any visual input 
and will only show minimal variation with task, illustrating the simplicity of the stimuli that 
evoke this component.  For example, Van Voorhis and Hillyard (1977) used flashes of light 
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at pseudorandom intervals to evoke a visual P1 component.  Mangun and Hillyard (1991) 
also found that the P1 component did not vary with task, eliciting the same component 
whether using simple or choice-RT measures with arrow-primed flashes of light.  They did 
however find a small task influence on N1, with choice RT eliciting an effect on N1 where 
simple RTs did not, leading the authors to suggest that N1 indexes visual discrimination.  
So, N1 has been shown to have a wider response than P1, for example Mangun (1995) 
reviews considerable evidence that N1 varies with spatial attention.  That said, spatial 
attention cannot explain the effects observed in this thesis because experiments featured 
centrally presented images which were compared like-for-like in different conditions. That 
is, the stimuli in congruent and incongruent affordance conditions had exactly the same 
distribution of left and right orientated objects, thus controlling for potential effects of 
spatial attention.  N1 has also been shown to act as a sensory gain control mechanism 
(Eimer, 1993; Vogel & Luck, 2000; Luck, Woodman &Vogel, 2005); by directing attention to 
a particular visual field, N1 effects will increase to stimuli presented in that visual field, 
demonstrating how attention filters perceptual information.  This is similar to Symes et 
al.’s (2008) finding that preparing a grip directed attention to similar objects in a visual 
search task. The lateral occipital N1 component has been shown to be larger when 
participants are performing discrimination tasks (Hopf et al., 2002; Ritter et al., 1979; Vogel 
& Luck, 2000) which were not dissimilar to the categorical judgements employed in the 
experiments here.  However this cannot be the sole explanation for the N1 effects 
observed in this thesis because no compatibility effects were observed for grip-type stimuli 
in P1 or N1 despite an equivalent discrimination being made with both grip-type and 
lateralised stimuli.  This returns the discussion to the other key difference between grip 
and lateralised experiments; the response devices.  If, as discussed above, the response 
devices really are scaffolding perception and embodying object characteristics by having 
participants maintain the required grips, then the lack of N1 discrimination effects for grip 
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type stimuli could again be explained by the response devices causing participants to 
maintain the grips, scaffolding the perception of the grasp-related features of the stimuli 
(Van Elk, Van Schie, Neggars and Bekkering, 2010; discussed below).   
To clarify, the lack of visual effects in grip-type experiments constitutes evidence of motor 
activity scaffolding object perception, i.e. the motor activity induced by preparing the grips 
embodies the object characteristics before the object appears on screen, so perception is 
scaffolded by motor preparation of the actions to be performed with the objects, with the 
maintained grips pre-activating the same neurons as viewing/interacting with the object 
and so facilitating behaviour by virtue of having already activated this network before the 
stimulus was visible.  So, this suggestion is an effect from motor preparation to visual 
perception, as seen in Symes et al. (2008) and others discussed throughout.  The 
mechanism for this is simple; maintaining the prepared grips activates the neurons 
associated with interacting with the object, and does so to a greater degree than the 
object affordance alone.  This is because affordances represent a low-level action 
preparation designed to facilitate actions if they are required, hence being a subordinate 
and presumably smaller effect than actually executing the prepared grip, which is precisely 
the kind of motor act that affordances are suggested to aid.  This is supported by findings 
from studies that indicate N1 is elicited in reach-to-grasp (Riehle, Wirtssohn, Grün and 
Brochier, 2013) and is more responsive when making a grasp to a target object than a point 
(Van Elk et al., 2010).   
Whilst main effects of category observed in N1 for the go, no-go and masked experiments 
support the classic interpretation of N1 as indexing visual discrimination, the present 
experiments belie further factors at work; here an interaction of action possibilities 
physically available to the participant (left or right handed button press) and action 
possibilities dictated by the stimulus have caused the compatibility effect in N1 in 
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lateralised experiments.  By contrast, the scaffolding provided by preparing the grips in 
grip-type experiments means that the grips afforded by the stimuli are already completed 
by maintaining the response grips, removing the requirement to generate the affordance 
in the same way as in lateralised experiments.  In this way, motor activity elicited by the 
grips scaffolds perception of the object and this scaffolding eliminates the need for a visual 
process to extract an affordance in order to activate motor areas associated with the 
afforded grip, precisely because they are already activated by the response devices.  This is 
startling because it suggests that the initial phases of processing visual stimuli may be 
deeper than previously thought (e.g. Luck, 2005), with action intentions (determined by 
the available responses) ‘filtering’ perception of the stimuli in a way that produces (or for 
grip-type, fails to produce) the observed affordance effects in N1 and P1.  This principle has 
been demonstrated by Symes et al. (2008), Hohlefeld et al. (2011) and others (discussed 
above), who showed that action intentions and available actions affected perception of 
object stimuli, demonstrating a two-way influence of action and vision.   
So, despite limited evidence suggesting a link between early visual components and object 
affordances every lateralised SRC experiment in this thesis has found at least one 
compatibility effect or interaction in these visual components.  For lateralised experiments, 
the P1 component was consistently detected with a peak at approximately 100ms, which 
was also the onset time for the motor activity detected in LRP.  In the same experiments, 
N1 consistently peaked at around 150ms, around halfway through the critical epoch for 
motor processing as revealed by the LRP results.  This concurrent activation speaks to the 
notion of visuomotor processing advanced in the behavioural literature, with compatibility 
effects detected simultaneously and for similar durations in visual and motor areas.  Other 
studies such as Kiefer, Sim, Helbig and Graf (2011) have found similar coactivation and also 
attributed it to visuomotor causes; they had participants name objects, two in sequence on 
each trial whilst recording ERPs. Trials could be congruent, where both objects afforded 
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similar actions, or incongruent where they afforded different actions.  They found motor 
effects from 100ms, similar to the experiments here.  They concluded that the rapidity of 
the effect indicated an influence of action priming even within 150ms of object 
presentation, fitting exactly with the findings in this thesis; that action intentions, dictated 
by available responses, affect stimulus perception at the earliest stages. This assertion is 
supported by convergent evidence from other ERP studies; for example, the simultaneous 
compatibility effects in visual and motor cortices fit well with the proposition from Handy, 
Grafton, Shroff, Ketay and Gazzaniga (2003) that action relevant object properties are 
detected rapidly and integrated with early sensory perception.  Handy et al.’s (2003) 
proposition offers a basis for the compatibility effects observed in visual components in 
this thesis, with action relevant object properties detected visually and fed into motor 
cortex by 100ms, eliciting the LRP compatibility effects seen with lateralised stimuli in this 
thesis.  They showed this by measuring P1 response to tools and nontool objects and found 
that the action properties of tool objects rapidly biased perception and yielded a significant 
difference in P1 amplitudes when compared with nontools.  This occurred very rapidly, in 
line with the findings from this thesis with P1 peaking from 100-150ms.  Overall, they 
found that the detection of irrelevant action possibilities biased attention to particular 
visual fields and yielded the difference in P1, following the assertion of visuomotor 
processing being automatic, i.e. not contingent on intention.  This experiment provides 
good converging evidence for the P1 effects observed here, with action relevant properties 
demonstrating systematic influence over these early stages of visual perception.   
Other researchers have made similar assertions; Kumar, Yoon and Humphreys (2012) also 
draw similar conclusions from their coactivation of visual and motor P1 and N1 effects 
when participants viewed objects that were either held with the proper grip or with an 
atypical grip.  These objects were either normal objects or nonobjects that were 
composites of parts of other objects, such as scissors with a hammer head instead of 
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blades.  They measured P1 and N1 on two sensor groups, one aimed at measuring motor 
activity and another aimed at measuring visual activity.  They found coactivation on visual 
and motor sensors in both components at both sites, strikingly similar to the results in the 
present thesis; visual and motor effects commencing around 100ms and persisting until 
around 200ms that varied with the action possibilities contained within the stimuli.  They 
suggested that their P1 effects were marginal but that the greater P1 amplitude for 
congruent grips represented enhanced processing of action possibilities, fitting well with 
the findings in the present experiments.  In turn, they also found greater N1 effects for 
congruent than incongruent grips, which themselves elicited a greater N1 component than 
non-objects.  This suggests that the action possibilities conferred by the pictured grips 
were also systematically influencing the N1 component.  It is important to note that this 
was not a typical SRC experiment, with stimuli depicting typical or atypical grips for 
interacting with the pictured objects supporting the assertion that the effects in visual 
components represent the extraction of action possibilities from the visual input, rather 
than reflecting task factors, such as the rule-cued response, which would be too high-level 
(i.e. requiring too many other processes to be complete, e.g. object identification, 
response selection) to have an effect on early visual processes.  This also led the authors to 
suggest that whilst N1 was systematically varying with action possibilities in all three 
stimulus classes, their P1 effect was unlikely to be due to the same kind of action 
enhancement seen in Handy et al. (2003) but rather was attributable to stimulus 
incongruence (both mismatched object parts and mismatched grips) which nonetheless 
reflects extracting the action possibilities (or lack thereof) contained within the stimulus.  
It is interesting to note that Kumar et al. (2012) also detected some interactions with grip-
congruency and electrode hemisphere, however where the effects in this thesis were 
biased to the left hemisphere theirs were biased to the right hemisphere.  This however 
may reflect differences between the normal object stimuli in this thesis and the stimuli 
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used by Kumar et al. which contained a variety of mismatched objects and grips, as well as 
non-objects composed of parts of familiar objects.  Researchers such as Grezes et al. 
(2003), Johnson-Frey et al. (2005) and Cisek (2007) (discussed variously) that have 
described a left hemisphere network for tool use and associated action effects have done 
so based on evidence from typical object stimuli, so the unusual composite non-objects 
may explain the partial right hemisphere lateralisation for anterior N1 effects observed by 
Kumar et al. (2012), which differs from the generally left-lateralised object network.  
Without further research, it is difficult to determine the accuracy of these assertions but 
regardless, the finding still betrays action-sensitivity in these early visual components.   
An action effect in N1 was also detected by Van Elk et al. (2010).  They found increased N1 
amplitude when participants grasped a response device compared with pointing at it.  
They suggested that this indexed the extraction of action possibilities according to action 
intentions because grasping required participants to account for many more object 
properties in order to successfully grasp the stimulus (e.g. relating hand position to 
stimulus position, calculating reach trajectory and grasp aperture) whereas pointing does 
not require participants to attend to any properties of the object itself, merely its location.  
This fits very well with the SRC affordance effect obtained in N1 in the lateralised 
experiments where the intention to make particular responses (provided by the response 
rule) was influencing the detection of the visual properties of the stimulus and 
simultaneously discriminating which category the object belonged to.  This may also go 
some way to explain why the N1 (and indeed P1) effects were limited to lateralised stimuli; 
as discussed above, maintaining a particular grip scaffolds perception just as demonstrated 
by Symes et al. (2008) and this scaffolding should reduce the load on visual cortex, 
facilitating detection of relevant object features, just as it does on motor cortex.  Van Elk et 
al.’s (2010) explanation fits here too, because their N1 was described as determining how 
to grasp the device, which is markedly different from viewing a grip-type stimulus whilst 
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already making the relevant grip; as above, when the grip is being maintained and there is 
no intention to grip the stimulus object, then participants need not parse the visual-action 
information with the aim of grasping it as they did in Van Elk et al. (2010) because they 
have already prepared the grasp.  Focussing less on the stimulus and more on the 
intentions provided by the response set explains the different effects of viewing stimuli 
with otherwise equivalent affordances in SRC paradigms, including the spread of motor 
and visual effects found in this thesis, as well as the effects from the literature reviewed 
here.  This approach unites visual and motor effects with both responses under a single 
explanation that sticks closely to the existing literature. 
Broadly, the compatibility effects found in visual components in this thesis support the 
conclusions from elsewhere in the literature and demonstrate them in a new way using 
simple variations on the affordance SRC paradigm.  Action intentions and available actions 
have been shown to affect the way visual information is parsed leading to effects of object 
and response typically assumed to be too high level to affect these early visual 
components.  Taken with studies such as Kiefer et al. (2011) these observed effects are 
attributable to an unexpectedly rapid influence of a combination of the actions available to 
the participant, which in these SRC studies are dictated by the response devices.  The 
following subsections will attempt to unravel this further by considering the differences 
between experiments and how they may inform this discussion. 
7.5.2. Left Hemisphere interactions with compatibility 
An interesting difference emerged between experiment one and the subsequent variations 
on the lateralised affordance SRC paradigm (experiments three, five and six).  Experiment 
one made the striking observation of a compatibility effect in N1 and P1, however in both 
experiment three (masked version of original experiment) and six (delayed-response 
experiment) the main effect changed to an interaction with electrode hemisphere 
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indicating greater activation in the left hemisphere.  It is notable that these were the only 
experiments that required participants to represent the stimulus after it was no longer 
visible in order to make their responses.  This has similarities to the evidence from Grezes 
and Decety (2002) and Grezes et al. (2003), demonstrating greater left-hemisphere 
activation in their affordance SRC experiments for both lateralised and grip-type stimuli.  
Grezes and Decety (2002) had participants perform three tasks on affording objects; 
categorical judgement, motor imagery and silent noun/ verb generation.  Using PET they 
found that each of these tasks (including those where the stimulus was not visible) 
activated a left hemisphere network including left iPL, left SMA, left pars triangularis and 
left precentral gyrus.  Because this network was active in all three tasks, irrespective of 
whether stimuli were visually present or not, it was associated with object representation. 
Grezes et al. (2003) extended these conclusions to include grip-type stimuli, finding very 
similar activations using fMRI.  In their motor imagery and word generation tasks, there 
was no visible stimulus and they found greater left-hemisphere activation indicating the 
representation of the object properties.  This evidence suggests that the greater N1 and P1 
amplitudes in the left hemisphere in the masked lateralised and delayed-response 
experiments are attributable to the stimuli offsetting before response, calling this left-
hemisphere network to represent them in their absence.  This interpretation is supported 
by Johnson-Frey et al. (2005) and Cisek (2007) who reviewed a variety of literature showing 
that object properties are handled by a left hemisphere network and have proposed 
models focussed on the left-hemisphere localisation of these effects.   
The masked lateralised (three) and delayed-response experiments (six) offer further insight 
when considering the nature of the LRP effects too; while the masked lateralised 
experiment (three) showed a negative compatibility effect in LRP, this was not reflected in 
the visual activity, which exhibited a typical, positive compatibility effect.  This hemispheric 
interaction in N1 and P1 is unlikely to be related to the direction of subsequent motor 
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effects, as it was also found in experiment 6, where the LRP exhibited normal polarity.  The 
finding that visual and motor affordance effects do not exhibit the same behaviour under 
masking shows that affordance effects in visual components and LRP are distinct, with the 
former reflecting the extraction of action-relevant object properties (that vary with handle 
orientation) that may later produce the motor compatibility effect.  Masked and unmasked 
experiments showing the same early visual effects suggests that these early stages of visual 
processing were the same, regardless of task demands or the LRP and RT effects that 
would follow.  So, this suggests that the compatibility effects observed in P1 and N1 were 
not compatibility effects per se, but instead represent precursors to compatibility effects; 
initial stages of object processing best characterised as the extraction of the affording 
object properties from the visual input that will later lead to compatibility effects in RT and 
LRP.  Distinguishing the visual effects from full compatibility effects is critical so that the 
compatibility effects in P1 and N1 are not overstated or misrepresented by implying that 
they represent the overlap of stimulus and response, which could not be reasonably 
expected to be resolved at such an early stage in processing (P1 from 70ms).  For this 
reason, the visual ‘compatibility effects’ may be better described as affordance effects, 
because they seem to represent the extraction of action possibilities from visual input that 
will later yield compatibility effects.  In so doing, they reflect the core idea of affordance; 
the online extraction of action possibilities from seen objects.   
7.5.3 Affordance effects in visual components in absence of response 
Elaborating on the summary from 7.5.1, the go, no-go experiment (five) is quite different 
from the masked, lateralised experiment (three) and the delayed response experiment 
(six).  As in previous experiments an interaction of affordance and left hemisphere was 
detected in P1, however this also interacted with electrode position and indicated greater 
amplitudes on left occipital sensors when viewing the stimuli without an intention to 
respond to them.  The occipital locus of these effects is quite surprising too, because 
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models such as Cisek (2007), Johnson-Frey et al. (2005) and studies such as Grezes et al. 
(2003) and Grezes and Decety (2002) have not specified occipital cortex in their networks 
for handling object properties.  This highlights the theoretical significance of detecting 
affordance effects in visual components, not only are the affordance effects observed in 
the visual components startling in terms of how rapidly action possibilities exert an 
influence, but also in terms of where they were detected; always strongest in the left 
hemisphere and on occipital sensors O1 and O2, rather than P7 and P8 as would be 
predicted by the literature, e.g. Cisek (2007) who focuses on parietal over occipital areas.  
This difference between experiment one and subsequent experiments has two 
implications; firstly it extends the idea of a left-hemisphere network and in doing so also 
recommends reconsidering the role of visual areas, especially during the earliest phases of 
affordance processing.  Secondly, previous investigations have failed to identify this early 
visual activity and have instead focussed on motor and parietal activations for reasons of 
techniques employed, demonstrating the value of using temporally sensitive metrics when 
investigating visuomotor processes such as affordance.  Examples of previous 
investigations focussing on parietal effects discussed so far include but are not limited to 
Grezes and Decety’s (2002) PET study, Grezes et al.’s (2003) fMRI study, Castiello et al.’s 
(2000) PET study and Johnson-Frey et al.’s (2005) and Cisek’s (2007) models, each of whom 
made extensive use of cerebral blood flow data in predicting their networks and few other 
methods. 
The left occipital locus of the P1 effects was not the only surprising finding of the go, no-go 
experiment (five), which also failed to observe an N1 effect and was the only lateralised 
experiment in this thesis to not detect an effect or affordance interaction in N1.  To 
reiterate, the key difference between the go, no-go experiment and other lateralised 
experiments is the lack of a manual response, instead using a verbal response to half of the 
stimuli (kitchen) and no response to the other half (tools) stimuli.  This means that there 
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was no manual response set to shape object perception as demonstrated by Symes et al. 
(2008), Van Elk et al. (2010), Hohlefeld et al. (2011) and others (discussed throughout).  So, 
the lack of an affordance effect in N1 in the absence of a manual response suggests that 
this difference between the go, no-go experiment and those with bimanual responses 
could be interpreted as another demonstration of a response set affecting how a stimulus 
was perceived. This would suggest than N1 is sensitive to action intentions and/or 
prepared actions dictated by response set and may reflect the motor effect on visual 
perception seen in Symes et al. (2008), Van Elk et al. (2010) and others.  This is a 
contentious assertion but one that may garner considerable support from the literature; 
Luck, Woodman and Vogel (2000) demonstrated that the visual N1 component indexes 
attentional selection effects, so without a response set to guide attention to the action 
relevant stimulus properties (as in Symes et al., 2008, etc.), perhaps objects were not 
selected for attention in the same way as experiments with bimanual keypress responses 
that offered compatibility with the stimuli.  Franconeri, Hollingworth and Simons (2005), 
Yantis and Hillstrom (1994), Yantis (1993) and others (discussed in greater detail below) 
have shown that objects capture attention regardless of factors such as novelty, 
presentation, task relevance, luminance and other factors so taken with the go, no-go 
effects this implies that the key factor in generating this N1 effect is the relationship 
between stimulus and response.  Perhaps then, the attention capturing properties of 
manipulable objects (e.g. Franconeri et al., 2005; Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Yantis & Hillstrom, 
1994; Yantis, 1993) are sufficient to yield the LRP and P1 effects in the absence of the 
intention to act (Kiefer et al., 2011) but without a response or action intention to shape 
stimulus perception (Symes et al., 2008; Ellis, 2009; etc.) the sensory gain function ascribed 
to N1 (Eimer, 1993; Vogel & Luck, 2000; Luck, Woodman &Vogel, 2005) is not amplifying 
the relevant object features in the go, no-go experiment as it did in the forced-choice, 
bimanual response, lateralised affordance experiments.  This explains the observed 
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differences between the go experiments and the go, no-go experiment (i.e. no affordance 
effect in N1 for go, no-go experiment five) and ties them to the existing literature on N1.  
The detection of a P1 effect in the go, no-go data suggests that the P1 effects with 
lateralised stimuli are automatic upon viewing the object, similar to the LRP effects.  
However this is far from certain as participants were still under speeded response 
conditions and still made a categorical judgement and so these task factors could affect the 
detection of P1.  The effect on no-go trials could represent an influence of speeded 
response conditions leading participants to view the objects in a particular way and further 
investigation is required to elucidate this, particularly into purely passive viewing of 
affording objects without any kind of judgement to make.  However this creates a problem 
in determining suitable catch trials.  Proverbio et al. (2011) conducted a passive viewing 
paradigm without speeded response but did have participants make a categorical 
judgement on the stimuli to determine whether a trial was a catch trial requiring a 
response.  They found that objects elicited a motor cortex effect much later than the 
present go, no-go experiment.  This implies that the effects observed here may have been 
influenced by the speeded response, an argument supported by the idea of response sets 
and action intentions affecting perception.  This may also apply to the visual components, 
with no effects reported by Proverbio et al. (2011) until much later, from 210ms.  That 
said, this experiment could be said to make a poor comparison here due to the variety of 
stimuli employed by Proverbio et al. (2011) featuring a variety of different affordances, 
including handled objects as well as objects with unclear affordances, such as puzzle cubes 
and typewriters.  A direct comparison using a single sample and a homogeneous stimulus 
set is required to assess this.  That said, because the same P1 effects were obtained 
regardless of the intention to act on the stimuli then the findings of this thesis suggest that 
the effect detected in lateralised experiments in the P1 component is automatic, reflecting 
the detection of action-relevant object features.   
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Based on all of the P1 data, it seems that the effects in P1 index the detection of action 
possibilities contained within the stimulus.  Because P1 is detected without responses, it is 
not contingent on action intentions created by the response set, speaking to early 
conceptions of affordance as occurring when simply viewing objects.  This suggestion is 
supported by experiments that have demonstrated the attention capturing properties of 
affording objects without using matched SR pairs or SRC paradigms; Franconeri et al. 
(2005) used a visual search task during which a new object stimulus was added and found 
that that objects captured attention regardless of novelty.  Relatedly, Yantis and Hillstrom 
(1994) also used visual search to show that presentation alone is sufficient to capture 
attention and that this attention-capturing effect is not contingent on luminance changes. 
Yantis’ (1993) discussion reviewed evidence from non-SRC paradigms and suggested that 
task-relevant or irrelevant object features may capture attention when a task requires 
participants to attend stimulus, similar to the argument advanced in 7.4 that as long as 
participants do not have an explicit intention to attend to subordinate object features (e.g. 
colour) then merely viewing an object will elicit its affordances.  Each of these findings fit 
perfectly with the experiments in this thesis and with the wider affordance literature too 
(e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 1998; affordance effect from task-irrelevant handle).   
The differences between these experiments leads to a potential distinction between P1 
and N1 components in terms of action compatibility/ affordance effects; P1 appears to 
index the detection of action possibilities (potentially explaining attention-capturing 
properties of objects) without reference to the participant’s available actions, as evinced 
by its detection in all lateralised affordance SRC experiments, including the go, no-go 
experiment which lacked a manual response but applied identical data transforms and 
obtained nearly identical results.  This assertion offers the possibility of P1 being treated as 
a neurophysiological marker of the attention capturing properties of objects (Franconeri et 
al., 2005; Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994; Yantis, 1993) and/or the first stage 
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in the extraction of object affordance from visual input.  Further evidence for this comes 
from the main effect of category that appeared in P1 in all experiments, which implies that 
when viewing the objects in order to complete the categorical judgement, participants also 
automatically extract the visual action-information therein, as suggested by Tucker and 
Ellis (1998), Vainio et al. (2008) and others.  It would be possible to test this by using the 
same stimuli without a categorical judgement in a purely passive viewing experiment 
although determining suitable catch trials is problematic.  Following the idea of P1 as 
indexing extraction of action-information, the lack of N1 for the go, no-go experiment 
suggests that the N1 affordance effect may be contingent on the relationship between 
perceived action possibilities and the perceiver’s action intentions (dictated by response) 
because when participants had no intention to act, no effects were detected in N1.  As 
discussed above, this fits with literature such as Van Elk et al. (2010) that also suggests a 
connection between action intentions and N1 effects.  In turn, the lack of a response in the 
go, no-go experiment also suggests that the P1 effect is not contingent on a response.  
These suggestions require further investigation, but offer a novel view on affordance in P1 
and N1 that fits the literature; P1 was obtained on all lateralised experiments (Luck, 2005) 
showing only minor latency variations (Van Voorhis & Hillyard, 1977; Mangun & Hillyard, 
1991) and affordance effects in N1 were only detected when participants intended to 
make a manual response (and were not preparing the grip associated with the object), 
fitting with the notion of N1 as controlling sensory gain based on action intention/ object 
attention (e.g. Eimer, 1993; Vogel & Luck, 2000; Luck, Woodman & Vogel, 2005).  
Furthermore, the lack of N1 effects on grip-type experiments fits with the explanation from 
Van Elk et al. (2010), who suggested that N1 was extracting action-relevant object 
parameters in order to guide their reach-to-grasp response, an assertion that also fits with 
the lack of N1 effects with grip-type stimuli, where maintaining the response grips 
throughout the experiments is suggested to have embodied the salient action-information/ 
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object properties, eliminating the need to extract the information from the visual input 
because it is already partially activated by effector position.  This distinction on N1 is also 
supported by Proverbio et al. (2007) who found greater N1 effects when responding to 
objects than animals (responding with a bimanual keypress response as in the lateralised 
experiments here) and Proverbio et al. (2011) who found no N1 effects during their passive 
viewing paradigm where participants made no response to object stimuli.  Future research 
could begin by replicating the different N1 effects using a single sample before attempting 
to elicit this component with other affording stimuli under a variety of response conditions 
in order to probe the assertion that visual N1 to affording objects is connected with 
observer’s action intentions. 
In summary, the small differences in visual components across lateralised experiments in 
this thesis are attributable to the systematic task variations and together offer some 
insight into some factors that may influence these components.  When the object was not 
visible during the masked and delayed response trials, greater left hemisphere activity was 
elicited to represent the objects.  When there was no response set, no N1 effect was 
obtained (as between Proverbio et al., 2007 and Proverbio et al., 2011), indicating that 
action effects in N1 have a relationship with intention (see also Van Elk et al., 2010).  The 
occurrence of P1 effects in these experiments means that affordance effects in P1 could be 
argued to be automatic (i.e. not contingent on action intentions), although this requires 
further experimental clarification.  Overall, the effects are remarkably consistent, with all 
lateralised experiments featuring a speeded categorical judgement and eliciting effects of 
affordance in P1 that are consistent with the visual extraction of action possibilities and 
eliciting N1 effects in all lateralised experiments with manual responses.  Similarly, the lack 
of a P1 or N1 action effect in the grip-type experiments is consistent with the explanation 




7.5.4. Differences between grip-type and lateralised affordances in visual components 
As mentioned in 7.2.1, there were considerable differences between grip-type and 
lateralised LRP effects and this extended to the visual components too.  No effect of 
affordance was observed in P1 or N1 for either of the grip-type affordance experiments.  
This is remarkable when considering the overall similarities in the paradigms, with only the 
class of affordance used in the SR pair changing between the grip and lateralised 
experiments.  The lateralised affordance experiments used a bimanual keypress response 
(or a verbal response for the go, no-go experiment) however the grip-type experiments 
used response devices that mimicked the actions afforded by the objects.  Participants 
held the devices throughout the experiment and maintaining a grip has been both 
hypothesised (Clark, 1997; Hommel, Müsseler, Ascherleben, & Prinz; 2001) and shown 
(Fagioli et al., 2007; Symes et al. 2008; Hohlefeld et al., 2011) to influence the perception 
of objects, so this difference in methods also explains the differences in the visual 
components.   
The explanation given for the different LRP latencies in grip-type and lateralised 
experiments is that maintaining the grips throughout the experiment is shaping the 
perception of the stimuli, with some of the requisite motor processing being scaffolded by 
maintaining the grips, effectively ‘pre-loading’ the actions in motor cortex and scaffolding 
perception by partially activating the relevant neuronal populations before the stimulus is 
visible, reducing time-pressure and yielding later effects.  This also explains why 
differences emerged between grip-type and lateralised affordance effects in visual 
components; the embodied/ scaffolding explanation hangs on the actions available to the 
participants through the response set, which are said to affect visual perception, as seen in 
various studies cited throughout (e.g. Fagioli et al., 2007; Symes et al., 2008; Hohlefeld et 
al., 2011; etc.).  This explanation is similar to the explanation from Van Elk et al. (2010) who 
found enhanced amplitude in P1 and N1 when participants completed a reach-to-grasp on 
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a grip-type response device, compared to pointing at the same device.  Van Elk et al. (2010) 
also concluded that the actions available to the participants (dictated by the response set, 
pointing vs. grasping) were shaping perception of the objects, with the reach-to-grasp 
eliciting greater N1 effects because in order to complete the movement, participants had 
to visually detect the relevant object properties to determine factors such as grasp 
aperture, distance, and timing among other concerns.  This explanation also fits for the 
lateralised stimuli in this thesis, where the response devices merely shared an abstract 
spatial relationship with the stimuli and so required participants to extract action-relevant 
properties in order to yield the observed affordance effects in RT and LRP.  This mode of 
explanation is also supported by the wide variety of research cited above that shows a 
two-way relationship between vision and action, where available actions affected 
perception (e.g. Fagioli et al., 2007; Symes et al. 2008; Hohlefeld et al., 2011). 
This differentiation also supports the suggestion above that these effects in visual 
components are better described as affordance effects than as compatibility effects 
because if the explanation from Van Elk et al. (2010) is correct and the early visual effects 
represent the extraction of action-relevant object properties (also indicated by the present 
data) then this suggests that the visual effects observed in the lateralised experiments are 
not the same as the compatibility effects observed in LRP and RT.  Instead, it suggests that 
the affordance effect observed in P1 indexes the extraction of action-relevant object 
properties and that N1 is part of relating the same action-relevant object properties to the 
available actions (i.e. response sets).  This is borne out by the lack of an N1 effect in the go, 
no-go experiment.  Put another way, it means that the affordance effects observed in early 
visual components in lateralised experiments are not compatibility effects in the same way 
as in RT and LRP, indeed it would be bizarre to suggest that the relationship between an SR 
pair had been resolved by the earliest stages of visual processing (~70ms).  Instead, these 
early visual ‘compatibility effects’ appear to represent precursors to the familiar LRP/ RT 
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compatibility effects, detecting the object properties which yield compatibility with the 
actions available to the participants.  These object properties necessarily vary with object 
compatibility, hence their manifestation in analyses of compatibility.  Both handle 
orientation and available actions are represented in the ANOVA models so it seems the 
compatibility effects in visual cortex represent a lower-level effect of these variables.  
Based on the literature and the spread of effects in this thesis, that lower-level effect 
seems to be one of extracting action-relevant stimulus features (P1) and subsequently 
relating them to the available actions (N1).  
An advantage of this mode of explanation is that it accounts for the observed results, 
including the differences in grip and lateralised experiments, without ascribing high-level 
processing such as object identification and completing categorical judgments to such low-
level visual components and instead couches it in the detection/ discrimination of visual 
features in a choice-RT paradigm, fitting with Mangun and Hillyard’s (1991) and Mangun’s 
(1995) treatments of N1 as varying with spatial attention.  It also provides a mechanism by 
which the influence of action intentions and/or available actions on visual processing may 
be exerted and begins to offer a neural basis for these effects.  Another advantage is that 
this explanation is couched in the notion of affordance as being a rapid and fundamental 
means for an agent to relate bodily states to environment.  This explanation takes 
advantage of the principles of embodied cognition described in the introductory chapters, 
particularly embodied/ situated cognition, which encompasses the scaffolding explanation.  
One way to test this assertion would be to conduct an experiment in which participants 
view the same set of grip-type stimuli whilst either maintaining the response grips in one 
condition or completing a reach-to-grasp action to the same response devices in another 
condition, similar to Van Elk et al.’s (2010) response. 
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One thing that may be learned from the difference between grip and lateralised 
experiments is that it does not appear that these early visual components represent 
automatically extracting the object affordance per se, because were that the case we 
would predict an effect on the grip-type experiments too.  Instead, perhaps a better way to 
consider the P1 and N1 effects for lateralised stimuli is as detecting the visual cues to the 
relationship between stimulus and effector. To put it more simply still, these visual 
components may be seen as detecting visual cues to the usability of the objects, 
particularly P1.  Viewed in this way, the visual effects in this thesis are novel but do not 
require great revision of the ideas they are based on and offer good fit with variations 
within and outside this thesis.   
7.5.5 Conclusions on visual components 
The suggestion that N1 is influenced by action intention fits perfectly with the idea that N1 
effects indicate sensory gain based on intention and attention (Eimer, 1993; Vogel & Luck, 
2000; Luck et al., 2005), because (as discussed throughout) participants’ action intentions 
and available actions affect the way stimuli are perceived and N1 provides a candidate 
mechanism for this.  Evidence supporting this comes from the lack of N1 effects when 
participants do not make response (e.g. go, no-go experiment five; Proverbio et al., 2011) 
compared to when they do make a response (e.g. lateralised SRC experiment one; masked 
lateralised experiment three; Proverbio et al., 2007; Van Elk et al., 2010).  Furthermore, 
when participants prepare the responses throughout, no N1 effects are detected (grip-type 
experiments two & four) and this explanation suggests that this is because maintaining the 
grips already partially activated the same neuronal populations as viewing the affordances, 
hence the sensory gain function ascribed to N1 is not detected because its action is already 
completed by the response devices.  So, the influence of response parameters on visual 
detection of affordances may be given a mechanism through the sensory gain control 
function of the N1 component. 
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The idea that maintaining grips scaffolds object perception has received wide support in 
the literature and also supports the interpretation of P1 as representing an initial stage of 
extracting object possibilities without reference to action intentions.  This is supported by 
the detection of P1 effects on all lateralised experiments with responses, but not on the 
grip-type experiments, where response devices led participants to prepare the afforded 
actions throughout the experiment, removing the need to visually extract the afforded 
actions.  
These findings not only elucidate a critical difference between two behaviourally 
equivalent sources of affordance (lateralised and grip-type) but they also offer a novel 
insight into the function of P1 and N1 components that follows naturally from the classic 
interpretations of them, merely extending these low-level processes into handling object 
properties.  In turn, this explanation offers a chance to explain some of the more striking 





The experimental work presented in this thesis has demonstrated consistent patterns of 
early visuomotor activation elicited by viewing affording objects, providing some of the 
first direct evidence on the timecourse of visuomotor processing of different classes of 
object affordances.  The experiments indicate that viewing a lateralised affording object 
will not only yield an automatic behavioural affordance effect, it will also yield concurrent 
motor activation and visual activation, measurable from 100ms in LRP and from 70ms in 
ERP components P1 and N1, respectively.  As well as providing novel evidence on the 
concurrent activation of visual and motor cortices when viewing lateralised affordances, 
three findings have emerged that were not predicted by the behavioural literature.  These 
findings offer new insight into affordance processing: 
a) This thesis has shown fundamental differences between grip-type and lateralised 
affordances in terms of the visual and motor effects they elicit that were not predicted by 
the literature.  This finding questions whether the label ‘visuomotor’ is applicable to 
processing grip-type affordances in SRC paradigms because they failed to elicit visual 
effects under the same conditions as lateralised affording objects, which always elicited an 
effect in visual P1 and/or N1.  These findings represent some of the only empirical 
evidence on this difference and one of few attempts to quantify these differences.  These 
results suggest that lateralised and grip-type affordance SRC experiments represent quite 
different processing routes to achieve the same behavioural outcomes.  This difference 
appears to be attributable to the bodily states induced by holding the grip-type response 
devices compared with making a button-press response and as such recommends a 
reconsideration of the role of responses or prepared actions in models of affordance SRC.  
To date, the literature has focussed on how the action information contained within the 
stimulus affects motor processing, however the present data is in-line with a growing 
literature showing that bodily states (such as prepared responses) affect visual perception.  
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The differences between affordance classes observed in this thesis suggest that lateralised 
SRC affordance effects are driven by stimulus information but that grip-type affordance 
SRC effects are driven more by the responses shaping the perception of the stimulus.  This 
thesis recommends future investigations and models of affordance account for the 
influences of response devices and affordances classes because they have a profound 
effect on what electrophysiological activity is elicited. 
 
b) Perhaps the most surprising finding was the effect of affordance on visual components P1 
and N1, which have typically been thought of as being elicited by all visual input without 
selecting for higher order object properties such as affordance.  The evidence presented 
here constitutes a consistent set of affordance effects in these components, replicated 
over a series of four experiments and elicited by viewing lateralised affording objects, 
regardless of the intention to act or task requirements to direct attention to them.  These 
findings make two recommendations; a reconsideration of P1 and N1 components in terms 
of vision for action and a revision to existing models proposed for handling object 
properties, to include very early occipital cortex activation represented by these 
components.  The findings also offer a tentative delineation of P1 and N1 as marking 
different stages of object perception and so, marking different stages in the production of 
an affordance; P1 appears to index the extraction of object properties from the visual 
input, including (but not limited to) the affordance-relevant object properties.  This 
appears to represent an early stage in a cascade of visuomotor processes leading to the 
generation of an affordance.  In contrast, the detection of N1 was contingent on the 
presence of a response in this thesis and varied with responses in the literature and this 
indicates that affordance-related effects in N1 must bear a relationship with response.  
Future research may use this as a starting point to better understand the contribution of 
occipital cortex to vision for action.   
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c) This thesis has used the observed electrophysiological activity to provide direct evidence to 
confirm the assumption of automaticity by using two entirely novel variations on the 
affordance SRC paradigm to demonstrate first evidence that neither an intention to act nor 
a categorical judgement is required to elicit affordance-related visuomotor activity with 
lateralised stimuli.  Viewing the same lateralised affordances consistently produced rapid 
visuomotor activation that varied systematically with the object affordance and did not 
change with task parameters such as the intention to make a motor response or task 
requirements to attend the stimulus.  The use of electrophysiological measures allowed a 
direct demonstration of the core principle of affordance; that merely viewing an object is 
sufficient to yield preparation of the actions that it affords.  An addendum to this is that an 
N1 effect was not obtained with lateralised stimuli in the absence of response, suggesting 
that only the P1 and LRP effects have automatic components. 
Overall, this thesis demonstrates that electrophysiological measures offer considerable 
insight into mechanics of object affordance and are a powerful means to examine some of 
the more esoteric claims and assumptions in the literature.  In doing so, it has 
demonstrated surprising differences between behaviourally equivalent affordances and 
emphasises the role of the response and of visual cortices in affordance SRC effects.  Taken 
together, these surprising findings build on the suggested two-way relationship between 
vision and action (e.g. Ellis, 2009; Symes et al., 2008; etc.) to suggest a three-stage loop, 
where bodily states affect object attention, object attention affects what visuomotor 
activity is elicited, and that visuomotor activity affects bodily states, which in turn affects 
attention, with no apparent prime mover.  This proposed loop accounts for how the 
different visuomotor activity elicited by different affordance classes can produce the same 
behavioural facilitation effect; because these three stages exist in a state of constant flux, 
each influencing each other in a continual effort to facilitate goal-directed action in our rich 






8. Chapter eight  
Appendix – stimuli 
8.1 Lateralised stimuli for experiments one, three and five 
8.1.1 Stimulus table 


















8.2 Stimuli used in grip-type experiments two and four 
8.2.1 Stimulus table 
















8.3 Stimuli used for lateralised, delayed response experiment six 
8.3.1 Stimulus table 




























9. Chapter nine   
Appendix – Publications 
9.1 Published study: Electrophysiological examination of embodiment in vision and action 
Goslin, J., Dixon, T., Fischer, M. H., Cangelosi, A., & Ellis, R. (2012). Electrophysiological 


























9.2 Abstract in conference proceedings:  
Dixon, T., Goslin, J., & Ellis, R. (2012). Affordance in the absence of the intention to act on 







10. Chapter ten 
References 
Adamo, M., & Ferber, S. (2009). A picture says more than a thousand words: Behavioural 
and ERP evidence for attentional enhancements due to action affordances. 
Neuropsychologia, 47, 1600-1608. 
Allport, D. A. (1987). Selection for action. In H., Heuer & H. F., Sanders (eds.), Perspectives 
on Perception and Action. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. 
Andersen, R. A., & Cui, H. (2009). Intention, action planning, and decision making in 
parietal-frontal circuits. Neuron, 63(5), 568-583. 
Anderson, M. L. (2003). Embodied cognition: A field guide. Artificial intelligence,149(1), 91-
130. 
Anderson, S. J., Yamagishi, N., & Karavia, V. (2002). Attentional processes link perception 
and action. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 269(1497), 
1225-1232. 
Arbib, M. A. (1997). From visual affordances in monkey parietal cortex to hippocampo–
parietal interactions underlying rat navigation. Philosophical Transaction Royal Society 
London, 325,1429–1436. 
Bach, P., & Tipper, S. P. (2006). Bend it like Beckham: Embodying the motor skills of famous 
athletes. The quarterly journal of experimental psychology, 59(12), 2033-2039. 
Balconi, M., & Caldiroli, C. (2011). Semantic violation effect on object-related action 
comprehension. N400-like event-related potentials for unusual and incorrect 
use. Neuroscience, 197, 191-199. 
Ballard, D. (1991). Animate vision. Artificial intelligence, 48: 57-86. 
265 
 
Ballard, D. H., Hayhoe, M. M., Pook, P. K., & Rao, R. P. (1997). Deictic codes for the 
embodiment of cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20(4), 723-742. 
Biederman, I. (1987). Recognition by components: A theory of human image 
understanding. Psychological Review, 94, 115–147. 
Borghi, A.M., Di Ferdinando, A., & Parisi, D. (2011). Objects, spatial compatibility, and 
affordances: A connectionist study. Cognitive Systems Research, 12, 33-44. 
Brooks, R. A. (1990). Elephants don't play chess. Robotics and autonomous systems, 6(1), 3-
15. 
Cantello, R., Civardi, C., Cavalli, A., Varrasi, C., & Vicentini, R. (2000). Effects of a photic 
input on the human cortico-motoneuron connection. Clinical neurophysiology, 111(11), 
1981-1989. 
Castiello, U., Bennett, K. M., Egan, G. F., Tochon-Danguy, H. J., Kritikos, A., & Dunai, J. 
(2000). Human inferior parietal cortex ‘programs’ the action class of grasping. Cognitive 
Systems Research, 1(2), 89-97. 
Chemero, A. (2001). What We Perceive When We Perceive Affordances: Commentary on 
Michaels ‘‘Information, Perception, and Action’’. Ecological Psychology, 13, 111–116. 
Chemero, A. (2003). An Outline of a Theory of Affordances. Ecological Psychology, 15, 181–
195. 
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge. 




Cho, D. T., & Proctor, R. W. (2010). The object-based Simon effect: Grasping affordance or 
relative location of the graspable part? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 36(4), 853-861. 
Cho, D. T., & Proctor, R. W. (2011). Correspondence effects for objects with opposing left 
and right protrusions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 37(3), 737-749. 
Cisek, P. (2007). Cortical mechanisms of action selection: the affordance competition 
hypothesis. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 362(1485), 1585-1599. 
Coles, M. G. H. (1989). Modern mind-brain reading: Psychophysiology, physiology, and 
cognition. Psychophysiology, 26, 251–269. 
Conway, B. R., Hubel, D. H., & Livingstone, M. S. (2002). Color contrast in macaque 
V1. Cerebral cortex, 12(9), 915-925. 
Costantini, M., Ambrosini, E., Tieri, G., Sinigaglia, C., & Committeri, G. (2010). Where does 
an object trigger an action? An investigation about affordances in space. Experimental 
brain research, 207, 95-103. 
Craighero, L., Bello, A., Fadiga, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (2002). Hand action preparation 
influences the responses to hand pictures. Neuropsychologia,40(5), 492-502. 
Craighero, L., Fadiga, L., Rizzolatti, G., & Umiltà, C. (1998). Visuomotor priming. Visual 
Cognition, 5, 109-125.  
Craighero, L., Fadiga, L., Rizzolatti, G., & Umiltà, C. (1999). Action for perception: a motor-
visual attentional effect. Journal of experimental psychology: Human perception and 
performance, 25(6), 1673-1692. 
267 
 
Craighero, L., Fadiga, L., Umiltà, C. A., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Evidence for visuomotor 
priming effect. Neuroreport, 8(1), 347-349.  
Creem, S. H., & Proffitt, D. R. (2001). Defining the cortical visual systems:“what”,“where”, 
and “how”. Acta psychologica, 107(1), 43-68. 
Derbyshire, N., Ellis, R., & Tucker, M. (2006). The potentiation of two components of the 
reach-to-grasp action during object categorisation in visual memory. Acta 
Psychologica, 122(1), 74-98. 
Eimer, M. (1993). Spatial cueing, sensory gating & selective response preparation: an ERP 
study on visuo-spatial orienting. Electroencephalography & Clinical Neurophysiology, 88(5), 
408-420. 
Eimer, M., & Schlaghecken, F. (1998). Effects of masked stimuli on motor activation: 
behavioural and electrophysiological evidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 24(6), 1737-1747. 
Ellis, R. (2009). Interactions between action and visual objects. In E.M., Morsella, J.A., 
Bargh, & P.M., Gollwitzer, (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of human action (213-224).  Oxford 
University Press. 
Ellis, R., & Tucker, M. (2000). Micro‐affordance: The potentiation of components of action 
by seen objects. British journal of psychology, 91(4), 451-471. 
Fagioli, S., Ferlazzo, F., & Hommel, B. (2007a). Controlling attention through action: 
Observing actions primes action-related stimulus dimensions.Neuropsychologia, 45(14), 
3351-3355. 
Fagioli, S., Hommel, B., & Schubotz, R. I. (2007b). Intentional control of attention: Action 
planning primes action-related stimulus dimensions. Psychological Research, 71, 22-29. 
268 
 
Fitts, P. M., & Seeger, C. M. (1953). SR compatibility: spatial characteristics of stimulus and 
response codes. Journal of experimental psychology, 46(3), 199-210. 
Franconeri, S. L., Hollingworth, A., & Simons, D. J. (2005). Do new objects capture 
attention?. Psychological science, 16(4), 275-281. 
Galpin, A., Tipper, S. P., Dick, J. P., & Poliakoff, E. (2011). Object affordance and spatial-
compatibility effects in Parkinson's disease. Cortex, 47(3), 332-341.  
Georgopoulos, A. P., Kalaska, J. F., Caminiti, R., & Massey, J. T. (1982). On the relations 
between the direction of two-dimensional arm movements and cell discharge in primate 
motor cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 2(11), 1527-1537. 
Gibson, J. J. (1977). The theory of affordances. Hilldale, USA. 
Gibson, J.J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Gibson, J. J., & Gibson, E. J. (1955). Perceptual learning: Differentiation or 
enrichment? Psychological review, 62(1), 32-41. 
Girardi, G., Lindemann, G., and Bekkering, H. (2010). Context effects on the processing of 
action-relevant object features. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance 36(2), 330-340. 
Goodale, M.A., Milner, A.D. (1992). "Separate visual pathways for perception and action". 
Trends in Neurosciences, 15 (1), 20-25. 
Goto, S. G., Ando, Y., Huang, C., Yee, A., & Lewis, R. S. (2010). Cultural differences in the 
visual processing of meaning: Detecting incongruities between background and foreground 
objects using the N400. Social cognitive and affective neuroscience, 5(2-3), 242-253. 
269 
 
Grant, E. R., & Spivey, M. J. (2003). Eye movements and problem solving guiding attention 
guides thought. Psychological Science, 14(5), 462-466. 
Greeno, J. G. (1994). Gibson’s affordances. Psychological review, 101, 336-342. 
Greeno, J. G., & Moore, J. L. (1993). Situativity and symbols: Response to Vera and 
Simon. Cognitive Science, 17(1), 49-59. 
Grèzes, J., & Decety, J. (2002). Does visual perception of object afford action? Evidence 
from a neuroimaging study. Neuropsychologia, 40(2), 212-222. 
Grèzes, J., Tucker, M., Armony, J., Ellis, R., & Passingham, R. E. (2003). Objects 
automatically potentiate action: an fMRI study of implicit processing.  European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 17(12), 2735-2740. 
Grimes, J. (1996). On the failure to detect changes in scenes across saccades. In K. Akins 
(Ed.), Perception: Vancouver studies in cognitive science (89-110). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gutteling, T. P., Kenemans, J. L., & Neggers, S. F. (2011). Grasping preparation enhances 
orientation change detection. PLoS One, 6(3), e17675. 
Handy, T. C., Grafton, S. T., Shroff, N. M., Ketay, S., & Gazzaniga, M. S. (2003). Graspable 
objects grab attention when the potential for action is recognized. Nature 
neuroscience, 6(4), 421-427. 
Handy, T. C., & Mangun, G. R. (2000). Attention and spatial selection: Electrophysiological 
evidence for modulation by perceptual load. Perception & psychophysics, 62(1), 175-186. 
Hasbroucq, T., & Guiard, Y. (1991). Stimulus-response compatibility and the Simon effect: 
Toward a conceptual clarification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 17(1), 246-266. 
270 
 
Hellige, J.B. (1993).  Hemispheric asymmetry; what’s right and what’s left. Harvard 
university press.  
Hillyard, S. A., Mangun, G. R., Woldorff, M. G., & Luck, S. J. (1995). Neural systems 
mediating selective attention. In Gazzaniga, M. S. (Ed). The cognitive neurosciences. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT press. 
Hillyard, S. A., Vogel, E. K., & Luck, S. J. (1998). Sensory gain control (amplification) as a 
mechanism of selective attention: electrophysiological and neuroimaging 
evidence. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 353(1373), 
1257-1270. 
Hohlefeld, F. U., Nikulin, V. V., & Curio, G. (2011). Visual stimuli evoke rapid activation 
(120ms) of sensorimotor cortex for overt but not for covert movements. Brain 
research, 1368, 185-195. 
Hommel, B. (1997). Interactions between stimulus-stimulus congruence and stimulus-
response compatibility. Psychological Research, 59, 248-260. 
Hommel, B. (1994a). Effects of irrelevant spatial SR compatibility depend on stimulus 
complexity. Psychological Research, 56, 179-184.  
Hommel, B. (1994b). Spontaneous decay of response-code activation. Psychological 
Research, 56, 261-268. 
Hommel, B. (2009). Action control according to TEC (theory of event coding). Psychological 
Research, 73(4), 512-526. 
Hommel, B., Müsseler, J., Aschersleben, G., Prinz, W. (2001). The theory of event coding 




Hommel, B. E., & Prinz, W. E. (1997). Theoretical issues in stimulus-response compatibility. 
In Hommel, B., & Prinz, W. (Eds.). Theoretical issues in stimulus-response compatibility.  
Amsterdam: North-Holland Press.  
Hopf, J. M., Vogel, E., Woodman, G., Heinze, H. J., & Luck, S. J. (2002). Localizing visual 
discrimination processes in time and space. Journal of Neurophysiology, 88(4), 2088-2095. 
Iani, C., Baroni, G., Pellicano, A., & Nicoletti, R. (2011). On the relationship between 
affordance and Simon effects: Are the effects really independent? Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 23(1), 121-131. 
Johannes, S., Münte, T. F., Heinze, H. J., & Mangun, G. R. (1995). Luminance and spatial 
attention effects on early visual processing. Cognitive Brain Research, 2(3), 189-205. 
Johansen-Berg, H., Rushworth, M. F., Bogdanovic, M. D., Kischka, U., Wimalaratna, S., & 
Matthews, P. M. (2002). The role of ipsilateral premotor cortex in hand movement after 
stroke. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 99(22), 14518-14523.  
Johnson, J.S., Spencer, J.P., & Schöner, G. (2008).  Moving to higher ground: The dynamic 
field theory and the dynamics of visual cognition. New Ideas Psychology, 26(2),227–251. 
Johnson, P. B., Ferraina, S., Bianchi, L., & Caminiti, R. (1996). Cortical networks for visual 
reaching: physiological and anatomical organization of frontal and parietal lobe arm 
regions. Cerebral Cortex, 6(2), 102-119. 
Johnson-Frey, S. H., Newman-Norlund, R., & Grafton, S. T. (2005). A distributed left 
hemisphere network active during planning of everyday tool use skills. Cerebral 
cortex, 15(6), 681-695. 
272 
 
Kiefer, M., Sim, E. J., Helbig, H., & Graf, M. (2011). Tracking the time course of action 
priming on object recognition: evidence for fast and slow influences of action on 
perception. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(8), 1864-1874. 
Klapp, S. T., & Hinkley, L. B. (2002). The negative compatibility effect: unconscious 
inhibition influences reaction time and response selection. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 131(2), 255-269. 
Koch, I. (2009). The role of crosstalk in dual-task performance: evidence from manipulating 
response-code overlap. Psychological Research, 73(3), 417-424. 
Koch, G., Franca, M., Del Olmo, M. F., Cheeran, B., Milton, R., Sauco, M. A., & Rothwell, J. C. 
(2006). Time course of functional connectivity between dorsal premotor and contralateral 
motor cortex during movement selection. The Journal of neuroscience, 26(28), 7452-7459. 
Kornblum, S. (1994). The way irrelevant dimensions are processed depends on what they 
overlap with: The case of Stroop-and Simon-like stimuli. Psychological Research, 56(3), 
130-135. 
Kornblum, S., Hasbroucq, T., & Osman, A. (1990). Dimensional overlap: cognitive basis for 
stimulus-response compatibility-a model and taxonomy. Psychological review, 97(2), 253-
270. 
Kornblum, S., & Lee, J. W. (1995). Stimulus-response compatibility with relevant and 
irrelevant stimulus dimensions that do and do not overlap with the response. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21(4), 855-875. 
Koski, L., Molnar-Szakacs, I., & Iacoboni, M. (2005). Exploring the contributions of premotor 




Kumar, S., Riddoch, M. J., & Humphreys, G. (2013). Mu rhythm desynchronization reveals 
motoric influences of hand action on object recognition. Frontiers in human 
neuroscience, 7, 66, 1-9. 
Kutas, M., & Federmeier, K. D. (2011). Thirty years and counting: Finding meaning in the 
N400 component of the event related brain potential (ERP).Annual review of 
psychology, 62, 621-647. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its 
challenge to western thought. Basic books. 
Lewis, J. W. (2006). Cortical networks related to human use of tools. The 
Neuroscientist, 12(3), 211-231.  
Lien, M. C., Gray, D., Jardin, E., & Proctor, R. W. (2014). Further evidence that object-based 
correspondence effects are primarily modulated by object location not by grasping 
affordance. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 26(6), 679-698.  
Lindemann, O., & Bekkering, H. (2009). Object manipulation and motion perception: 
evidence of an influence of action planning on visual processing. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,35(4), 1062-1071. 
Lu, C. H., & Proctor, R. W. (1994). Processing of an irrelevant location dimension as a 
function of the relevant stimulus dimension. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 20(2), 286-298. 
Luck, S. J. (2005). An Introduction to the Event-Related Potential Technique. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Mangun, G. R. (1995). Neural mechanisms of visual selective attention. 
Psychophysiology, 32(1), 4-18. 
274 
 
Mangun, G. R., & Hillyard, S. A. (1988). Spatial gradients of visual attention: behavioral and 
electrophysiological evidence. Electroencephalography and clinical Neurophysiology, 70(5), 
417-428. 
Mangun, G. R., & Hillyard, S. A. (1991). Modulations of sensory-evoked brain potentials 
indicate changes in perceptual processing during visual-spatial priming. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 17(4), 1057-1074. 
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. 
McBride, J., Boy, F., Husain, M., & Sumner, P. (2012). Automatic motor activation in the 
executive control of action. Frontiers of Human Neuroscience, 6(82), 1-14. 
McBride, J., Sumner, P., Jackson, S. R., Bajaj, N., & Husain, M. (2013). Exaggerated object 
affordance and absent automatic inhibition in alien hand syndrome. Cortex, 49(8), 2040-
2054. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963). La Structure du comportement. (A. Fisher, trans). Boston, 
Beacon Press. (Original work published 1942). 
Michaels, C. F. (1988). SR compatibility between response position and destination of 
apparent motion: evidence of the detection of affordances. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,14(2), 231-240. 
Michaels, C. F. (1993). Destination compatibility, affordances, and coding rules: A reply to 
Proctor, Van Zandt, Lu, and Weeks.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 19(5),1121-1127. 
Michaels, C. F., & Stins, J. F. (1997). An ecological approach to stimulus-response 
compatibility. Advances in Psychology, 118, 333-360.  
275 
 
Miller, J.O. and Hackley, S.A. (1992).  Electrophysiological evidence for temporal overlap 
among contingent mental responses.  Journal of experimental psychology, 17, 195-209. 
Osman, A., Bashore, T.R., Coles, M.G.H., Donchin, E. and Meyer, D.E. (1992). On the 
transmission of partial information: inferences from movement related brain potentials.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 17, 217-232. 
Pappas, Z., & Mack, A. (2008). Potentiation of action by undetected affordant 
objects. Visual Cognition, 16(7), 892-915. 
Pellicano, A., Iani, C., Borghi, A. M., Rubichi, S., & Nicoletti, R. (2010). Simon-like and 
functional affordance effects with tools: The effects of object perceptual discrimination 
and object action state. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63(11), 2190-
2201. 
Port, R. F., & Van Gelder, T. (1995). Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of 
cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT press. 
Proctor, R. W., & Miles, J. D. (2014). Does the concept of affordance add anything to 
explanations of stimulus–response compatibility effects. The psychology of learning and 
motivation, 60, 227-266. 
Proctor, R. W., Miles, J. D., & Baroni, G. (2011). Reaction time distribution analysis of 
spatial correspondence effects. Psychonomic bulletin & review,18(2), 242-266. 
Proctor, R. W., & Vu, K. P. L. (2006). Stimulus-response compatibility principles: Data, 
theory, and application. CRC Press. 
Proverbio, A. M., Adorni, R., & D’Aniello, G. E. (2011). 250ms to code for action affordance 
during observation of manipulable objects. Neuropsychologia, 49(9), 2711-2717. 
276 
 
Proverbio, A. M., Del Zotto, M., & Zani, A. (2007). The emergence of semantic 
categorization in early visual processing: ERP indices of animal vs. artifact recognition. BMC 
neuroscience, 8(1), 24-40. 
Riehle, A., Kornblum, S., & Requin, J. (1997). Neuronal correlates of sensorimotor 
association in stimulus–response compatibility. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 23(6), 1708-1726. 
Requin, J., & Riehle, A. (1995). Neural correlates of partial transmission of sensorimotor 
information in the cerebral cortex. Acta psychologica, 90(1), 81-95. 
Riehle, A., & Requin, J. (1995). Neuronal correlates of the specification of movement 
direction and force in four cortical areas of the monkey. Behavioural brain research, 70(1), 
1-13. 
Riehle, A., Wirtssohn, S., Grün, S., & Brochier, T. (2013). Mapping the spatio-temporal 
structure of motor cortical LFP and spiking activities during reach-to-grasp movements. 
Frontiers in neural circuits, 7, (48) 1-14. 
Ritter, W., Simson, R., Vaughan, H. G., & Friedman, D. (1979). A brain event related to the 
making of a sensory discrimination. Science, 203(4387), 1358-1361. 
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Matelli, M., Bettinardi, V., Paulesu, E., Perano, D., & Fazio, F., 
(1996).  Localization of grasp representations in humans by PET: 1. Observation vs. 
execution. Experimental Brain Research, 111(2), 246-252.  
Rizzolatti, G., Gentilucci, M., (1988). Motor and visual-motor functions of the premotor 
cortex (269–84). In: P., Rakic, & W., Singer, (Eds.). Neurobiology of cortex. Chichester: 
Wiley. 
Robbins, P., & Aydede, M. (2008). A short primer on situated cognition.  In Aydede, M., & 
Robbins, P. (Eds.). The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
277 
 
Rueschemeyer, S. A., Lindemann, O., Van Elk, M., & Bekkering, H. (2009). Embodied 
cognition: the interplay between automatic resonance and selection‐for‐action 
mechanisms. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39(7), 1180-1187. 
Rumiati, R. I., & Humphreys, G. W. (1998). Recognition by action: dissociating visual and 
semantic routes to action in normal observers. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 24(2), 631-647. 
Schlaghecken, F., & Eimer, M. (1997). The influence of subliminally presented primes on 
response preparation. Sprache & Kognition, 16, 166-175. 
Schluter, N. D., Rushworth, M. F. S., Passingham, R. E., & Mills, K. R. (1998). Temporary 
interference in human lateral premotor cortex suggests dominance for the selection of 
movements. Brain, 121, 785-799. 
Simon, J. R. (1969). Reactions towards the source of stimulation. Journal of experimental 
psychology, 81, 174-176. 
Simon, J. R., & Rudell, A. P. (1967). Auditory SR compatibility: the effect of an irrelevant cue 
on information processing. Journal of applied psychology, 51(3), 300-304. 
Simon, J. R., & Wolf, J. D. (1963). Choice reaction time as a function of angular stimulus-
response correspondence and age. Ergonomics, 6(1), 99-105. 
Simons, D. J., & Levin, D.T., (1997). Change Blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,1, 261-
267. 
Stins, J. F., & Michaels, C. F. (1997). Stimulus-response compatibility is information-action 
compatibility. Ecological Psychology, 9(1), 25-45. 
278 
 
Strigaro, G., Ruge, D., Chen, J. C., Marshall, L., Desikan, M., Cantello, R., & Rothwell, J. C. 
(2015). Interaction between visual and motor cortex: a transcranial magnetic stimulation 
study. The Journal of physiology, 593(10), 2365-2377. 
Sumner, P., & Husain, M. (2008). At the edge of consciousness: automatic motor activation 
and voluntary control. The Neuroscientist, 4(5), 474-486. 
Supp, G. G., Schlögl, A., Fiebach, C. J., Gunter, T. C., Vigliocco, G., Pfurtscheller, G., & 
Petsche, H. (2005). Semantic memory retrieval: cortical couplings in object recognition in 
the N400 window. European journal of neuroscience, 21(4), 1139-1143. 
Svensson, H. Lindblom, J. & Ziemke, T. (2007).  Making sense of embodied cognition: 
simulation theories of shared neural mechanisms for sensorimotor and cognitive 
processes. In: Ziemke, T., Zlatev, J. & Frank, R. (Eds.) Body Language and Mind I: 
Embodiment. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Symes, E., Tucker, M., Ellis, R., Vainio, L., & Ottoboni, G. (2008). Grasp preparation 
improves change detection for congruent objects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 34(4), 854-871. 
Thomas, L. E., & Lleras, A. (2007). Moving eyes and moving thought: On the spatial 
compatibility between eye movements and cognition. Psychonomic bulletin & 
review, 14(4), 663-668. 
Thorpe, S., Fize, D., & Marlot, C. (1996). Speed of processing in the human visual 
system. Nature, 381(6582), 520-522. 
Tipper, S. P., Paul, M. A., & Hayes, A. E. (2006). Vision-for-action: The effects of object 
property discrimination and action state on affordance compatibility effects. Psychonomic 
bulletin & review, 13(3), 493-498. 
279 
 
Torta, D. M., & Cauda, F. (2011). Different functions in the cingulate cortex, a meta-analytic 
connectivity modeling study. Neuroimage, 56(4), 2157-2172.  
Tovée, M. J. (1994). Neuronal Processing: How fast is the speed of thought? Current 
Biology, 4(12), 1125-1127. 
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (1998). On the relations between seen objects and components of 
potential actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human perception and 
performance, 24(3), 830-846. 
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (2001). The potentiation of grasp types during visual object 
categorization. Visual cognition, 8(6), 769-800. 
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (2004). Action priming by briefly presented objects. Acta 
psychologica, 116(2), 185-203. 
Tucker, T. R., & Fitzpatrick, D. (2006). Luminance-evoked inhibition in primary visual cortex: 
a transient veto of simultaneous and ongoing response. The journal of neuroscience, 
26(52), 13537-13547. 
Vainio, L. (2009). Interrupted object-based updating of reach program leads to a negative 
compatibility effect. Journal of motor behavior, 41(4), 305-316. 
Vainio, L., Hammarén, L., Hausen, M., Rekolainen, E., & Riskilä, S. (2011). Motor inhibition 
associated with the affordance of briefly displayed objects. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 64(6), 1094-1110. 
Vainio, L., Symes, E., Ellis, R., Tucker, M., & Ottoboni, G. (2008). On the relations between 
action planning, object identification, and motor representations of observed actions and 
objects. Cognition, 108(2), 444-465. 
280 
 
Van Elk, M., Van Schie, H. T., & Bekkering, H. (2010). The N400-concreteness effect reflects 
the retrieval of semantic information during the preparation of meaningful actions. 
Biological psychology, 85(1), 134-142. 
Van Elk, M., van Schie, H. T., Neggers, S. F., & Bekkering, H. (2010). Neural and temporal 
dynamics underlying visual selection for action. Journal of neurophysiology, 104(2), 972-
983. 
Vanrullen, R., & Thorpe, S. J. (2001). The time course of visual processing: from early 
perception to decision-making. Journal of cognitive neuroscience,13(4), 454-461. 
Van Voorhis, S., & Hillyard, S. A. (1977). Visual evoked potentials and selective attention to 
points in space. Perception & Psychophysics, 22(1), 54-62. 
Vingerhoets, G., Vandamme, K., & Vercammen, A. L. I. C. E. (2009). Conceptual and physical 
object qualities contribute differently to motor affordances. Brain and Cognition, 69(3), 
481-489. 
Vogel, E. K., & Luck, S. J. (2000). The visual N1 component as an index of a discrimination 
process. Psychophysiology, 37(02), 190-203. 
Vogel, E. K., Woodman, G. F., & Luck, S. J. (2005). Pushing around the locus of selection: 
Evidence for the flexible-selection hypothesis. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 17(12), 
1907-1922. 
Wascher, E., Hoffmann, S., Sänger, J., & Grosjean, M. (2009). Visuo‐spatial processing and 
the N1 component of the ERP. Psychophysiology, 46(6), 1270-1277. 
Weinrich, M., Wise, S.P., Mauritz, K.H., (1984). A neurophysiological study of the premotor 
cortex in the rhesus monkey. Brain, 107, 385–414. 
281 
 
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 9(4), 
625-636. 
Yantis, S. (1993). Stimulus-driven attentional capture and attentional control settings. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 19(3), 676-681. 
Yantis, S., & Hillstrom, A. P. (1994). Stimulus-driven attentional capture: evidence from 
equiluminant visual objects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 20(1), 95-107. 
Zhang, J., Riehle, A., Requin, J., & Kornblum, S. (1997). Dynamics of single neuron activity in 
monkey primary motor cortex related to sensorimotor transformation. The Journal of 
neuroscience, 17(6), 2227-2246. 
Zhao, Y., & Zhu, S. C. (2013). Scene parsing by integrating function, geometry and 
appearance models. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and 
Pattern Recognition (pp. 3119-3126). 
 
 
